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Propositions 
 
 
1. By legally mandating that biofuels should be sustainable, the EU has created a potential 
instrument for other commodities.  
(this thesis) 
 
2. Successful private sustainability certification requires strong states.  
(this thesis) 
 
3. A focus on agricultural productivity distracts from the pursuit of sustainable agriculture. 
 
4. Successful academics practice the adage ‘less is more’. 
 
5. Energy and agricultural interlinkages are the most crucial sustainability nexus of the future. 
 
6. Introducing school lunches in the Netherlands offers a major opportunity for shifting towards a 
‘planetary diet’. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the problem 
This thesis is about the governance of liquid biofuels (bioethanol and biodiesel), with a focus on 
Brazil and the European Union (EU). Biofuels have been on the national governance agenda of some 
countries since the 1970s but emerged on the global governance agenda in the late 1990s, in 
response to the twin challenges of the search for energy security and addressing climate change. 
Biofuel policies are being implemented by (interdependent) states across the globe with the 
ambition to (partly) replace fossil fuels for transport with renewable alternatives.  
Biofuels are solid, liquid or gas fuels derived from biomass sources such as starch, sugars, fat, wood, 
or waste (Figure 1.1). Global (governance) attention has focused mostly on liquid biofuels, the 
subject of this study. Classifying categories of biofuels is subject to debate, but mostly liquid biofuels 
are classified in three generations. So-called first-generation biofuels are derived either from sugar 
or starch from food crops such as sugarcane or corn which are converted to bioethanol; or from 
vegetable oils (soy, rapeseed, palm) or animal fats which are converted to biodiesel. Second-
generation biofuels are derived from ligno-cellulosic (woody) sources or organic waste streams, 
while third-generation biofuels are produced from algae (Johnson et al., 2012) (see Textbox 1.1 for a 
more elaborate biofuels typology). 
This thesis focuses on first-generation liquid biofuels because they are produced on a large scale for 
transport fuel and are under intense scrutiny with regard to sustainability and potential competition 
with food security (Dam et al., 2010; FAO, 2008; Johnson et al., 2012). The sustainability debate on 
biofuels exploded around 2007-2008, as the demand for biofuels grew rapidly even as food prices 
increased substantially. This led to very intense global debates about food versus fuel use of (energy) 
crops, whereby the major concern was that biofuel for the developed countries would undermine 
the availability of food in poorer regions by driving up the prices (Rice, 2010; Searchinger, 2009; 
Zuurbier and van de Vooren, 2008). Also, the assertion that biofuels can reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, compared to the use of fossil fuels, is under continuous scrutiny. 
As a result, the environmentally friendly connotation of such biofuels in the early years of their 
development faced sustained critiques because of an array of (perceived) negative effects arising 
from their production and use. These effects included increased deforestation and land clearing, 
accusations of land-grabbing, expansion of agricultural areas at the cost of nature conservation and 
undermining of food security by diverting crops for fuel rather than food (FAO, 2008; Wilkinson and 
Herrera, 2010). In addition, it became clear that not all these effects are equally relevant for all liquid 
biofuels. Instead, effects depend upon biomass source and other contextual factors, resulting in 
efforts to distinguish sustainable biofuels from non-sustainable biofuels. However, what constitutes 
sustainable biofuels remains heavily contested, partly because different understandings and 
assessments have varying implications for access to a growing global market for biofuels.  
Chapter 1 
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This thesis examines the global governance of sustainable biofuels, with a specific focus on Brazil and 
the European Union (EU), as major players in the production, trade and/or use of first-generation 
biofuels. Stimulation of biofuels use is largely driven by mandatory blending targets or other fiscal 
incentives that are set by governments. The EU, one of the largest markets for biofuels, is leading in 
the attempt to promote global trade in “sustainable” biofuels (Dam et al., 2010). Brazil, as a leading 
producer and strong proponent of a global biofuels market and a key exporter to the EU, has to 
engage with the EU sustainability imperatives that now dominate global biofuel trade and 
governance debates (Garcez and Vianna, 2009; Goldemberg et al., 2008; Mol, 2010).  
Brazil is one of the few countries with long-established domestic biofuel policies and programs. 
Domestic biofuel policies in Brazil are intrinsically linked to other social policies and environmental 
policy ambitions. For example, food, fuel, and feed systems in Brazil show clear interdependencies 
regarding claims on land and feedstock use, which have contributed to the difficulty of debating, 
operationalizing and implementing sustainability in biofuel governance. Since the mid-2000s, the 
government has also expressed the ambition to be a leader in global biofuel markets. While Brazil is 
often believed to be able to dictate biofuel developments within its borders, its authority to continue 
to do so, given a rapidly evolving global biofuel trade and governance context, is becoming less 
evident and needs to be re-examined.  
The characteristics of biofuel production add to this governance complexity. As mentioned above, 
there exist different types and generations of biofuels based on production methods and use of 
feedstock (Textbox 1.1 and Figure 1.1). The large variability of feedstock options means that there 
are many different crops, production regions, agricultural methods, and conversion techniques to 
consider. Together these elements make biofuels a complex and challenging issue-area to govern, 
both domestically and in an international context.  
Diverse objectives (environmental and social) are thus sought when using biofuels, which in turn are 
linked to existing multiple commodity chains with very different characteristics. As biofuels also cut 
across different policy domains like agriculture, energy, environment, social and economic 
development, it becomes clear that many different public and private actors are shaping the 
landscape of biofuels governance. There is a vast and expanding conglomerate of state and non-state 
initiatives involved in the governance of biofuels over the past few years (Dam et al., 2008; Pacini 
and Assunção, 2011; Scarlat and Dallemand, 2011). This adds to the complexity of the governance 
challenge, with multiple sectors, multiple actors, and multiples sites of governance.  
In short, biofuels are a complex case of sustainability governance, where governance is both needed 
and very challenging, and where notions of sustainability remain contested. Therefore, it becomes 
important to understand how governance of biofuels has been approached, and how existing 
approaches to sustainability have fared, and whose notion of sustainability is shaping global biofuel 
trade and markets. The thesis looks at this through in-depth analysis of biofuel governance 
arrangements in the EU and Brazil, and their interactions with each other.  
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Textbox 1.1 Types of biofuels 
Source: developed by author based on International Renewable Energy Agency (2014); Renewable Energy 
Policy Network for the 21st Century (2014); Smeets et al. (2008a)
First generation biofuels are “conventional” biofuels. There are two main types of first-generation 
biofuels used for transport: ethanol and biodiesel. Ethanol is used in regular car engines and 
replaces gasoline either in blends or used pure for adapted engines. It is made by the 
fermentation of plants with a high-level of sugar (e.g. sugarcane) or starch (e.g. corn). Biodiesel is 
most often used for trucks or commercial transport vehicles and is blended with diesel. It is most 
commonly made from vegetable oils or animal fats (e.g. soy or palm oil). The sugars and vegetable 
oils are relatively easily extracted using conventional technologies. Sustainability concerns are 
related to competition with food use of the resources and (indirect) land use change due to the 
large scale that is required to meet current demand.  
Second generation biofuels are “advanced” biofuels that are made from several types of biomass. 
This can be lignocellulosic biomass, woody crops, agricultural waste products, and even animal 
fats. Chemical and physical treatments are required to extract the required fuel, which requires 
more advanced technological systems to produce transport fuels. Competition with food 
production is less apparent, but second-generation biofuels still require the use of agricultural 
products and land. 
Third generation biofuels are also “advanced” biofuels that are produced from algae. Depending 
on the used conversion technique various forms of fuels can be produces. Currently, this type of 
biofuels is produced at a limited scale. Expectations are high, because algae fuel would not 
compete or interfere with other uses of biomass resources and would require only limited land 
compared to first and second-generation biofuels.  
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1.2 Sustainable biofuels: evolving developments and debates 
This section describes the current state of policy-driven biofuel production, trade and market 
developments, and how they are related to sustainability discussions (section 1.2.1). It then discusses 
unique characteristics of biofuels that pose governance challenges (section 1.2.2) and diverse actors 
now engaged in biofuel governance, both state and non-state (section1.2.3). 
1.2.1 Development of ‘sustainable’ biofuel markets: from local to global commodities 
This section provides a brief overview of global biofuel production and trade data, as well as policy 
developments in major biofuel producing countries, and how diverse sustainability considerations 
have come to the fore. In 2018, energy for transport sector made up 32% of total energy 
consumption on a global scale. Within this global scale around 3.1% of total global energy 
consumption for transport comes from renewable sources of which 2.8% comes from biofuels and 
the remaining 1.3% constitutes of electricity sources (REN21, 2018 p. 38). The percentages may 
appear low, but they indicate that in a relatively brief time period, biofuels have moved from being a 
focus of domestic policies to becoming a global commodity (REN21, 2015). Of this, the US and Brazil 
constitute 80% of biofuel production (IEA, 2017; REN21, 2018 p. 72). Other key producer countries 
include Germany, Argentina and China (REN 2017). The largest users of ethanol and biodiesel are the 
USA, Brazil, and the EU (for an overview, see Table 1.1 on global biofuel production data). 
The demand for and thus the production of liquid biofuels is almost completely policy-driven, where 
governments implement policies to enable, stimulate and mandate biofuel production and use. 
Without governmental policy intervention, liquid biofuel production and markets would not have 
increased and expanded so rapidly (see also Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3). Below, policy trends and 
production patterns in key biofuel producing countries and regions, including the US, Brazil and the 
EU are highlighted. In tracing these developments, it can also be noted how these trends have been 
shaped by diverse sustainability considerations.  
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Table 1.1 Biofuels Global Production, Top 15 Countries and EU-28, 2017 
Country Ethanol Biodiesel (FAME) Biodiesel (HVO) 
Change relative 
to 2016 
 Billion litres 
United States 60.0 6.0 1.7 1.7 
Brazil 28.5 4.3  0.3 
Germany 0.9 3.5  0.0 
Argentina 1.1 3.3  0.5 
China 3.3 1.0  0.2 
France 1.0 2.3  -0.3 
Thailand 1.5 1.4  0.5 
Indonesia 0.1 2.5  -0.3 
Canada 1.7 0.5  0.1 
Netherlands 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.1 
Spain 0.5 1.3  -0.2 
Poland 0.2 1.0  0.0 
Singapore 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.1 
India 0.8 0.2  -0.2 
Colombia 0.3 0.6  0.0 
EU-28 4.1 11.8 3.5 -0.3 
World Total 105.5 30.7 6.5 3.5 
Source: REN21, 2018, Renewables 2018 Global Status Report (Table R15 REN21, 2018 p. 206) 
 
 
Figure 1.2 World production trends bioethanol by region 
Source: Cartographer Riccardo Pravettoni, UNEP/GRID-Arendal (http://www.grida.no/resources/6187), based 
on OECD-FAO (2008, pp. 71–72) 
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Figure 1.3 World production trends biodiesel by region 
Source: Cartographer Riccardo Pravettoni, UNEP/GRID-Arendal (http://www.grida.no/resources/6187), based 
on OECD-FAO (2008, pp. 71–72) 
 
The USA started with the large-scale use of biofuels when the Energy Policy Act of 2005 passed the 
US Congress. This Energy Policy Act actively encouraged the use of biofuels, such as ethanol and 
biodiesel. It continues to be the largest producer of biofuels in the world, with domestic agricultural 
policies and federal renewable fuel standards supporting continued production (REN21, 2017). 
Biofuel policies in the USA market are strongly linked to agricultural policies and support. These 
policies are implemented under the Renewable Fuel Standard, which is a federal program that puts 
in place a minimum volume of renewables to be used, while also focusing on reducing import of 
fossil fuels in order to achieve more energy independence. For first generation biofuels, derived from 
feedstock (like corn), a reduction of 20% greenhouse gas emissions has to demonstrated in the life 
cycle analysis. For more advanced biofuels, this percentage increases to 50-60% (REN21, 2017). 
Brazil began stimulating ethanol production and use as a transport fuel in the mid-1970s. It 
subsequently started with a large-scale biodiesel program in 2004. The country is the second largest 
producer of biofuels (after the United States) (REN21, 2017). Domestic policies called for blending 
ethanol with gasoline at levels of 27% in 2018 (this number generally fluctuates between 20-25%, 
based on sugarcane harvests, and is set by government regulation). Domestic production and use of 
biodiesel is encouraged through obligatory blending targets that increased from 5% to 7% in 2014. 
The ambition is to go to 10% by 2019. Special to the Brazilian biodiesel program have been initiatives 
to stimulate social sustainability in order to include family agriculture production into the biodiesel 
production chain.  
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The EU began developing biofuel policies in 2003 and set the target of having 5.75% biofuels in 
transport fuels by 2010. It quickly increased these ambitions with development of the Renewable 
Energy Directive (RED) 2009/28/EC that requires that 20% of all energy use in the EU come from 
renewable sources by 2020, which includes at least 10% of all energy in road transport fuels. In 
addition, standards are set about the required GHG reduction levels compared to fossil fuels in the 
Fuel Quality Directive 2009/30/EC. Ongoing sustainability concerns have led to additional 
requirements for biofuels from lands with high biodiversity or carbon stock, which has resulted in an 
elaborate system to monitor these sustainability requirements.  
Many other countries have also created mandatory blends or fiscal incentives to encourage use of 
biofuels during the period 2000 – present, the period covered by this thesis (see also Figure 1.4 and 
Figure 1.5). Both ethanol and biodiesel production have almost tripled during this time. We turn next 
to how evolution of a global biofuel market and the addition of sustainability concerns, sketched 
above, has resulted in the need for governance of sustainable biofuels.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Countries with biofuel obligations for transport 
Source: REN21 Renewables 2017 Global Status Report - Policy database (2017. figure 48) 
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Figure 1.5 National and Sub-National Renewable Transport Mandates, End-2017 
Source: REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report - Policy database (2018, figure 14) 
 
1.2.2 Governing sustainable biofuels: whose notion of sustainability? 
As described above, the growing production, trade and demand for biofuels worldwide has rapidly 
brought a variety of sustainability concerns to the fore. The policy driven obligatory blending targets, 
in combination with limited production in certain key regions (at first), actively stimulated the 
increase of transborder biofuel trade. The blending targets have also led to enormous investments of 
multinational companies and financiers in biofuel production globally. The fact that these first-
generation biofuels can be made from a broad range of food crops e.g. soy, palm oil, and sugar cane, 
which were already being traded at a global scale, accelerated this development even more. Biofuels 
(both ethanol and biodiesel) derived from different commodity crops each raise different 
sustainability questions.  
All these characteristics of ‘sustainable biofuels’ pose some unique governance challenges. A key 
concern has been that use of biofuels competes with food production, because many crops used for 
first generation biofuels play an important role in the food and feed industry (soy, palm oil, corn, 
sugar cane). With this development, food, feed, and fuel markets (and their chains, actors, and 
systems) get increasingly interconnected at national and global levels (see Figure 1.6 for a graphic 
depiction).  
Through subsidies and obligatory blending targets, the price of biofuels increases, which creates 
incentives for farmers to sell feedstock to the biofuel industry rather than the food market. Food and 
feed producers argue that this creates unequal competition on the feedstock market and a rise in 
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consumer food prices (Bindraban and Zuurbier, 2007). This illustrates that the impact of biofuel 
policies not only affects the energy sector, but also has consequences for adjoining commodity 
markets. This cross-sector impact has consequences for the way biofuels are sought to be governed, 
because the range of actors and policy domains involved creates increasing governance complexity 
and contested sustainability objectives.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Sustainable biofuels at the intersection of multiple and overlapping policy domains 
Source: developed by author 
 
1.2.3 Multiple actors negotiating sustainability  
The rapid growth in a policy-driven biofuel market over the last two decades has stimulated a wide 
range of actors to become involved in biofuels production. Oil companies have become interested in 
agriculture, while food companies have developed an interest in energy production. In addition, 
many social and environmental organizations have also become involved, partly because the 
increased demand for agricultural products was seen as an opportunity for the economic 
development of farmers or the use of abandoned land.  
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Multiple actors are thus now also involved with determining sustainability standards for sustainable 
biofuels. Civil society organizations, corporate industry, governments and academia are all involved 
with initiatives or certification schemes that aim to measure biofuel sustainability. All these (private 
and public) actors are formulating principles, standards and criteria for sustainable biofuel 
production and set up governance arrangements accordingly, which are implemented at various 
levels: local, national, global. Countries are now seeking ways to develop and implement 
sustainability criteria, but also need to consider how they, as public governors, deal with the private 
certification standards and their impact. Producers face the consequences of this confusion, because 
each standard uses its own criteria, mechanisms, requirements.  
The EU and international organizations are using their own or a combination of other schemes to 
identify and define what sustainable biofuels are. Whose notions of sustainability will come to shape 
global biofuel production and trade is thus an important question, also because there are winners 
and losers implicated in different notions of sustainability.  
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
The overarching research objectives of this thesis are to, first, analyze how biofuels have been 
governed in the EU and Brazil over time, and what notions of sustainability are embodied in these 
evolving governance arrangements. It also then analyzes whether and how the EU has sought to 
export its own notions of sustainability beyond its borders, and to what extent it has succeeded in 
doing so.  
These research objectives lead to the following two main research questions:  
1. How have biofuels been governed in the EU and Brazil over time, and what (conflicting or 
converging) notions of sustainability are embodied in these evolving governance 
arrangements? 
 
2. How has the EU sought to export its notions of sustainability beyond its borders, with 
particular focus on Brazil, and (how) has it succeeded in doing so? 
Analyzing these questions also yields insights into other complex and challenging areas of global 
sustainability governance.  
1.4 Conceptual lens: the state in a changing sustainability governance 
context 
This section discusses how the nature of global (environmental) governance is changing, with 
consequences for the role of the state vis-à-vis non-state actors in shaping governance trajectories 
and aims. As has been extensively documented in recent years, in an era of economic globalization, 
the practices and nature of global governance are changing (Andonova, 2010; Sassen, 2006; 
Spaargaren and Mol, 2008). Especially in sustainability governance, a large number of state and non-
state actors are active (Falkner, 2003; Rosenau, 2007). In the sphere of biofuel governance, however, 
the role of the state remains crucial, given that states have created market demand for biofuels by 
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setting obligatory biofuel transport blending targets, thereby creating a rapidly accelerating market 
for this new commodity.  
Biofuel policies, until a decade ago, used to be a state and domestic affair. But the growing global 
interest in biofuels, paired with the sustainability ambitions, has changed the governance landscape 
in this realm as well. Increasingly, the rise of non-state actors is impinging on the authority of state 
(Cashore, 2002; Pattberg and Stripple, 2008; Ponte, 2014; Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015; Schouten and 
Glasbergen, 2012). These non-state actors operate across multiple levels, including beyond national 
jurisdiction. This development is discernible in various fields, including fisheries, forestry, food crops 
and other agricultural domains (Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2009; Cashore et al., 2007; Chan and 
Pattberg, 2008; Schouten and Glasbergen, 2012). This broad involvement of a variety of actors in 
governance practices and arrangements is now widely described as a horizontal shift in governance. 
Simultaneously also a vertical shift is taking place, due to the increasing connectedness between 
local and global governing initiatives (Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004; Leeuwen, 2010). 
In spite of horizontal and vertical shifts in governance, the state remains crucial (Sassen, 2006), even 
as collaboration between state and non-state actors is on the rise. Non-state or private authority 
operates not always in contrast or competition with state authority. It is also possible that private 
authority needs the support of the state to legitimize and execute its actions and decision-making 
power (Cutler et al., 1999, p. 5). This can be witnessed in public-private partnerships, i.e. 
collaborations between state and non-state actors that present forms of hybrid governance 
authority.  
A prominent issue in governance debates in recent years has thus been how hybrid forms of 
governance function, and how they shape the operationalization of sustainability (Mol, 2010; Ponte 
and Daugbjerg, 2015; Smeets et al., 2008b). In particular, global trade rules might make it difficult for 
states to discriminate imports of biofuels based on their production methods and regions, whereas 
non-state authorities are not restricted by such constraints in seeking to shape sustainability 
requirements (Maciel, 2015). As a consequence, non-state actors might be able to implement stricter 
or different sustainability guidelines with the (in)direct support of the state (Daugbjerg and 
Swinbank, 2014; Ponte, 2014). In this way, hybrid governance can potentially enhance or add 
sustainability dimensions. But such hybrid sustainability requirements can also generate 
controversies and debates, depending upon their impact on specific production circumstances. 
In sum, the theoretical assumptions underlying this thesis are: (i) the nature of global governance is 
changing; (ii) this has consequences for the role of the state due to the involvement of non-state 
actors; (iii) it does not necessarily mean the decline or the abandonment of state governance and 
authority, but it involves a reorientation of the state vis-à-vis other governing actors; (iv) there might 
be shifts in authorities in these new forms of hybrid governance; and (v) these developments have 
implications for how sustainability is being operationalized, and whose notions of sustainability come 
to shape biofuel markets and use. Figure 1.7 depicts these theoretical propositions, and the 
analytical lens used in this thesis to answer the two research questions.  
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Figure 1.7 Analytical lenses: interacting spheres of governance authority  
Source: developed by author 
1.5 Research methodology and methods 
This section explains the research methodology, methods and research design, including data 
collection and analysis techniques.  
1.5.1 Research design and case study approach  
This research undertook a multilevel, comparative case analysis of biofuel governance in Brazil and 
the EU, and interactions across these. A case study approach was selected as the most suitable 
methodological approach to execute the study. A case study is most relevant to answer ‘how and 
why’ questions in a constantly evolving policy domain, and particularly so in non-experimental 
settings, wherein the researcher has no control over events (Yin 2009). A case study approach is also 
most suitable when the objective is to understand and explain complex, real world phenomena 
embedded in specific institutional, political, economic, cultural and social contexts. Case studies can 
be single or multiple. This thesis employs a multiple case-study approach that is most suited to 
address how biofuels are being governed over time in specific, multilevel, intersecting jurisdictional 
contexts, and the notions of sustainability embodied herein.  
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1.5.2 Case selection 
Brazil and the EU are selected as the case study foci because, as is outlined in more detail in the 
problem statement above, they are major players in the production, trade and/or use of first-
generation biofuels. The EU is one of the largest markets for biofuels and was one of the early 
leaders in the attempt to promote production, consumption and global trade in “sustainable” 
biofuels. Brazil is one of the few countries with long-established domestic biofuel policies and 
programs. It is a leading producer of biofuels, and a strong proponent of a global biofuels market. 
Given that it is also a key exporter to the EU, it has to engage with the EU sustainability imperatives 
that have dominated global biofuel trade and governance debates over the last decade. The 
selection of the EU and Brazil thus facilitated a multilevel, comparative analysis of shifting biofuel 
sustainability policies in these two domains, and the role of the state herein, thus allowing the 
overarching research objectives of this thesis to be addressed.  
1.5.3 Data collection and analysis 
Data for this thesis was collected in the period 2007-2018. For a case study approach, the most 
widely used and appropriate data sources include, inter alia, primary documents or grey literature 
(e.g., reports, working papers, government documents and white papers, NGO position papers and 
evaluations), archives, interviews and surveys, direct observation and participant observation (Yin 
2009). This thesis utilizes all these data sources, with a predominant focus on three qualitative 
techniques of data collection: in-depth interviews, document analysis and participant observation.  
Interviews: The first method of data collection was interviewing key-informants with support of open 
and semi-structured questionnaires (see Appendix III for some examples). A wide-range of formal 
and informal interviews were held in multiple regions and governance arenas. The interviewees 
varied from policy makers in Brazil and the EU, members of international institutions, members and 
observers of private governance initiatives, producers of biofuels, farmers (small and large scale) in 
Brazil, members of cooperatives, researchers, and representatives of civil society organizations in 
Brazil and the EU. A total number of 54 interviews were conducted (see Appendix I for a list of 
people interviewed, with date, place and function).  
Document analysis: The second method of data collection was document analysis, including 
gathering information and triangulation with a variety of written data sources such as scientific 
articles, policy documents, research reports, statistics, legislation, and newspaper articles. These 
documents were used to understand the development of the biofuel debate over time, including 
how different notions of sustainability were debated and evolved over time in diverse settings. 
Document analysis also helped to identify the main actors and institutions to be approached for 
interviews.  
Participant observation: The third data collection method was direct (participant) observations at 
field visits, meetings, conferences, and workshops (see Appendix II for an overview of attended 
meetings and conferences. I attended a total of 12 meetings, where I had different roles: as 
observer, participant or presenter. Some meetings were focused on biofuels in Brazil and the EU, 
whereas others were about energy transitions or academic workshops on governance challenges.  
More specific data collection strategies are detailed in each of the four research chapters, as are the 
methods used to analyze the data.  
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1.5.4 Research validity 
By using and triangulating multiple sources and approaches and having open conversations as well as 
(semi-) structured interviews, as much relevant data/information as possible was gathered, 
combined and cross-checked, also to secure internal validity of the analysis and findings. As outlined 
by Yin (2009), the internal validity drew on three principles underpinning data collection: use of 
multiple sources; generation of a database that can be used over time by the researcher and others; 
and building up a body of evidence. These three principles underpinned the selection of data 
collection techniques used in the thesis (interviews, document analysis and participant observation), 
in order to ensure triangulation, validity of the findings and quality control.  
As discussed further in the concluding chapter 6, external validity of the thesis will be assured 
through distilling generalizable lessons from EU and Brazilian biofuel governance arrangements and 
the search for agreed sustainability criteria herein for biofuel governance in other countries, as well 
as going beyond the issue of biofuel governance to address broader sustainability challenges.  
1.6 Outline of the thesis  
This thesis is organized in six chapters, wherein this introduction (chapter 1) and the general 
conclusion (chapter 6). The four empirical chapters (2- 5) are publication-based chapters that answer 
specific elements of the main research questions (see Table 1.2 for a detailed overview). 
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Table 1.2 Biofuel Governance: Evolving notions of sustainability? 
Chapters 2-5 Chapter 2: Governing 
biofuels in Brazil: A 
comparison of 
ethanol and biodiesel 
policies  
Chapter 3: Social 
sustainability of 
Brazilian biodiesel: 
The role of 
agricultural 
Cooperatives  
Chapter 4: 
Negotiating Authority 
in Global Biofuel 
Governance: Brazil 
and the EU in the 
WTO  
Chapter 5: Toward 
Sustainable Biofuels 
in the European 
Union? Lessons from 
a Decade of Hybrid 
Biofuel Governance 
 
Conceptual 
focus 
Using knowledge of 
the policy (objectives), 
politics (actor 
constellations) and 
polity (institutional 
coordination) to 
understand the 
development of 
biofuel governance 
fields.  
Looking at 
characteristics of 
agricultural 
cooperatives - as a 
hybrid form of 
governance – that are 
used by the state to 
achieve social 
sustainability and rural 
development.  
 
Understanding which 
public spheres of 
authority play a key 
role in exporting 
notions of 
sustainability  
Hybrid environmental 
governance, the role 
of the state herein, 
and its prospects to 
further sustainably 
goals 
 
Empirical 
focus 
A historical 
comparison of 
bioethanol and 
biodiesel policies, 
actors, and 
institutions in Brazil.  
A focus on agricultural 
cooperatives in the 
northeast of Brazil and 
their connection to 
the Brazilian biodiesel 
program in order to 
achieve rural 
development.  
An analysis of how 
Brazilian and EU 
biofuel policies relate 
to WTO trade 
legislation with 
identification of 
potential trade 
controversies and 
strategic governance 
moves.  
 
Tracing 10 years of 
hybrid biofuel 
governance in the EU, 
and its contributions 
to achieving 
sustainability 
objectives  
Specific 
question 
Whether, to what 
extent and how the 
national biodiesel 
program developed in 
a similar way as 
ProÁlcool, regardless 
of the thirty-year time 
difference and the 
lessons learnt? 
How and why 
cooperatives are 
successful in 
integrating small 
farmers into the 
biodiesel chain and 
what this cooperative-
enhanced social 
inclusion actually 
means for family 
farmers? 
 
How does the 
Brazilian state interact 
with two dominant 
sources of state-led, 
public authority: the 
EU and the World 
Trade Organization, in 
shaping trajectories of 
biofuel trade and 
governance? 
What is the nature 
and outcome of the 
EU’s experiment in 
hybrid biofuel 
governance with 
regard to sustainable 
biofuels? What 
lessons can be drawn 
for future policy 
directions? 
Governance 
level(s) 
Brazil Brazil Brazil, EU, WTO EU, private 
certification initiatives 
Source: developed by author 
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Chapter 2 demonstrates the processes of institutionalization that have shaped the biodiesel and 
bioethanol governance landscape in Brazil. It uses a historical approach to study the development of 
ethanol and biodiesel policies in Brazil. It demonstrates who the main initiators were, what kind of 
actor coalitions shaped the outlook of Brazilian biofuel governance and how this has changed 
through time. It also shows the relation between biofuel policies and other affiliated policy domains 
that co-shaped the governance landscape. In doing so, it contributes to a better understanding of 
how biofuels in Brazil have been governed over time, including evolving understandings of 
sustainability.  
Chapter 3 focuses specifically on the social sustainability aspects of biodiesel production in Brazil by 
analyzing the role of agricultural cooperatives. This is a form of domestic governance hybridization 
between the state and a non-state actor. Special emphasis lies on the relation between state, 
cooperatives, and farmers to illustrate this form of hybrid biofuel governance and related evolving 
notions of sustainability and how they have been sought to be operationalized in Brazil.  
Chapter 4 explores the role of the Brazilian state vis-à-vis two other dominant sources of 
international sources of biofuel governance authorities: the EU and the WTO. The rapid emergence 
of a global demand for sustainable biofuels created a gap wherein these different forms of authority 
needed to interact either by collaboration or by confrontation. In this chapter, EU and Brazil trade 
controversies over the definition of sustainable biofuels are discussed. This chapter illustrates the 
strategies used by the EU to seek to export its notions of sustainability beyond its borders to a 
biofuel producing country such as Brazil.  
Chapter 5 shifts focus to analyzing, in depth, the last decade of evolving biofuel governance 
arrangements in the EU, including its efforts to create a market for and govern sustainable biofuels 
for the transport sector, even as debates over sustainability escalated. The chapter focuses, in 
particular, on analyzing the risks and benefits of the novel hybrid (public and private) governance 
arrangements developed by the EU. The findings of this chapter contribute to an ongoing debate 
about the merits of hybrid governance, and whether a hybrid approach helps strengthen or weaken 
sustainability objectives.  
In concluding, Chapter 6 combines the insights of the four empirical chapters in order to answer the 
main research question. It sums up how biofuels have been governed in the EU and Brazil over time, 
and what notions of sustainability are embodied in these evolving governance arrangements. It also 
addresses how the EU has sought to export its notions of sustainability beyond its borders and 
whether it has succeeded in doing so. The thesis also highlights how these findings can be 
generalized beyond Brazil and the EU in shaping future biofuel governance.

  
2 Governing Biofuels in Brazil: A Comparison of Ethanol and 
Biodiesel Policies1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Over the last decade Brazil has implemented a new and ambitious biofuel program: the National 
Program of Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB). When launching this program in 2004 the 
government stated that it wanted to avoid the same kind of geographical concentration, single crop 
focus, dominance of agribusiness, and exclusion of family farmers that have occurred with 
bioethanol production through the ProÁlcool policy since 1975. This paper compares the life 
histories of the bioethanol and the biodiesel policies of Brazil by analyzing their substantive policy 
content; the power and politics of actors that struggle for the design and implementation of the 
policies; and the polity in terms the organization and institutionalization of the policies. The paper 
concludes that both policies have become submerged by and dependent on the polity and politics of 
primarily the energy and agricultural sectors that operate as the two semi-autonomous governance 
fields. This submerging has shaped the substantive contents of biofuels policies, and explains why 
the 2004 biodiesel policy PNPB, in spite of its objectives for social inclusion and rural development, 
faces similar problems in implementation as its predecessor, the 1975 bioethanol policy ProÁlcool.
                                                          
1 This chapter has been published as: Stattman, Sarah L., Otto Hospes, and Arthur P J Mol. 2013. Governing 
Biofuels in Brazil: A Comparison of Ethanol and Biodiesel Policies. Energy Policy 61: 22–30. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.005. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In 2004 Brazil launched the National Program of Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB), aiming to 
include biodiesel into the national energy matrix. Brazil was not unique: many other governments 
also launched similar national biofuel programs to address national energy demand and supply over 
the last decade (Rothkopf, 2007; Sorda et al., 2010). However, unlike other governments it was not 
Brazil's first national biofuels program. Already in 1975 Brazil introduced the National Fuel Alcohol 
Program (ProÁlcool) and implemented it rather successfully over four decades: ethanol production 
increased from 594,985 m3 in the harvest of 1974/75 to a production of 27,604,120 m3 in the 
harvest of 2010/11 (MAPA, 2013). 
ProÁlcool has been praised for its contribution to energy diversification and energy sovereignty of 
Brazil and the economic and developmental benefits it has brought to the Sao Paulo area (Hira and 
de Oliveira, 2009; Rovere et al., 2011). Yet, it has also been criticized for its geographical 
concentration of ethanol production in the Sao Paulo area and poor labor conditions in the 
sugarcane industry (Hall et al., 2009; Lehtonen, 2011). In addition, environmental concerns have 
arisen due to the large scale and capital intensive agriculture of sugarcane production (Hall et al., 
2009, p.581). Debates about the energy and agricultural benefits versus the environmental and social 
concerns of ProÁlcool still continue today (e.g. Goldemberg et al., 2008; Walter et al., 2011; 
Watanabe et al., 2012). 
The PNPB focuses on biodiesel rather than ethanol production. While it follows the footsteps of the 
ProÁlcool program, the PNPB deliberately aims to incorporate lessons from its predecessor in terms 
of objectives, implementation and outreach (Garcez and Vianna, 2009). The main governmental 
objectives of the PNPB are to contribute to energy diversification and energy sovereignty of Brazil by 
creating a market for sustainable biodiesel production that is viable, both technically (high fuel 
quality and supply) and economically, and with a strong focus on social inclusion of family farms and 
regional development (MDA, 2013a; Pousa et al., 2007; Rathmann et al., 2012). To support the aim 
of regional development (especially in the northeast of Brazil) special policy instruments, such as tax 
incentives and obligatory blending targets, have been included (as further explained in Section 2.4). 
Research on PNPB has shown that in spite of these intentions the social inclusion of small-scale 
farmers, regional development (César and Batalha, 2013; Watanabe et al., 2012) and crop 
diversification (ANP, 2012; Padula et al., 2012) have proven to be very difficult. On the one hand the 
government continues with stimulation packages to promote these social and developmental goals, 
while on the other it increases obligatory blending targets of biodiesel to diesel ahead of schedule, 
which supports and triggers large scale commercial biodiesel industry in the Centre-West that 
produces primarily soy based biodiesel through capital intensive and large scale agricultural systems 
(MDA, 2013). Academic and NGO evaluations of the PNPB program conclude that it has not 
contributed much to economic inclusion of family farmers in vegetable oil chains (César and Batalha, 
2010; Hospes and Clancy, 2011), that production did not disperse over the country towards the 
poorest regions, and that environmental sustainability is not a key issue in the implementation of the 
PNPB (given the dominance of soy oil with more than 90%; ANP, 2012). This all suggests that also the 
PNPB faces successes and shortcomings. 
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This paper aims to understand whether, to what extent and how the PNPB developed in a similar 
way as ProÁlcool, regardless of the thirty year time difference and the lessons learnt. We do this 
through a comparative analysis of the life histories of ProÁlcool, and PNPB, focusing on the (state 
and non-state) actor interactions and power, and the institutional ownership and embeddedness 
that have shaped the development, policy content and implementation of both programs. 
Information has been collected between 2007 and 2011 through semi-structured interviews with 
government actors, industry experts, scientists, and civil society representatives in Brazil; 
participation in public meetings on both programs; and reviews of scientific articles, policy 
documents, newspaper articles and governmental communiqués. 
The next section develops the concept of ‘governance fields’ to analyze biofuel programs and their 
life histories. Subsequently, the history and development of ProÁlcool (Section 2.3) and PNPB 
(Section 2.4) will be analyzed. The final part compares the two programs and draws conclusions on 
the future outlook of biofuel governance in Brazil (Section2.5). 
2.2 Policy, politics and polity in governance fields 
Policy domains are organized differently per country, but often include agriculture, economic affairs, 
trade, energy, transport and environment. Policy domains reflect what political authorities consider 
substantive and distinctive issues that require distinctive political and administrative action. Or, as 
defined by Burstein (1991: 327), policy domains are ‘components of the political system organized 
around substantive issues’. The concept of ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ is useful to clarify that 
these policy domains are to some extent interdependent, and to some extent autonomous. The 
concept was originally coined by Moore (1973) to emphasize that every field of social life is neither 
fully governed by rules and actors ‘emanating from the outside world’, nor fully autonomous in 
following its own endogenous rules. The notion of semi-autonomy prompts us to relate the 
development of a new (for instance policy) field to existing (policy) fields and not to understand its 
emergence in a political or institutional vacuum. 
The UN-Energy (2007: 4-6) indicates that at least four distinct policy domains or fields are shaping 
the development of liquid biofuels policies: energy, environment, agriculture and trade. When a new 
national biofuel policy emerges, one or more of these policy fields (ministries/departments with their 
substantive policies, rule-systems and state actors) may try to annex the new policy into their 
routines, mandate and/or portfolio. As a result, a biofuel policy may become subsumed in – and thus 
take on board major characteristics of – one of the existing policy fields. However, if a single policy 
field is unable to fully claim and determine the new biofuel policy, or when different domain holders 
and representatives agree to treat a new policy as a joint responsibility of multiple policy fields, 
biofuel policy may turn into a (often complex) interdepartmental (or inter-field) affair. A new policy 
may also start as a subsumed or an interdepartmental area and at a later stage – when it remains 
high on the public/political agenda – turn into a distinct policy field with its own domain holder, rule 
system and institutions. 
These developments are of course not just state-internal affairs of national bureaucracies. Powerful 
private interest groups and sub- and supranational state actors have a major interest and influence 
in the structuration of new policy areas, through close interaction with state agencies that represent 
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existing fields. It that sense, governance field is a more adequate concept than policy field (e.g. 
Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004; Treib et al., 2007; van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove, 2010).  
The concept of governance field as such does not explain whether, when and how new governance 
domains emerge or existing ones become subsumed in other governance fields. The concept of 
governance field could remain a rather static concept. To study the emergence of a national biofuel 
policy and how and to what extent it is shaped by and located in-between or within existing 
policy/governance institutions and fields, we need concepts to unpack the dynamics in governance 
fields. On the basis of an extensive review Treib et al. (2007) distinguish three different dimensions 
of governance in a domain or field: policy, politics and polity. Policy is about objectives, content and 
instruments of governmental programs. Politics is about constellations of private and public actors 
and about power struggles that shape policies. Polity is about institutional coordination mechanisms 
and division of competences between public (and private) actors in using instruments to realize 
objectives. The implication of this multidimensional notion of governance field is that one cannot 
understand the emergence, content and implementation of national biofuel policies without 
exploring biofuel politics and polity; that is, without the power struggles among public and private 
actors on the division of competencies and on how the coordination and institutions of biofuel 
policies are organized, also in relation to other governance fields.  
From this conceptualization, one can conceptualize three different models of how newly emerging 
programs of bioethanol and biodiesel become ‘institutionalized’ in the existing organizational 
structure of semi-autonomous governance fields (see Figure 2.1): (1) as a new semi-autonomous 
governance field; (2) as a more or less coordinated ‘sub-field’, with similarities between the two 
biofuels programs in terms of policy, politics and polity, but hardly semi-independent from existing 
governance fields; (3) as two separate biofuel sub-fields with limited similarities between their 
policies, politics and polity. Figure 2.1 is schematic and limited to only two initial governance fields 
that may structure biofuels policies; also, bio-ethanol and biodiesel policies can be ‘located’ in one 
semi-autonomous governance field rather than at the junction of two or more existing fields. 
Whether a governance fields becomes more or less autonomous over time and how existing 
governance fields capture or give room to a new emerging (biofuels) policy to evolve into a more or 
less semi-autonomous field remains an empirical question. In analyzing ProÁlcool and PNPB biofuel 
policies as governance fields we focus on how they evolve in terms of policy, polity, and politics 
through time: the ‘life history’ of governance fields. In this life history the policy refers to the content 
in terms of regulations and instruments that is developed and implemented within a certain 
timeframe. The politics refer to the relations, interdependencies and power struggles between the 
main actors in developing the policies, such as state agencies, NGOs, private companies, farmer 
organizations etc. The polity refers to the formal institutional arrangement of politics, that is the 
structure and institutions that are medium and outcome of politics. For a biodiesel and/or a 
bioethanol field to become a semi-autonomous governance field it would have to develop its own 
separate policy contents, a typical set of powerful actors and constellations that struggle for specific 
contents, and its own specific institutional structure; all three semi-independent from other 
governance fields, such as agriculture, energy or environment.
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Figure 2.1 Conceptualizing the development of biofuels governance 
Source: developed by authors 
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To be sure, development into a semi-autonomous governance field or not has no simple linear 
relation with success or failure of the field in reaching policy goals. Both as subsumed sub-field in 
another semi-autonomous governance field (e.g. agriculture), and as semi-autonomous biofuel 
governance field biofuel policy goals can be successfully achieved, or not. But the kind of policy goals 
set and implemented, as well as the main actors responsible for setting and implementing policy 
measures to reach goals will be different in each of the alternative routes of Figure 2.1. 
2.3 The emergence and structuration of Brazilian ethanol policy 
In this section the emergence and development of the governance of Brazilian ethanol is analyzed. 
We distinguish four phases: the period before the launch of the ProÁlcool policy, the ten year period 
following implementation of the policy, the years of decline, and the revival and growth of ethanol. 
These phases are identified based on changes in the politics (actor and power constellations) and 
substantial policies of the ethanol governance field (see Hira and de Oliveira, 2009; Rosillo-Calle and 
Cortez, 1998; Rovere et al., 2011).  
2.3.1 Pre-ProÁlcool (–1975) 
During the phase prior to the implementation of ProÁlcool actors became involved in ethanol and/or 
sugarcane production, experiments were held that shaped policy ideas and perspectives with regard 
to ethanol as transport energy, governmental involvement in sugarcane production emerged. 
The first official ethanol policy in Brazil dates back to 1919 (Fischetti, 2008), when the Government of 
Pernambuco (northeast of Brazil) made ethanol an official fuel within that state. This policy followed 
a growing awareness among Brazilian policy makers at that time of the lack of domestic fossil fuel 
resources in a country with long transport distances and a growing economy. Fossil fuel imports led 
to large foreign debts, so alternatives had to be considered. From the start the role of the Brazilian 
state has been important in initiating policies for alternative fuels in Brazil. Already in 1903 the 
Brazilian president launched the idea of a stronger linkage between the sugar and ethanol industrial 
sectors for the production of ethanol fuels. 
Governmental regulation of the sugarcane and ethanol sector began with the creation of three state 
institutions that were created between the 1920s and 1950s. The first important institute is the 
Sugar and Alcohol Institute (IAA—Instituto do Açucar e Álcool), created in 1933, which aimed to 
regulate the sugar and alcohol market by setting strict production quotas in order to keep prices at 
an adequate level. The quotas permitted every mill to produce a certain amount of sugar and kept 
prices under control, with two principal effects: in the northeast it prevented sugarcane producers 
from bankruptcy, and in São Paulo it increased sugar and ethanol self-sufficiency and modernization 
(Hira and de Oliveira, 2009). Second, innovative research institutes were established, such as the 
Technological Institute of Aeronautics (ITA—Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica) and the Technical 
Centre of Aeronautics (CTA—Centro Técnico de Aeronáutica). These institutes formed the 
technological infrastructure that enabled Brazil in the 1970s to adapt a car engine to ethanol. Third, 
the national petroleum company Petrobras (PB—Petroleo Brasileiro S/A), established in 1953, gained 
authority to organize all the activities of the oil industry in Brazil on behalf of the government. These 
three state institutions (as the polity of the pre-ProÁlcool era) were developed in three rather 
autonomous governance fields: agricultural production and regional development (i.e. IAA), science 
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and technology (i.e. ITA and CTA), and energy (i.e. PB). Together these institutes increased the 
capacity of the state to control market developments with respect to ethanol in Brazil, but polity 
coordination was not always easy. 
In 1964 the military seized power, which further stimulated centralized governmental control 
towards decreased dependency on fossil fuel imports, especially following the energy crises of the 
early 1970s (Rosillo-Calle and Cortez, 1998). Motivated by the rapid increase in fossil fuel prices in 
1973 and 1974 a policy package that imposed a 10% blend of alcohol to gasoline was imposed in 
1973 (Magalhães et al., 1991). Unfortunately problems arose with regard to the ethanol quality, due 
to varying blends per state and hence inconsistent ethanol quality (Fischetti, 2008). To increase 
ethanol use as fuel two developments took place, forming the background of the sugarcane-ethanol 
industry coalition: technological innovation and a geographical shift in ethanol production. 
Technological innovation was considered essential. Initially car engines were not adapted for ethanol 
use and many cars suffered from corrosion and high maintenance costs, which created aversion of 
car-owners against ethanol use (Veja, 1980). However, the car industry was able to solve these 
problems through the rapid emergence of a Brazilian based car manufacturing (national branches of 
Ford and General Motors), and increasing domestic innovation capacity facilitated the adaptation of 
car engines to ethanol. 
A shift in ethanol production from the northeast to the São Paulo region was also crucial. Historically 
sugarcane farmers in the northeast used a plantation system based on unequal landownership and 
cheap slave labor. Even after the abolition of slavery (in 1888) very unequal landownership and work 
relations continued to exist (Lehtonen, 2011). In contrast, the farmers in São Paulo state, with a 
different historical background, relied more on innovative and technologically-advanced production 
methods. Gradually, the expansion of sugarcane to the state of São Paulo marked the increasing 
importance of this state and brought sugarcane farmers, ethanol producers and car engine 
innovators geographically close to each other and to the heart of economic development. Hence, 
while sugarcane production, regional development, technological innovation of cars, and energy 
were initially more or less autonomous governance fields (both with respect to state agencies and 
societal interests groups), in the early 1970s they were gradually moving towards geographical 
closeness and substantive interactions, but these new politics needed strong interventions to 
overcome sector interests. 
When the former president of Petrobras, Ernesto Geisel, became President of Brazil (1974–1979), he 
– together with Minister of Mines and Energy Shigeaki Ueki (1974–1979), who later became 
president of Petrobras (1979–1984) – had the power (and the Petrobras knowledge and connections) 
to break the multiple resistance politics and reluctance against alternatives for fossil fuel (Petrobras, 
2013). At this time the car industry, sugar producers, and some entrepreneurs became proponents 
of the ethanol program while Petrobras and the financial sector remained critical (Hira and de 
Oliveira, 2009). 
2.3.2 Energy sovereignty and expansion (1975–1985) 
By 1975 the proponents of an ethanol fuel program were able to create “ProÁlcool”, the National 
Fuel Alcohol Program, through decree no. 76593 on November 14th in 1975. The new policy had four 
goals: one, reducing the demand for imported fuel and thus addressing the national security 
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concerns about energy dependence; two, stimulating the industry in the northeast by generating 
additional income opportunities for the sugar industry that suffered from low prices on the world 
market; three, increasing national income by better utilizing Brazilian resources; four, increasing the 
growth of agricultural and industrial domestic sectors (Hira and de Oliveira, 2009, p.2452; Rosillo-
Calle and Cortez, 1998). 
A three-step plan for the implementation of alcohol fuel was introduced: first, using a mixture of 
anhydrous alcohol to gasoline (up to 25%); second, conversion of gasoline engines to make the car 
fleet suitable for alcohol; and third, the use of special alcohol engines to run on hydrated alcohol 
with maximum efficiency (a 100% alcohol fueled car). This plan was carried out with policies that 
required Petrobras to buy a guaranteed amount of ethanol and that provided low interest loans, 
subsidized prices and production quota (Goldemberg et al., 2004; Hira and de Oliveira, 2009, 
p.2452). 
Through ProÁlcool, alcohol production by sugar cane, cassava, or any other crop was stimulated. 
Between 1975 and 1985 the production of manioc (cassava) by small farmers in poor regions was 
stimulated in order to stimulate economic development. In this period about 8% of ethanol was 
produced from manioc by small farmers and local ‘mini-distilleries’, but this small scale manioc 
production suffered from crop diseases and could not compete with the large-scale and efficient 
production of the sugarcane sector (Hira and de Oliveira, 2009; Lehtonen, 2011). Hence, sugarcane 
became the dominant crop for ethanol production in Brazil, due to previous experiences, low sugar 
prices, high growing potential and economies of scale. 
Initially the ProÁlcool program did not please conventional sugar mill owners. They argued that sugar 
was a more secure market, because IAA protected them from heavy price fluctuations through the 
existing quota system by buying for a guaranteed price. Also the idea of selling to Petrobras was not 
considered attractive, even though the government stipulated that Petrobras had to buy the entire 
production from mill owners and would be responsible for transport, storage, distribution, and 
mixing of alcohol. ProÁlcool also created resistance within Petrobras, because it saw ethanol as 
competition and it expected lower prices for gasoline. Also the automobile industry opposed 
ProÁlcool, because they were aiming for a ‘world car’ for a global market and did not appreciate 
Brazil's specific car engine adaptation needed for ethanol. However, the politics and power 
constellation of ProÁlcool was clear: the military regime accepted no frustration of and interference 
in the ProÁlcool program and forced sugar mill owners, Petrobras and car manufacturers to 
cooperate through top down implemented government policies. The polity of the program was also 
more a presidential than a ministerial one, preventing sectoral interests to frustrate collaboration. 
ProÁlcool was initially heavily subsided with approximately seven billion dollars between 1975 and 
1989 (Fischetti, 2008). 
At the start of ProÁlcool a food versus fuel discussion emerged, but this was soon dismissed as a 
false problem due to the large expansion opportunities of sugar cane (Magalhães et al., 1991). 
During the first phase of ProÁlcool the northeast kept receiving subsidies to keep up with the more 
efficient ethanol production in the state of São Paulo. The São Paulo region further modernized, 
resulting in land ownership concentration into the hands of industrialists and large-scale producers 
and in gradual displacement of smaller independent producers (Lehtonen, 2011). 
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Consumers were stimulated to use ethanol, by setting the price of hydrated alcohol at 64.5% of the 
price of gasoline. The oil price shock of 1978 got the remaining ProÁlcool critics on board. In 
September 1979, after severe pressure by the government, the National Association of Motor 
Vehicle producers (ANFAVEA— Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores) 
signed a protocol in which car manufactures would develop technologies and produce vehicles that 
could run on pure hydrated alcohol. A purely ethanol fuelled passenger car came on the market in 
1979 (Rosillo-Calle and Cortez, 1998). The market of alcohol cars grew rapidly, from 0.46% in 1979 
via 26.8% of the sold vehicles in 1980, to 76.1% in 1986 (Fischetti, 2008; Veja, 1980). This rapid 
increase was celebrated and stimulated by public exhibitions, commercials, festivals and 
governmental campaigns. It lasted until the mid-1980s when problems started to arise on the 
ProÁlcool path. 
2.3.3 Neo-liberalism and stabilisation (1985–2003) 
With the end of the military dictatorship in Brazil in 1985, ProÁlcool became a controversial policy, 
because it was considered an unwanted heritage of the military regime. The politics of ProÁlcool 
changed dramatically. The Minister of Industry and Commerce, the IAA and ethanol producers in São 
Paulo were in favor of abolishing ProÁlcool. Northeastern producers (for the financial support they 
received) and the Minister of Mines and Energy wanted to continue with ProÁlcool. Major power 
struggles led to insecurity of governmental support, which resulted in consumer withdrawal, a fall in 
alcohol fueled car sales, and lost interest of the car industry. This came together with a strong fall in 
world market crude oil prices and a fall in the income of sugar mill owners (as ethanol prices were 
coupled to oil prices) (Magalhães et al., 1991; Rosillo-Calle and Cortez, 1998). This created a severe 
supply crisis, amplified by the demise of the sugar industry in the northeast as subsidies declined (see 
Figure 2.2). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Ethanol production Brazil, 1948-2012 (million m3/year)  
Source: MAPA (2013) 
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In the São Paulo region the decline of subsidies was less of a problem, because the industry's 
economies of scale and its mechanization reduced costs; hence, here blending of ethanol continued 
at a large scale (Lehtonen, 2011; Rosillo-Calle and Cortez, 1998). Altogether, the crisis transformed a 
highly subsidized national program into a profitable, geographically concentrated and increasingly 
privatized business. New problems emerged as environmental and farmer organizations started to 
emphasize the negative impacts of sugarcane production on the environment and on small (family) 
farmers who leased their land to sugarcane producers. 
The 1990s are marked by attempts of the sugar industry to create a competitive sugar and ethanol 
market without governmental intervention. Although ethanol was still seen as a viable alternative if 
gasoline prices are above 30 USD/barrel, lack of consumer trust and continuation of technological 
problems regarding corrosion of car engines remained main challenges. In 1994 the central 
government again intervened through Plan Real, in which it stimulated and forced the sugar and 
ethanol industry to further improve their productivity (Rosillo-Calle and Cortez, 1998). 
2.3.4 Revival, growth, and sustainability (2003–) 
The current phase of ethanol use has been largely shaped by an innovation from the car industry 
that developed flex-fuel technology for car engines in 2003. Currently 90% of all car sales in Brazil are 
flex-fuel vehicles, which means they can run on any possible blend of ethanol to gasoline. Consumers 
were quickly attracted to the new cars, because they could benefit from cheap ethanol, without 
running supply risks as in the 1980s (MVO, 2009). Brazil still uses different mixes of anhydrous 
ethanol to gasoline depending on supply and demand. Since 2010 there have been two periods 
wherein the ethanol blend was reduced from 25% to 20% ethanol due to low supply as a 
consequence of drought and failed harvests (Jagger, 2013). 
With 436 sugarcane plants that use 50% of its crushed sugarcane to produce 30 billion liters ethanol 
in 2010 (Figure 2.2), Brazil's production capacity is higher than domestic demand and its ethanol 
seeks new markets: USA, Europe, and Japan (Mol, 2010; Unica 2010 interviews, 2007). The USA has 
recently labeled Brazilian ethanol an ‘advanced biofuel’, meaning that it receives trade advantages 
because of its relatively limited environmental impact and production efficiency. The 
internationalization of the bioethanol sector also increased sustainability concerns in the ethanol 
business and the sugarcane industry (Goldemberg et al., 2008). Brazilian ethanol industry and 
government are still dominant actors within this globalizing biofuel arena in Brazil, but new 
(international) state and non-state actors question the social (working conditions) and 
environmental impacts of ethanol production in Brazil. For instance, civil society organizations 
monitor the working conditions, biodiversity, landownership, and greenhouse gas emissions 
(Repórter Brasil, 2010). And EU importers ask for sustainability certifications following the 2009 EU 
Renewable Energy Directive. 
2.4 The emergence and structuration of Brazilian biodiesel policy 
In this section the emergence and development of the governance of Brazilian biodiesel is analyzed. 
Three main phases can be distinguished based on changing politics and policies: first, the 
developments towards a biodiesel policy; second, the development and implementation of the 
PNPB; third, adaptations to the PNPB and the importance of the global context. 
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2.4.1 Pre-PNPB (1975–2004) 
In the 1970s, while implementing ProÁlcool, the government also experimented with Pró-Óleo, a 
biodiesel program (Magalhães et al., 1991; Pousa et al., 2007; Rosillo-Calle and Cortez, 1998). The 
government used the same discourse and arguments: i.e. strengthening of energy sovereignty by 
diminishing fossil fuel imports. Contrary to the ethanol politics, where the government found a 
capable and ambitious partner in the sugar industry, the biodiesel program failed to create similar a 
political alliance between state agencies and non-state industries of oleaginous crops. This was also 
due to the fact that vegetable oil production was less stimulated at that time and its processing 
industry did not suffer from fluctuations on the world market like the sugar industry. Consequently 
the government did not succeed in creating a powerful political consortium and capacity for large 
scale biodiesel introduction, and the drop in petroleum prices in the mid-1980s stalemated the 
program. 
The next attempt to introduce biodiesel took place in 2002 when a diesel substitution program was 
introduced by the Ministry of Science and Technology. This Próbiodiesel program focused on the 
conversion of soybean oil to biodiesel (Pousa et al., 2007). Although soybean oil is not an efficient 
biodiesel crop, it was available at large quantities and against relatively low cost. Table 2.1 lists yield 
characteristics of the different oil crops in Brazil. 
 
Table 2.1 Characteristics of oleaginous crops in Brazil 
Species Oil origin Oil contents (%) 
Harvest 
(months/year) 
Yield (tons of 
oil/hectare) 
African palm Nut 22.0 12 3.0 - 6.0 
Coconut Fruit 55.0-60.0 12 1.3 - 1.9 
Babassu Nut 66.0 12 0.1 - 0.3 
Sunflower Grain 38.0-48.0  3 0.5 - 1.9 
Colza/canola Grain 40.0-48.0  3 0.5 - 0.9 
Castor beans Grain 45.0-50.0  3 0.5 - 0.9 
Peanut Grain 40.0-43.0  3 0.6 - 0.8 
Soybean Grain 18.0  3 0.2 - 0.4 
Cotton Grain 15.0  3 0.1 - 0.2 
Source: MAPA (2006); Stattman et al. (2008) 
 
Soybean production in Brazil started in the 1970s in the SouthWest of Brazil and expanded to the 
Centre-West. Technological and agronomic knowledge led to higher productivity, which drove this 
expansion. A second driver for early expansion was market demand increase, because soy (consisting 
of oil and protein content) proved suitable for cattle feed and many other purposes. Fiscal incentives 
and infrastructure improvement further increased expansion into ‘low value’ lands in Mato Grosso 
(Dall’Agnol et al., 2004). Not unlike sugarcane, soybean expansion was characterized by large scale 
practices, monocultures, innovations, and strong linkages to the world market (Berkum et al., 2006; S 
L Stattman et al., 2008). Hence, at the start of the biodiesel program soy was widely available and 
was looking for market diversification due to suffering from fluctuating world market prices. 
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Soy farmers were already familiar with large scale commodity trading and had the ability to innovate 
and adapt quickly to new policies and conditions that would improve their market position. The 
Ministry of Agriculture of Brazil was also actively seeking for alternative markets for the soy farmers 
in the South- and Centrewest, which brought together a larger coalition of state and nonstate actors 
supporting biodiesel. 
2.4.2 National Biodiesel Program (2004–2010) 
The PNPB was launched by President Lula da Silva during his first term in office (Decree No. 5.297 on 
December 6, 2004). An Inter-ministerial Working Group on Biodiesel (GTIB), involving twelve 
different ministries, assessed the viability of introducing biodiesel into Brazil's energy matrix and 
designed federal laws no. 11.095-005 (on mandatory introduction of biodiesel into Brazil's energy 
matrix) and no. 11.116-05 (on the gradual increase of blending targets and movement from 
voluntary to obligatory blending). In October 2009 Brazil announced that taking effect in January 
2010 it will raise the biodiesel to diesel content to 5% (B5), originally planned for 2013. Production in 
2011 was almost 2.7 billion liters and the total capacity of the 70 plants was estimated at 5.5 billion 
liters per year (Figure 2.3). These production and capacity levels are more than enough to comply 
with the B5 mandate (MVO, 2009), which could result in Brazil becoming soon a net exporter of 
biodiesel. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Biodiesel production in Brazil, 2005-2012 (million litres)  
Source : figure is based on ANP (2012) (The numbers for 2012 are incomplete) 
 
In learning from the ProÁlcool experience, the government based the PNPB on three pillars 
(environmental sustainability, social inclusion, and economic development) and a solid technological 
and knowledge base. Ministries involved with the PNPB all claimed in interviews that, contrary to 
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 in
 m
3
 
Biodiesel production per year 
Biodiesel production in Brazil (m3)  
Biofuel Governance in Brazil and the EU 
 
31 
ProÁlcool, the PNPB was designed as a multi-crop program that should contribute to regional 
development, economic growth, social inclusion and environmental sustainability. Social inclusion is 
supported by the Social Fuel Seal (SFS) and a tax structure that benefits specific producers, 
production regions and types of raw material (César and Batalha, 2013; Garcez and Vianna, 2009). In 
practice, biodiesel companies need to be awarded the SFS by the Ministry for Agrarian Development 
(MDA) in order to be allowed to sell biodiesel on the Brazilian market. They will only be awarded the 
SFS when they buy a certain percentage of their biodiesel oils from small-scale family farmers. The 
required percentage differs per region (Table 2.2). There are no specific environmental criteria 
mentioned in the PNPB. The government officials argue that the general environmental laws of Brazil 
apply and that biodiesel does not need to comply with any additional or specific requirements. 
Stimulating diversification of oil crops is considered sufficient to prevent monocultures. 
 
Table 2.2 Percentage family farmer feedstock necessary for obtaining SFS 
Region 
% harvest  
until 2009 
% harvest 
2009/2010 
% harvest 
2010/2011 
Centre-West and North 10 10 15 
North-East and Semi-arid 50 30 30 
South-East and South 30 30 30 
Source: Lei n. 11.116; MDA (2012a); Stattman and Mol (2014)  
 
Already in the design of the policy program weaknesses with respect to social inclusion and 
sustainability could be spotted (Watanabe et al., 2012). In 2004 environmental organizations and 
labor unions formulated three social and environmental recommendations: (1) technologies used 
should support local resources and environmental sustainability, (2) crops of non-transgenic seeds 
should be stimulated, (3) production of seeds by family farming organizations of recently settled 
populations should be stimulated. None of these proposals, however, were incorporated in the PNPB 
(Garcez and Vianna, 2009). Instructions of the Ministry for Agricultural Development on the 
percentage of primary material acquired from family farmers were significantly lower than suggested 
originally in 2003 (Garcez and Vianna, 2009). 
How was then the implementation? In Brazil biodiesel is produced from a variety of vegetable oils 
and animal fat. However, the crops that are specifically stimulated by the PNPB, such as castor oil 
from the northeast produced mainly by family farmers, have hardly contributed to total production 
(César and Batalha, 2010). Castor oil was specifically targeted due to its high oil content (Table 2.1) 
and the fact that family farmers in the northeast already had experience with the crop (on a small 
scale). From the onset strong tensions existed between family farmer inclusion and the interests of 
Brazilian agribusiness. The power and politics during implementation were clearly in favor of the 
agribusiness coalition, which was joined by state and non-state energy organizations. Five years after 
the launch of the PNPB biodiesel originated mainly from soy oil (78.8%), bovine fat (14.6%) and 
cotton seed oil (4.1%), and only for 2.6% of other resources (ANP, 2012). In spite of official intentions 
for diversification of feedstock resources, due to its availability and scale advantages soy oil had a 
preferential position in the PNPB from the start. Its production methods, i.e. large scale farming with 
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little demand for unskilled labor, monocultures, and excellent connection with commodity markets, 
made it into an attractive resource in spite of the low oil content per hectare. Other raw materials, 
such as Jatropha, castor oil and indigenous palm varieties with high oil content, could not keep up 
with the ambition for rapid expansion of biodiesel production and gained insufficient support from 
state actors to build up capacity. Vegetable oil produced from these indigenous oil crops has also a 
higher economic value, making it too expensive to be used for biodiesel (and more relevant for the 
cosmetics industry). In this way soy oil had no real competition. The strong presence of soy oil 
affected the regional spread of biodiesel production, which is now largely located in the centre-west 
of Brazil. 
The dominance of energy production over social inclusion can also be found in the rather rapid 
increase of blending targets. At the start of the PNPB policy makers gave family farmers time to 
become included in the biodiesel production chain by introducing the SFS and by gradually increasing 
blending targets. At the same time these blending targets would provide the biodiesel industry with 
guaranteed sales. Debates between different stakeholders indicate that the industry is looking for 
higher blends whereas the percentage of biodiesel that comes from family farmers is still very low. 
This demonstrates the competition between the views on the PNPB as an energy program vis-à-vis as 
an agricultural development program. The SFS system did only marginally work because small famers 
do not have the capacity to negotiate favorable contracts and auctions were dominated by 
companies that are not located in areas with many family farmers. Hence, overall, the PNPB 
appeared to be influenced by the interests and ambitions of primarily the large soy farmers and the 
soy oil industry of the centre-west, and by the state and private energy organizations. 
An interesting actor in this context is Petrobras. In the beginning of the PNPB Petrobras said it was 
only taking care of distribution of biodiesel. Within a short time frame, however, Petrobras invested 
and actively participated in the biodiesel market. When the social inclusion of small scale farmers 
was at risk, Petrobras was ordered by the government to take over projects which should make use 
of the feedstock of small farmers. Hence, Petrobras was allowed what it was declined during the 
ProÁlcool program: to create Petrobras Biofuels (PBio) in 2009. With that the polity of PNPB has 
moved in the direction of an energy institutional arrangement. PBio now focuses on all biofuels and 
is also buying ethanol mills. PBio is actively supporting family farmers in the production of biodiesel 
in the northeast, where it has been able to negotiate over 25,000 contracts since 2009 (Souza, 2011). 
Hence, PBio has become a very important player in fulfilling the social inclusion of family farmers in 
the PNPB. Still, the inclusion of small scale family farmers has proven to be very difficult, and the 
regional spreading is still a challenge. Since 2009 there have been adaptations to the PNPB to 
improve the social inclusion of family farmers, for instance through enhancing the role of agricultural 
cooperatives and of PBio. This seems to result in a rise in the number of family farmers participating 
in the PNPB (MDA, 2010). 
2.4.3 Globalisation and sustainability (2010–) 
To limit foreign interference, Brazil emphasized at several occasions that the PNPB is a national 
policy, organized and governed by a national polity. The Brazilian state sovereignty is, nevertheless, 
contested from various angles. First, the key feedstock, soybean, has been a global commodity for 
many years. Through its central role as the key resource in the PNPB, dynamics of global soy 
governance are ‘transposed' to the biodiesel sector. An example of this development is the Round 
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Table for Responsible Soy (RTRS), a global private partnership of civil society, industry and farmers 
aimed at increasing sustainability of soy production (Hospes et al., 2009). Governments cannot 
become a member of this partnership. The RTRS has been adapting its sustainability criteria to 
comply with European biofuel policy directives so that RTRS certified soy can also be used for 
European biodiesel. 
Second, other national governments are also diversifying their energy matrix through the use of 
biofuels, and their blending obligations often go hand-in-hand with sustainability requirements (most 
notably the EU and the USA). Through requiring sustainability standards and defining what kind of 
production areas and conditions are sustainable these other states co-shape the outlook of the 
global biodiesel market, which may also have an effect on Brazilian biodiesel production. Third, 
global and national civil society organizations continue to stress the competition for land between 
food, biofuel and animal feed, regardless of counter claims of other organisations and academics 
(Mitchell, 2008; OECD, 2008; Veja, 2008). This puts especially first generation crop-based biofuel 
under continuous debate globally, endangering future global markets for soy-based biodiesel. 
2.5 Comparison and conclusions 
Comparing biodiesel to ethanol policies is not without controversy. Both policies have been carried 
out under different political regimes, during different times, and with slightly different objectives. In 
spite of these differences both programs have been implemented top-down by the national 
government, both rely on agricultural crops to produce liquid transport energy, both use similar 
policy instruments (blending targets, financial stimuli, technological innovation policy, agricultural 
development policy), and there are some similarities in combined objectives of energy security and 
rural development. Hence, in many ways, the development of the PNPB is similar to ProÁlcool, 
although it is of a younger age and occurring at a much faster pace. When launching its biodiesel 
policy in 2004 the government explicitly stated that it looked closely at ProÁlcool, to avoid the same 
kind of geographical concentration, the focus on a single crop, the dominance by agro-business as in 
the ethanol field, and the social exclusion of small-scale farmers. 
In the formation period of ProÁlcool a military government had the ability to enforce its energy 
security program without much consultation with and consideration of stakeholders. In contrast, the 
Lula government consulted with different ministries and a variety of nonstate stakeholders. In the 
current era of globalisation a broader set of (international) actors are also involved in biodiesel 
politics. These differences in the politics and actors networks involved in designing the programs 
resulted in a biodiesel program that was on paper more conscious of the social dimensions and 
environmental impacts, compared to the bioethanol program. Still, in the implementation of both 
programs small scale production systems are marginalized, sustainability conditionalities are 
marginally applied, and regional spreading failed. In that sense, the structure of the PNPB with its 
stronger emphasis on social inclusion and rural development has proven very difficult to achieve. 
This means that the lessons drawn from the ProÁlcool program did result in a different policy design, 
but not in a different implementation and result of the biodiesel policy. We will explain this policy 
implementation convergence by analyzing the politics and polity of the ProÁlcool and the PNPB 
policies, and conclude on the question of an emerging semi-autonomous biofuel governance field. 
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Both programs have been strongly structured through the energy and agricultural governance fields. 
Developments in the ethanol and biodiesel sector are primarily driven by agri-business and energy 
industry; the transport, industry and trade governance fields have had a minor influence on the 
policies and politics of bioethanol and biodiesel and have primarily operated as facilitators; the 
environmental governance field has hardly influenced the course of development of the two 
programs. Even the current international demand for sustainable biofuels seems to have had little 
effect on local production circumstances. In this sense biofuels fall under regular environmental 
regulation, but do not have any specific status, which indicates that the environmental actors are not 
strongly represented in the governance field(s). 
The key actors in both programs are very similar i.e. Petrobras, ANP, governmental departments and 
ministries of energy and agriculture; and they are using similar ideas, rules and experiments to 
develop the ethanol and biodiesel sectors. International developments, such as sustainability 
requirements on exports to the EU and the Round Table for Sustainable Biofuels, have further 
contributed to a similar development of both programs. As such one can identify a growing 
commonality in the policies, politics and polity of biodiesel and those of bioethanol. Yet, these 
similarities in actors, ideas, rule-systems and experiences have not resulted in the emergence of a 
semi-autonomous biofuel governance field. Powerful governmental and nongovernmental actors 
and institutions of especially the agricultural and energy sectors are dominating biofuel policies and 
programs, and no semi-autonomous biofuels institutions, powerful biofuel actors and domain 
holders, and important biofuel rule systems have emerged. 
Biofuel policies and developments have been governed within the boundaries and through the 
politics and polity of existing energy and agricultural governance fields. This also means that biofuel 
policies reflect the interests of major agricultural and energy (state and nonstate) actors. Ethanol 
developments remain strongly linked with the sugarcane industry and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
biodiesel development is dominated by (state and non-state) soy interest representatives; and in 
both Petrobras and the Ministry of Energy have a major say. Over time, the dominance of the 
agricultural (state and private) actors and polity in structuring bioethanol developments has 
diminished and powerful energy actors and rule-systems have moved into the biofuel value chain, 
enlarging its influence. This process still continues, for instance where international oil companies, 
such as Shell, have become a member of the Roundtable on Responsible Soy, while Brazilian actors 
like Fetraf-Sul (representing small scale farmers) have decided to end their membership due to 
disagreements on the type of standards that needed to be developed. 
Hence, we see two major developments in structuring biofuels governance in Brazil. First, we have 
witnessed a merging of bioethanol and biodiesel policy and politics and in the end also bioethanol 
and biodiesel polity. The policy contents, the actors, rule-systems and institutions of bioethanol and 
biodiesel are increasingly coming together. Second, instead of developing into one semi-autonomous 
governance field, biofuel policies and politics in Brazil remain a battleground in-between especially 
the agricultural and energy governance fields.  
Figure 2.4 visualizes the process of developing what we could label a governance subfield on biofuels 
in Brazil, located in-between and dependent upon the two major semi-autonomous fields of 
agriculture and energy. The logics of these energy and agricultural orientated governance fields drive 
biofuel developments: an emphasis on quantity, a neglect of crop diversity and regional spreading, 
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power with the large scale (energy and agricultural) producers rather than with small scale family 
business, and a preference of energy security above environmental sustainability of energy sources. 
Hence, by way of conclusion, the specific and increasingly similar politics and polity of the bioethanol 
and biodiesel programs explain the major similarities in the implemented policies of the two 
programs. We see the emergence of a sub-field of biofuels governance in-between those of 
agriculture and energy. The specific positioning of this subfield also ‘determines’ the powerful (state 
and non-state) actors involved, and the dominant rule-systems and institutions; and hence explains 
the shortcomings of contemporary biofuels programs in Brazil. It is unlikely that this subfield will 
develop in the short term into a semiautonomous biofuels governance field; a more likely scenario 
might be that other semi-autonomous governance fields (e.g. environment) enhance their influence 
on biofuel governance following especially the globalization of biofuels (trade). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Historical development towards a biofuel governance subfield 
Source: developed by authors 
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3 Social sustainability of Brazilian biodiesel: The role of 
agricultural cooperatives2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Biofuels have been criticized in academic and activist circles not only for their environmental 
consequences but also for their social impacts on food availability and on small-scale family farming. 
Meanwhile (global) initiatives and policies have been developed to stimulate ‘‘sustainable biofuels’’. 
Brazil – a frontrunner in production and use of biofuels – aimed to combine biodiesel production 
with rural development. The biodiesel policy implemented in 2004 had two main objectives: to 
advance biodiesel as a transportation fuel and to foster the social inclusion of family farmers through 
participation in the biodiesel chain. Although participation of family farmers was low in the 
beginning, it increased substantially after a 2009 policy change that gave cooperatives a more 
prominent role. We analyze how, why and to what extent cooperatives are involved in integrating 
family farmers into the biodiesel chain and what this means for the social sustainability of biodiesel, 
taking the northeast state of Bahia as a case study area. The findings show that through the biodiesel 
policy, cooperatives—until then a marginal phenomenon in northern Brazil—increased their 
membership, were empowered and contributed to the economic development of a significant group 
of family farmers. However, these family farmers have not been substantially included in the 
biodiesel production chain itself. The biodiesel policy functions as a catalyst for rural (economic) 
development in which the cooperatives seem to achieve what governments were unable to achieve: 
the integration of specific categories of family farmers into agrarian development. Subsistence family 
farmers, in particular, have not been able to profit from this policy-driven, ‘‘market-oriented,’’ rural 
development model. Hence, it can be questioned whether this policy has made biodiesel more 
socially sustainable.
                                                          
2
 This chapter has been published as: Stattman, Sarah L. and Arthur P J Mol. 2014. Social sustainability of 
Brazilian biodiesel: The role of agricultural cooperatives. Geoforum 54: 282–294. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.04.001. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, the worldwide embrace of biofuels as an alternative source for transportation 
energy has been heavily debated, globally as well as locally. This embrace of biofuels has various 
sustainability concerns following the (potential) adverse impacts of large-scale biofuel production 
and use. These adverse impacts may include not only increased deforestation, land consolidation, 
expansion of agricultural areas at the cost of nature conservation and greenhouse gas emissions 
through indirect land use change, but also social issues such as land ownership, food prices and 
access, and marginalization of small farmers. Hence, governmental policies to further enhance the 
production and use of biofuels have been and still are strongly debated and criticized for both their 
environmental sustainability and their social consequences for small-scale family farmers (Mol, 2010, 
2007; Sorda et al., 2010). 
One of the major challenges in this context of sustainable biofuels is the impact of indirect land use 
change on food production and landownership. The notion of indirect land use change has proven to 
be difficult to measure and the impact is very unpredictable. Nevertheless, the European Union (EU) 
has put in place an obligation to monitor the effects of indirect land use change from cropbased 
biofuels, without any clear indicators (Levidow, 2013). In September 2013 the EU parliament voted 
that in meeting the EU’s target of 10% biofuels in transportation fuels only 6% could be food-based 
biofuels, in order to stimulate ‘‘advanced biofuels’’ that do not compete with food production; 
however, the proposal was rejected, just two votes short of a majority (EurActiv, 2013). This 
indicates that concerns about sustainable biofuels have risen to such a level that policy objectives 
might change in the future. 
The EU debates show a growing awareness about the social and environmental impacts of biofuel, as 
do the increasing amount of governmental and other global (non-state) initiatives that stimulate 
sustainable biofuels (Scarlat and Dallemand, 2011). Some countries have begun to address the 
environmental impacts of biofuels, but few countries have formulated concrete policies to mitigate 
the social impacts of crop-based biofuel production (Dam et al., 2008; Smeets et al., 2008b), such as 
small farmers’ being pushed from their land by agro-industrial investors and the competition of 
biofuel crops with food crops. Brazil – as a major user, producer and exporter of biofuels and biofuel 
crops – holds a key position in these global debates and how the future biofuels market will evolve 
(Garcez and Vianna, 2009; Goldemberg et al., 2008). Brazil is also one of the first biofuel producing 
countries to explicitly include social sustainability into its national biodiesel promotion policy. 
The Brazilian government aims to combine biofuel blending promotion with social sustainability by 
protecting and enhancing the social and economic development of small-scale family farmers. These 
combined objectives became operational in the 2004 Brazilian biodiesel policy: the National Program 
of Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB). The PNPB has two main goals: to introduce and enhance 
biodiesel as a transportation fuel into the national fuel matrix and to foster the social inclusion of 
small-scale family farmers through their participation in the biodiesel value chain in the poorest 
regions of the country (MDA, 2010). The development and implementation of the PNPB led to two 
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main debates. First, policy measures for implementing the PNPB show tensions between the two 
goals; for instance, PNPB policy measures create a conflict between the participation and 
development of small-scale family farmers, the prevention of biodiesel domination by agro-
industries, and the stimulation of sufficient biodiesel (crop) production. In the implementation of the 
PNPB, these conflicting goals remain a source of ongoing debate (Sarah L. Stattman et al., 2008; 
Stattman et al., 2013). The second debate concerns the implicit assumption in the PNPB that small 
farmer participation in the production of biofuels will result in desirable small-scale family farmer 
development. This interpretation and ambition of social inclusion have been contested for their 
narrow (economic) definition of social inclusion and their relationship to rural development (e.g., 
Hospes and Clancy, 2011; MDA, 2013b; Quiñónez et al., 2012). 
The PNPB objective of small farmer social inclusion and rural development has been advanced with 
two main policy instruments: (a) the Social Fuel Seal (SFS), and (b) a special tax system. These 
instruments together are designed to facilitate and stimulate the inclusion and involvement of family 
farmers in the northeast (the poorest region of Brazil) in biofuel production, as opposed to the large-
scale agricultural producers in the central west. The SFS is awarded by the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development (MDA) to biodiesel companies that buy a minimum percentage of their biodiesel 
feedstock from small farmers. Only companies that possess the SFS are allowed to bring their 
biodiesel onto the Brazilian biodiesel market. In addition to buying feedstock from family farmers, 
biodiesel companies are obliged by the SFS to deliver technical assistance and support to these 
family farmers. This means that they have to support small-scale family farmers in improving their 
agricultural systems and farming practices, resulting in their economic and social development as 
defined by the Brazilian government. The tax model supports this objective by reducing taxes 
depending on the region and type of crop; for example, family farmers in the northeast who produce 
castor or palm oil pay lower taxes than do large-scale farmers in the central west who produce 
soybean oil. 
In spite of these policy measures, the involvement and ‘‘inclusion’’ of small farmers in biodiesel 
production lagged behind governmental expectations and targets in the early years of the PNPB. 
However, this changed with the biodiesel policy revision in January 2009, which, among other 
changes, enhanced the role of agricultural cooperatives in biodiesel feedstock production and 
marketing. From 2009 onward, cooperatives have appeared to function as key organizations 
between farmers, industry and government authorities in implementing the biodiesel social inclusion 
policy. This raises questions with regard to how and why cooperatives are successful in integrating 
small farmers into the biodiesel chain and what this cooperative-enhanced social inclusion actually 
means for family farmers. In focusing on the (changing) role of agricultural cooperatives in biodiesel 
production, we aim to contribute to the wider debates on the social sustainability of biofuels and on 
cooperatives in rural development. 
Before introducing the research outcomes (Section ‘Bahian cooperatives participating in the PNPB’), 
the theoretical framework of cooperatives in rural development (Section ‘A role for cooperatives in 
rural development’) and the history of biodiesel promotion policy in Brazil are introduced (Section 
‘The National Program of Production and Use of Biodiesel’). Section ‘Social inclusion’ analyzes how 
and with what consequences cooperatives have successfully advanced the social inclusion of family 
farmers in the biodiesel chain and is followed by conclusions. 
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3.2 A role for cooperatives in rural development 
Currently, rural development policies are an important part of Brazil’s social policies. In November 
1999, the government even created a ministry to specifically support agrarian reform and the 
sustainable development of family agriculture (MDA, 2013c). This is very different from the period 
during the military dictatorship (1964–1984) when the focus was primarily on opening up new land 
in the Amazon region and settling farmers on public lands. Schneider et al. (2010: 231-235) 
distinguish three consecutive phases in post-military rural development policies. In the first phase 
(1993–1998), the government had a strong focus on agrarian issues such as unequal land ownership. 
Rural organizations and social movements, such as the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST) and the 
Land Pastoral Commission (CPT), emerged as important action and lobby groups. A first generation 
of rural policies for small family farmers was created to give these farmers access to credit and 
financial support, such as PRONAF (National Program for Family Agriculture). The creation of the 
MDA to facilitate these processes can also be considered an outcome of this first phase. 
The second phase (1998–2005) can be characterized by social and compensation policies that aimed 
to increase the income and welfare of family farmers. During this phase, programs for food security 
and family spending, such as Bolsa Familia, were developed and implemented. In the third phase 
(2005–present), attention has shifted to fine tuning and improving existing rural development 
programs through changing their institutional design and better integrating different levels of 
government and other institutions. Schneider et al. (2010: 233) place the development of the 
biodiesel program in this last phase because it is a fine-tuned strategy of adding value to products 
from family farmers and of making markets accessible to them. 
Two key elements of this third phase are relevant for our biodiesel analysis. First, rural Brazil can be 
characterized by significant regional differences, for instance, when considering socioeconomic 
indicators such as income, health, infant mortality and nutrition. The richer south and southeast 
regions score much better on these indicators than do the poorer north and northeast ones, 
although the inequality between these regions seems to be declining slowly (World Bank, 2013). 
These differences require rural development policies to be fine-tuned to different regions to be 
effective and this is also a core characteristic of this third phase with respect to biofuel policies. 
Second, one of the key institutional changes of the third phase seems to be the increased 
involvement of local agricultural cooperatives in rural development. Government agencies argue that 
cooperatives increase effectiveness and reduce the costs of rural development policies. In evaluating 
Brazilian rural development policies the Washington Office on Latin America (2013: 11-13) recently 
concluded that consultation with and the involvement of cooperatives and producer organizations 
had positive effects on rural development and on long-term policy effectiveness, although the 
participation of the most marginalized farmers remains limited. 
3.2.1 Agricultural cooperatives as hybrid governance form 
To explore the potential role of agricultural cooperatives in rural development and biodiesel policies, 
we turn to the cooperative literature. Economic organization scholars usually distinguish between 
markets, hierarchies and hybrids. Markets are forms of economic organization and coordination in 
which no hierarchy is used and contracts are the typical form through which markets organize inter-
firm cooperation. Hierarchies, in contrast, use authority over decisions to coordinate and cooperate 
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economically. Hybrids are intermediate forms of economic organization. They are market-like in 
some dimensions and hierarchy-like in others. A wide variety of hybrid arrangements have been 
identified, including franchise agreements, partnerships, business networks, supply chains and 
cooperatives (e.g., Bonus, 1986; Makadok and Coff, 2009; Ménard, 2004). Ménard (2004: 348) 
concludes that ‘‘there is indeed a great diversity of agreements among legally autonomous entities 
doing business together, mutually adjusting with little help from the price system and sharing or 
exchanging technologies, capital, products and services, but without a unified ownership. These 
characteristics are likely the minimum required to encapsulate the variety of hybrids’’. Makadok and 
Coff (2009) offer a further-refined taxonomy of hybrid forms of governance using three dimensions: 
authority, ownership and incentives. Cooperatives can be viewed as a ‘‘true hybrid’’ because 
‘‘cooperatives blend market-like attributes with hierarchy-like mechanisms’’ (Chaddad, 2012: 447). 
Although this literature is very insightful regarding the unique forms of economic organizations 
between markets and hierarchies, it limits the role of cooperatives to a strong focus on transaction 
cost minimization as the explanation for their emergence and existence. Sociological studies also 
interpret cooperatives in terms of movements that organize landless people and peasants to 
articulate their interests in other economic organizations and government authorities (e.g., Altieri 
and Toledo, 2011). According to Ingalsbe and Groves (1989) the emergence of agricultural 
cooperatives should be understood not only by reference to economic conditions and logic but also 
public policy and governmental interests and logic. Government authorities can have various 
interests in supporting and advancing agricultural cooperatives because cooperatives can play a role 
in the pacification of rural (land) conflicts, in integrating peasants into markets to advance rural 
development and in rolling out government social and economic programs in peripheral areas. In the 
analysis of cooperative thought and history, little attention has been given to the relationship 
between cooperatives and government policies for rural development (Torgerson et al., 1998), but 
such a perspective is key in understanding the emergent role of cooperatives in Brazilian biodiesel 
policy. Of course, such a policy perspective does not render conventional economic organizational 
and sociological perspectives irrelevant. 
3.2.2 Cooperatives in Brazilian rural development 
In Brazil, agricultural cooperatives have always received special government attention. Even before 
the military dictatorship, the government made instrumental use of cooperatives to encourage 
frontier development by small farmers, to encourage market production, to further technological 
development and agricultural extension and to improve economies of scale (Chase, 2003). The more 
recent government ‘‘use’’ of cooperatives in biodiesel policy and rural development is in line with 
these historical developments. 
Brazil is a large, unevenly developed country with different agricultural systems and different 
cooperative traditions. Academics such as (Bialoskorski, 2003) and cooperatives themselves 
distinguish among three ideal types of agricultural cooperatives, each with a specific approach 
towards rural development. ‘‘Traditional cooperatives’’ were initiated by (European) immigrants 
more than 100 years ago and were successfully promoted by the government for frontier rural 
development; currently, they are the older (more mature) cooperatives generally represented 
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through membership in the Brazilian Cooperative Organization (OCB)3. They are predominantly 
located in the southern regions of Brazil, have many members and are well organized in providing 
(access to) credit, technology and services to their members and representing member interests in 
governments and supply chains. 
In the 1990s, a second group of cooperatives emerged representing an ‘‘economics of solidarity’’ 
(Bialoskorski, 2003). These cooperatives are rooted in a history of local labor and trade unions, such 
as the Movement of Landless People (MST) and the National Workers Federation for Family 
Agriculture (FETRAF4) (Abramovay et al., 2008). These cooperatives are not registered with the 
Brazilian Cooperative Organization because they do not recognize its authority (Bialoskorski, 2003: 
5). Economics of solidarity cooperatives generally seek agricultural reform and more autonomy from 
and power in dealings with the government and agribusiness. This ‘‘younger generation’’ of 
cooperatives is still building its institutional structure and capacity and can be found in different 
regions of Brazil, especially in areas without a long-standing cooperative tradition (e.g., the north and 
northeast). 
Finally, ‘‘virtual or elite cooperatives’’ do not necessarily possess significant assets or industrial plants 
and are not always associations of small farmers, but they form a (wealthy) economic network with a 
particular business strategy in agricultural markets (Bialoskorski Neto, 2001: 153; Chase, 2003). 
These cooperatives are driven by the globalization of commodity markets and adapt their strategies 
to international (niche) markets. They seek economies of scale, use advanced technological systems 
and operate on an exclusive basis (through high membership fees). These cooperatives can be found 
across the country. 
In general, large-scale, highly efficient farmers who produce for worldwide commodity markets 
compose traditional or elite cooperatives. These farmers are often located in the central west or 
south of Brazil. Small-scale family farmers from the north and northeast who produce for their own 
livelihood and/or for local or regional markets are either members of economics of solidarity 
cooperatives or are not cooperative members at all. Historical factors and unequal landownership 
entitlements explain this geographic differentiation in types of cooperatives and why the level of 
organization of farmers in cooperatives has always been very low in the north and northeast 
(Lehtonen, 2011; e.g., Magalhães and Drouvot, 2009). Compared with those in the south and central 
west, cooperatives in the north and northeast often have low organizational capacity, social capital 
and trust (Kilham et al., 2010; Watanabe et al., 2012) and, more than incidentally, have a negative 
reputation among farmers because of corruption and their (government-related) roles in the political 
control of farmers (César and Batalha, 2010). 
3.3 The National Program of Production and Use of Biodiesel 
Brazil has a long history of using biofuels as an alternative to fossil fuels. The production and use of 
ethanol, to partly replace gasoline, increased strongly from the 1970s. In the 1970s, attempts were 
also made to introduce biodiesel, but owing to a lack of supply and infrastructure, this did not occur 
                                                          
3 Organização das Cooperativas Brasileiras (OCB). 
4 Federação Nacional dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras na Agricultura Familiar (FETRAF). 
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at a national level (Stattman et al., 2013). The 2004 National Program of Production and Use of 
Biodiesel (PNPB) marks the start of the growing production and use of biodiesel in Brazil. 
The PNPB was formed as the result of an inter-ministerial negotiation among 14 different ministries. 
These negotiations led to the two main objectives of the PNPB: market creation and the social 
inclusion of family farmers. Market creation was encouraged through the decision that biodiesel 
should be gradually integrated into the Brazilian energy market through compulsory blending targets 
(biodiesel to diesel) that increase over time (i.e., B2-2% blend— between 2008 and 2011 and B5-5% 
blend—in 2012). Social inclusion was promoted through an auction, a social seal and a tax system 
that gave specific preference to biofuels produced by small holders in the northeast as opposed to 
large-scale agricultural producers in the central west and south of Brazil. These two policy lines of 
market creation and social inclusion are closely linked. 
3.3.1 Design of PNPB social inclusion policy 
The PNPB policy is designed to work as follows. Fuel companies are obligated to increase their blend 
of biodiesel to diesel on the domestic market. Hence, they have to buy biodiesel at national auctions 
that are organized by the National Agency for Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels (ANP). This national 
agency determines the quantity of biodiesel that can enter the Brazilian market, which will slowly 
increase as blending targets become higher (from B2 to B5 and further). These auctions create the 
demand for biodiesel and are simultaneously intended to stimulate investment and production in 
the early stages of the PNPB. Petrobras, the national oil company, buys this biodiesel sold through 
the auctions in advance and thus establishes a secure market for biodiesel-producing companies 
(Pousa et al., 2007). The social sustainability of the PNPB is organized through the Social Fuel Seal 
(SFS). This SFS can only be obtained by biodiesel producers if they purchase a percentage of their raw 
material from family farmers. The MDA defines who qualifies as family farmers and awards the SFS 
to biodiesel companies that can prove that they have (sufficient) contracts with family farmers. Only 
biodiesel producers that hold the SFS are allowed to bring their biodiesel to the auctions. In sum, this 
means that only biodiesel companies that buy a specified percentage of their raw material from 
family farmers are able to participate in the ANP auctions and thus bring their product onto the 
market to be purchased by fuel companies for blending. The required amount of family farmer 
feedstock that companies must buy varies per region and over time (Table 3.1). 
The MDA determines who can register as a family farmer. Registration is possible at the farm or the 
institutional (e.g., cooperative) level. To qualify as a family farmer, the farmer must ask for DAP 
individual5, based on proven land entitlements, the size of the area, the number of residents and the 
composition of work and income on the farm. Local administrative offices of labor or trade unions 
ensure the fulfillment of these criteria. A cooperative can ask for DAP Juridica when 70% of the 
members of the cooperative qualify as family farmers (until March 2010, this was 90%; Watanabe et 
al., 2012). Biodiesel companies that buy sufficient feedstock from individual family farmers or from 
cooperatives with DAP Juridica thus receive the SFS. 
                                                          
5 DAP (Declaração de Aptidão ao PRONAF) is the statement of eligibility for the National Program for the 
Strengthening of Family Agriculture (PRONAF, 2013). 
Chapter 3  
44 
The necessity to receive the SFS is a key incentive for companies to buy their raw material from 
family farmers. In practice, this means that biodiesel industries need to develop contracts with family 
farmers because legal contracts rather than the actual transfer of feedstock into biodiesel production 
are the basis of qualifying for the SFS. In the early phases of the PNPB, these contracts with family 
farmers were negotiated with the help of local labor unions and cooperatives. These contracts do 
not just represent a commitment to buy raw material from the family farmers, but also include the 
signing of a technical collaboration agreement that requires the biodiesel industry to provide 
technical assistance and support to these farmers, e.g., providing assistance with logistics, providing 
new or better seeds, improving farming systems, supporting better infrastructure and sometimes 
even providing support with access to credit. In addition to the SFS system described above, the 
taxation system benefits biodiesel companies that buy raw material from family farmers who 
produce castor oil in the northeast versus companies that buy from large-scale soy producers in the 
center-west of Brazil. 
 
Table 3.1 Percentage family farmer feedstock necessary for obtaining SFS  
Region 
% harvest until 
2009 
% harvest 2009/2010 % harvest 2010/2011 
Centre-West and North 10 10 15 
Northeast and Semi-arid 50 30 30 
South-East and South 30 30 30 
Source: Lei n. 11.116, MDA (2012b) 
 
3.3.2 Stagnation and adaptation of social inclusion 
The early years of the PNPB (2005–2009) showed rapid growth in biodiesel production, from 736 m3 
(2005) to 1,608,448 m3 (2009) (ANP, 2012; Souza and Paulillo, 2010: 9). Figure 3.1 demonstrates that 
the majority of biodiesel production took place in the center-west and south of Brazil, despite policy 
incentives to increase biodiesel production in the poor north and northeast. Moreover, soy from 
larger farmers proved to be dominant, whereas castor, palm and other vegetable oils constituted 
only a marginal portion of biodiesel production (Leite et al., 2013; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2010). 
Only 37,000 family farmers were reported to be included in the biodiesel value chain in 2008, far 
below the government target of 200,000 (Wilkinson and Herrera, 2010: 758). These numbers 
increased to over 100,000 family farmers in 2010, but only 246 of them were located in the less 
developed northern region (César and Batalha, 2013). 
The government related the complications with the implementation of the PNPB and its social 
sustainability policies to the fact that biodiesel companies had little experience with technical and 
development assistance projects for family farmers and lacked the agricultural knowledge needed to 
provide farmer assistance (César and Batalha, 2010; Garcez and Vianna, 2009; Hall et al., 2009). By 
the same token, family farmers had relatively small plots of land that were only partly available for 
biodiesel feedstock production. Family farmers also had limited experience with biodiesel crops, 
technical assistance and seed provision were not always appropriate or provided at the appropriate 
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time, resulting in low harvests (Kilham et al., 2010). Contracts between family farmers and the 
biodiesel industry proved difficult to enforce and were often ignored by family farmers because they 
lacked experience with commercial ventures, preferred to produce other (food) crops, favored local 
traders over regional biodiesel companies, and/or felt ill-treated by the industry regarding payments 
and seed delivery (Leite et al., 2013; Magalhães and Drouvot, 2009; Watanabe et al., 2012). Hence, 
contract compliance was poor and logistical and transaction costs were high. 
  
Figure 3.1 Biodiesel production (B100) per region from 2005-2011 (in m3) 
Source: developed by authors based on statistics provided by ANP (2012) 
 
These biodiesel policy implementation problems and the poor record of social inclusion prompted a 
policy adaptation in 2009 consisting of three major changes: (a) the minimum percentage of 
biodiesel feedstock obtained from small farmers decreased in the northeast and semi-arid regions 
from 50% to 30% (Watanabe et al., 2012: 4034; see also Table 1); (b) Petrobras (the national oil 
company) was allowed to establish a special biofuels branch, PBio, responsible for the inclusion of 
family farmers in the northeast and semi-arid regions, which completely changed the ‘‘buyers’’ 
market for biodiesel; and (c) the role of agricultural cooperatives changed from passive 
intermediaries to more active actors through new policy incentives (MDA, 2010). In this paper, we 
especially focus on the third change, i.e., the new position of agricultural cooperatives, and, to a 
lesser extent, on the second change. 
3.3.3 Cooperatives and the restructuring of the PNPB after 2009 
With the revised biodiesel policy of 2009, the Brazilian state actively supported the development of 
cooperatives as a way to enhance the social inclusion of family farmers in biodiesel feedstock 
production. The MDA stated that the formation and functioning of cooperatives were essential for 
the social success of the PNPB and the long-term sustainability of biodiesel production (MDA, 2010: 
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35). A key change was that biodiesel companies were now allowed to buy their biodiesel feedstock 
from agricultural cooperatives and would still receive the desired Social Fuel Seal as long as the 
cooperatives possessed DAP Juridica. To receive DAP Juridica, the cooperatives are required to 
inform the MDA about their business with family farmers, to play a main role in technical assistance 
and to become responsible for the biodiesel feedstock operations and transactions. In addition, the 
MDA actively stimulated cooperatives by supporting different cooperative projects (César and 
Batalha, 2013; MDA, 2012a) that linked biodiesel policy to other policies that supported family 
agriculture, such as the National Program for Strengthening Family Agriculture (PRONAF6), the Food 
Acquisition Program (PAA7) and the National School Nutrition Program (PNAE8). This new 
government strategy reflected the ambition of the government to create a more integrated 
approach toward rural development and is in line with earlier experiments from the 1940s through 
the 1960s, when cooperatives were used as instruments to enhance rural development and to align 
small (frontier) farmers into wider, state directed development trajectories. The policy intentions 
stated by the ministry reflect a multidimensional stimulation policy for cooperatives that aims to 
enable and mobilize their capacity to (MDA, 2010): 
 Ensure that the socioeconomic benefits of the PNPB become available for family agriculture. 
 Stimulate family farmers into further cooperation via cooperative membership. 
 Make the benefits of PRONAF and DAP available to family farmers. 
 Provide technical assistance and commercialization of oil crops and co-products produced by 
family farmers. 
 Disseminate technical knowledge on oil crops and co-products among family farmers. 
 Exchange experiences about technologies, production and commercialization of biodiesel 
crops. 
Government agencies active in stimulating cooperatives in the northeast also include the national 
development bank and the main oil company, Petrobras (Magalhães and Drouvot, 2009). Initially, 
Petrobras was only responsible for providing logistical support and blending of biodiesel and was 
not, as in the ethanol/sugarcane industry (Stattman et al., 2013), involved in feedstock production. 
After failures to include sufficient family farmers in the PNPB, the government initiated the creation 
of Petrobras Biofuels (PBio), a biofuel and vegetable oil company, in 2009. This subsidiary of 
Petrobras was intended to support, in a not-for-profit manner, the biodiesel development in the 
north and northeast by improving the social inclusion of family farmers. PBio has the specific tasks of 
supplying seeds to family farmers, improving technical assistance, buying produced feedstock above 
market prices, reducing smallholder vulnerability, supporting local cooperatives and social 
movements in improving the bargaining power of family farmers (Bastos Lima, 2011). PBio now 
provides(or, more often, organizes the provision of) technical assistance, seeds (castor, soy, 
sunflower and palm), advice, and—together with regional governments (e.g., that of Bahiastate)—
financial and organizational support of cooperatives. PBio claims—and this was supported by our 
                                                          
6 Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar – this program offers projects and financial 
support to family farmers to support them to improve their livelihoods. 
7 
Programa de Aquisicao de Alimentos – stimulates buying food products from family farmers. 
8 
Programa Nacional de Alimentacao Escolar – School Feeding Law (Law. No. 11.947/2009): 30% of the food for 
school feeding programs must be purchased from local family farmers. 
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interviews—that in Bahia alone, it had contracts with over 25,000 farmers through cooperatives or 
family farmer associations in 2011 (Souza, 2011), indicating that PBio is succeeding at including 
northeast family farmers in the PNPB.  
Figures provided by the MDA indicate that this shift in strategy has indeed increased the number of 
cooperatives that participate in the PNPB (Figure 3.2) and the number of family farmers involved 
(Figure 3.3). Both figures display the initial problems with the PNPB, showing a strong decline in 2007 
and 2008 and significant increases following the policy revision of 2009. Until 2009, cooperatives in 
the north and northeast were only marginally involved in the PNPB, but since then, the numbers of 
involved cooperatives and farmers has rapidly increased. We will use research on cooperatives in 
Bahia to reveal what is behind this apparent successful engagement of north and northeast family 
farmers in Brazilian biodiesel policies and what that means for rural development. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Overview of the number of family farmer cooperatives that participate in the PNPB, 2006 - 
2012  
Source: developed by authors, based on data from MDA (2013b, 2013c, 2013a, 2010) 
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Figure 3.3 Number of family farmers that participated in the PNPB in the North/Northeast and in 
total, 2005–2010 
Source: developed by authors. based on data from MDA (2010) 
 
3.3.4 Research methodology 
All agricultural cooperatives participating in the PNPB are registered on a continuously updated list 
(MDA, 2012c). This registration can be used by biodiesel companies that want to buy feedstock from 
these cooperatives to obtain the SFS. During our fieldwork in fall 2012, 18 cooperatives in the 
northeastern states were registered: Alagoas (1), Bahia (14), Piaui (1) and Sergipe (2). This research 
focuses on the state of Bahia because it has the largest number of participating cooperatives and is 
one of the largest states in Brazil with a variety of agricultural systems. Bahia has approximately 
760,000 farmers who would qualify as family farmers (IBGE, 2006), with a growing number of 
farmers currently involved in the PNPB through the SFS. Most farmers involved in the PNPB are 
members of agricultural cooperatives. Bahia can be divided into three different agro-ecological zones 
that each produce different biodiesel crops: coastal (palm oil), central/ semi-arid (castor) and 
western (soy) (Figure 3.4). 
In total, 8 out of 14 cooperatives in Bahia (that together represented 32,000 family farmer members 
in 2012; Table 3.2) were selected for our field research, based on regional differentiation across 
these three agro-ecological zones. Seven of them had DAP Juridica and were on the ministry’s list; 
the eighth is in the process of receiving approval from the ministry for inclusion on the list. The 
regional spread, climatological differentiation and crop diversity make these cooperatives 
representative of the 14 Bahia agricultural cooperatives on the ministry’s list. Semi-structured 
interviews (13) were held with the president and/or manager of these eight cooperatives who was 
responsible for implementing the PNPB and for technical assistance. Triangulation of this information 
was obtained through informal interviews and participation in meetings with family farmers 
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(cooperative members) (11), academics (9) and regional and national policy makers (9) and through 
analyzing policy documents and secondary literature. The interviews with cooperatives took place in 
fall 2012 but built on various previous visits to Brazil in the period 2007–2010. Cross-checking the 
interview information with other sources proved to be difficult. The last agricultural census was held 
in 2006, which means that any changes as a result of the (revision of the) PNPB are not yet available. 
Another challenge is that the census provides general information about family farmers but not 
information specific to cooperative members or PNPB participants. No reliable data exist on 
cooperative members or PNPB participating farmers. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Selected cooperatives in the three agro-ecological zones of the State of Bahia 
Source: Cartographer B. du Pon, based on data provided by authors. 
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3.4 Bahian cooperatives participating in the PNPB 
This section begins by analyzing the general issues and experiences mentioned by all cooperatives,9 
followed by a discussion of specific developments per agro-ecological zone. 
3.4.1 Cooperatives and the PNPB 
All eight cooperatives are relatively young (<17 years). Five cooperatives were founded in the late 
1990s and the remaining three were founded in the early 2000s (Table 3.2). This shows that all of 
these cooperatives were founded during the second phase of rural development policies (1998–
2005), which also explains why many of them have a background in social movements or rural 
syndicates. They were often built upon or started by local labor unions or social movements that 
used existing organizational structures and/or received governmental support through agricultural 
reform (i.e., redistribution of land for landless farmers), although some were (co-)founded by 
farmers, banks, or NGOs (Table 3.2). Only COOTEBA was founded by a company (Brazil Ecodiesel) 
and a bank (Banco do Brasil) at the start of the PNPB, with the sole objective of delivering biodiesel 
feedstock. According to the classification system presented above, all cooperatives can be regarded 
as representing the ‘‘economics of solidarity’’. Two show some traits of ‘‘elite cooperatives’’ 
(COOTRASB and COOMAF)10 because they have limited and more exclusive membership conditions 
and a strategic focus on specific niche markets for their agricultural products. Nevertheless, both 
presented plans to gradually open up membership to larger numbers of family farmers, which 
represents a strategic move to maintain the DAP Juridica certificate. All eight cooperatives have seen 
membership numbers increase rapidly in recent years and most are still in the process of developing 
their institutional structures. They started small, with 20–50 farmers (COOPAF is an exception, 
having started with > 500 members), but have grown rapidly, with between 50 and 500 new 
members/year. This also illustrates the rather recent cooperative tradition in Bahia compared with 
other regions in Brazil, where cooperatives can have histories of over 100 years. According to our 
interviews, membership increase was attributable to the cooperatives’ more active approach toward 
family farmers, offering technical assistance and trainings, as well as their successes in obtaining 
higher prices for certain agricultural products in recent years. Most of the cooperatives try to keep 
their membership fees low to attract farmers to join. Membership is generally paid in cash or by a 
combination of cash and goods. To put our sample in perspective, the 32,328 members of the eight 
studied cooperatives in 2012 compose less than 5% of the total number of family farmers in Bahia 
(761,528 in 2006, IBGE, 2006). These data, however, do provide evidence of major growth in 
cooperative membership in Bahia from the approximately 830 members in the late 1990s. 
Cooperatives and their members mentioned a number of reasons why they were not attracted to the 
PNPB before 2009: internal debates/conflicts over fuel versus food production, little trust of 
biodiesel industries, the absence of a formalized position for cooperatives within the PNPB and the 
                                                          
9
 All data in this section are based on interviews with cooperatives, family farmer members and other 
stakeholders unless indicated otherwise. Because several interviewees demanded anonymity (especially with 
regard to criticism of PBio and the government), clear references to particular cooperatives could not always 
be made. 
10 
It is interesting that these same two cooperatives are currently (late 2013) having trouble obtaining and 
maintaining the SFS. 
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inaccessibility of the SFS for cooperatives. The latter made them irrelevant partners for industry. 
Their strong relationships with and embeddedness in social movements may explain the strong 
internal food-versus-fuel debates and the strong reluctance to collaborate with the biodiesel 
industry to produce agro-fuels. After 2009, this changed because of new market opportunities for 
family farmers, the benefits of additional technical assistance and seeds and the opportunity to 
strengthen their power (interview with COOMAF). The creation of PBio, with the federal 
government’s clear aim to develop biodiesel programs in the northeast, further stimulated this 
process. This policy change also opened up the market for cooperatives with a more ‘‘elitist’’ 
background (e.g., COOTRASB and COOMAF) because they would not have qualified for the SFS 
before 2009 and therefore would not have been useful partners for the industry. Cooperatives are 
gradually harmonizing their strategies vis-à-vis PBio and learning from each other on the PNPB. 
Cooperatives show similar developments with regard to biodiesel dynamics and they are increasingly 
interlinked and collaborating with each other through horizontal coordination. They view the PNPB—
especially since its 2009 revision—as an additional opportunity to empower their institutional 
structures and to provide more and better technical assistance, support and services to their family 
farmer members. 
This change also brought the further dependence of cooperatives on the current system. The 
(financial) support for technical assistance embedded in the SFS and the biodiesel supply contracts 
are crucial for the growth and professionalization of cooperatives. Without these ‘‘rights’’, 
participation in the PNPB would be much less attractive for cooperatives. Hence, a main concern of 
cooperatives is the future stability of the program and its institutional changes, especially their 
dependence on PBio as the sole buyer of their raw materials. Cooperatives feel vulnerable to policy 
adaptations, for instance, when PBio might be released from its obligation to buy from them. This 
dependence of cooperatives on the current policy structure becomes evident when noticing that 
most cooperatives only started participating in the PNPB after the 2009 policy revisions. 
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3.4.2 Cooperatives by agro-ecological zone 
The PNPB aims at promoting specific crops (palm, castor, and sunflower) produced by family 
farmers that often relate to different agro-ecological conditions in specific agricultural systems. In 
the western agricultural zone of Bahia, the cooperative COOMAF has soybeans as its main 
vegetable oil crop for biodiesel production (Figure 3.4). Because oil from soybeans is dominating 
biodiesel production in Brazil (more than 90%) and is mainly produced by large-scale agro-industry 
farmers in the center-west (ANP, 2012; MDA, 2013a), this poses challenges for COOMAF. A 
comparative advantage exists because COOMAF soybeans are produced only by family farmers. 
The cooperative considers the PNPB a welcome additional and secure source of income, mainly 
because of the fixed, long-term contracts with PBio. This means that farmers run less risk regarding 
seed investments and during the growing season. COOMAF also encourages its members to 
participate in other government programs such as the National School Nutrition Program and the 
Food Acquisition Program. Family farmers have been convinced to join because of the benefits of 
membership, including the agricultural and non-agricultural services provided to them such as 
assistance meeting irrigation challenges and assistance with crops adapted to the agro-ecological 
conditions of that region. For instance, a local seed bank was developed to improve productivity. 
These initiatives and technical assistance to members are made possible through financial support 
from the PNPB contracts, according to COOMAF. However, for COOMAF, it remains quite 
challenging to convince family farmers to join the cooperative. Family farmers live in very remote 
areas and do not always understand the cooperative system. Distance makes it complicated for 
COOMAF to provide sufficient agricultural assistance to all (potential) members. 
In the center of Bahia, castor is the main biodiesel crop; castor is a crop rich in oil (up to 45%) that 
produces high-quality biodiesel. In this region, castor beans have always been planted by farmers. 
The crop is considered very suitable for family farming because production requires a large amount 
of (hand) labor. Castor oil once had a quite low market value, but market prices are increasing 
rapidly. This poses new challenges in the context of the PNPB because the oil is currently rather 
expensive for biodiesel production. However, from a rural development perspective, this price 
increase enables farmers to earn more from their produce. Cooperatives have further contributed 
to this phenomenon by successfully excluding local intermediaries and motivating farmers to sell 
their produce directly to the cooperative (see also Schaffel et al., 2012). This change has not only 
reduced costs, but also given cooperatives more power to negotiate better prices for their 
members. Although selling castor for biodiesel production is no longer the most attractive market, 
at this moment, contracts with PBio still give cooperatives and family farmers highly valued 
security in the form of a guaranteed market with pre-negotiated prices. Climatologic conditions 
(shortness of rain) may (and did) lead to failed harvests and lower production, making it impossible 
for cooperatives to meet the required quantities as agreed in their contracts with PBio and causing 
financial difficulties. Nevertheless, both COOPERACD and COOPAF indicated that the SFS created a 
buffer between their members and PBio, allowing them to (re)negotiate with PBio on behalf of 
their members. The sharp increase in membership in both cooperatives after 2009 shows their 
success in this endeavor. 
Another key benefit from the PNPB is technical assistance, which PBio must deliver to the farmers 
and for which it uses the cooperatives. COOPERACD and COOPAF argue that many members face 
challenges because of their remote locations and poor infrastructure. The technical assistance 
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program helps cooperatives to reach these farmers and to increase their agricultural productivity 
(see also Schaffel et al., 2012). Both cooperatives argued that medium-sized family farmers are 
most successful in benefiting from their technical assistance and adapting farming practices 
because they have the capacity and education to adopt new knowledge and change production 
practices. The smallest farmers in remote areas—the original targets of social inclusion—profit less 
from PNPB-induced technical assistance because they are primarily subsistence farmers with less 
ability and/or willingness to make these types of structural changes (see also Watanabe et al., 
2012). Cooperatives find it difficult to convince these farmers to join technical assistance programs 
through membership but also indicate that they themselves fall short in efforts to approach them. 
This may be owing to the fact that these farmers choose not to join the PNPB (for a variety of 
different reasons) or that they are not interested in cooperative membership in general. Further 
survey research on small family farmers is needed on this subject. 
In the coastal region of Bahia, biodiesel comes from palm trees. Palm tree planting has a long 
tradition in the region, with different varieties and productivity levels, but has primarily been used 
as a local cooking oil. Local cartels kept palm oil prices quite low for a long time, but cooperatives 
have been able to break these cartels, resulting in a rapid increase in prices offered to farmers, 
according to COOTRASB. Although cooperatives do have contracts with PBio, no palm oil for 
biodiesel production has been delivered yet; projects are still in an initial phase. PBio has provided 
cooperatives and their farmers with new high-productivity palm tree varieties, but these palm 
trees take 4–5 years to become productive and the new trees have not yet been harvested. This is 
also the largest challenge for palm farmers because they have to reserve land for new trees but 
receive no additional income for years. COOFAVA uses technical assistance to temporarily promote 
inter-cropping with, e.g., bananas. Cooperatives, often with local government assistance, also 
improve traditional pressing methods (and increase harvests) by establishing small pressing 
factories to create a product with a higher value, a strategy frequently adopted by cooperatives 
(see also Wilkinson and Herrera, 2010: 759). International market prices for palm oil are higher 
than the local prices offered by PBio because it only pays prices comparable with those for soy oil, 
whereas palm oil has a higher value. However, COOTRASB accepts prices that are lower than 
international market prices because they are part of a package that includes (technical) assistance 
for pressing facilities, agricultural equipment and credit access. Additionally, other cooperatives 
prefer to continue selling (part of) the harvest to PBio because of the income security for family 
farmers. Participation in the PNPB helps them to improve their organizational capacities and to 
receive financial compensation for their agricultural extension services. 
3.5 Social inclusion 
3.5.1 Cooperative inclusion in the PNPB 
Regardless of the diversity of family farmer cooperatives in the three regions,11 the cooperatives as 
a whole appreciate the PNPB because it offers concrete support and resources for family farmers 
such as obligatory technical assistance, the provision of seeds, infrastructure improvements and 
partial income security. The PNPB is preferred over other large government family farmer support 
                                                          
11 
See footnote 7. 
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programs, such as the PNAE and the PAA, because it is the only program that offers financial 
resources through contracts with the biodiesel industry/PBio. To participate in both PNPB/SFS and 
other governmental family farmer support programs, either DAP individual (farmers) or DAP 
Juridica (cooperatives) is needed. Although the difficulty in obtaining DAP is sometimes mentioned 
as an important reason why family farmers do not want to participate in the PNPB (Kilham et al., 
2010; e.g., Watanabe et al., 2012), none of the eight cooperatives and none of the interviewed 
family farmers recognized this as a problem. Obtaining DAP Juridica proved possible, but the need 
to review DAP Juridica every 1–3 years is perceived as a significant administrative burden by some 
cooperatives. Individual family farmers indicated that DAP individual can be easily obtained 
through local rural syndicate offices. 
At the start of the PNPB, social movements related to agriculture—and many economics of 
solidarity cooperatives that originated from these movements—were quite critical of the biodiesel 
policy. In spite of the SFS, they considered the PNPB to be part of the agribusiness paradigm with 
major advantages for large-scale agriculture. In addition, they had principal objections against 
using arable land for fuel instead of food production (e.g., Fernandes et al., 2010). This view 
dominated the public debate in Bahia in the early years of the PNPB. Cooperatives proved unable 
and unwilling to convince and organize family farmers around biodiesel feedstock production, in 
part because the biodiesel policy did not specify the tasks and responsibilities of cooperatives and 
cooperatives could not function as legal entities in SFS contracts; they were only able to carry out 
extension services and coordinate the buying of seeds, fertilizers and agricultural equipment. The 
2009 policy change enhanced the position and power of cooperatives in biodiesel policy 
implementation, resulting in greater membership and improved organizational capacity and 
professionalization. The PNPB also motivated cooperatives to establish better organizational and 
collaborative structures to develop a common negotiation strategy with Petrobras. These 
interactions and joint operations have also increased mutual learning among cooperatives. They 
are becoming more than just providers of feedstock for the biodiesel industry and providers of 
technical assistance and services to members. They are professionalizing their buying and selling 
positions in the market, building storage facilities to have better negotiation positions on the 
market, constructing and running small factories/presses that help them (and their members) to 
add value to agricultural products and expanding their services to a broader variety of farm 
products by including more crops or livestock. This process of growth and institutionalization is 
paralleled by a stronger market orientation, larger organizations with their own interests, greater 
financial risks and vulnerability and a growing (financial) dependence of cooperatives on 
government programs, to the extent that this dependence may undermine long-term stability. 
Hence, the character of these economics of solidarity cooperatives is beginning to change. Some 
cooperatives felt that they had to ensure that farmers did not perceive them as extensions of a 
government agency but continued to see them as organizations that represented the interests of 
their members. 
The challenges cooperatives face in relation to the PNPB are political and financial in nature. The 
uncertain future of the program and the significant dependence on the SFS pose major challenges. 
Cooperatives indicated that the sole reason that PBio or any other biodiesel company buys raw 
material from cooperatives is to obtain SFS. Several cooperatives mentioned concerns that PBio 
only uses soy for biodiesel production and re-sells the other vegetable oils (castor and palm) with a 
profit to other industries (a development also noted by César and Batalha, 2013: 4033; Wilkinson 
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and Herrera, 2010: 759). Family farmers are then hardly relevant as raw material producers for 
biodiesel production but rather are only an entry ticket into the biodiesel market auctions. As soon 
as the political system changes this SFS/auction entrance requirement, the preferential family 
farmer position in biofuel feedstock provisioning could be severely undermined. 
In addition, most cooperatives are facing financial woes because their low membership fees barely 
cover organizational costs. By the same token, they are hesitant to increase fees because that 
could discourage family farmers from becoming members. Although cooperatives are hesitant to 
impede access for family farmers, recently at least two cooperatives substantially increased their 
fees, and others are considering doing so. This is necessary to cover increasing financial costs to 
run and professionalize their cooperatives and to cope with existing internal financial problems. In 
addition, cooperatives function as a financial buffer between family farmers and PBio. Because the 
2009 PNPB reform cooperatives sign market contracts with PBio and receive financial 
compensation from PBio for, e.g., extension services, in return, they guarantee a certain harvest 
output. When the harvest fails and cooperatives cannot satisfy contract requirements, they are 
placed in a difficult (financial) position, but then PBio also provides (or pays cooperatives or other 
institutions to provide) technical assistance because of the policy requirement to buy feedstock 
from (or, better, to have contracts with) family farmers. Nonetheless, cooperatives have argued 
that to maintain or even expand this system of family farmer social inclusion, more investments 
(beyond the scope of the PNPB) are needed to improve infrastructure, storage facilities, technical 
advice and value-adding steps. All cooperatives complained about the lack of support for these 
additional investments and their inability to obtain bank credit, which hampered them in becoming 
more professional and better in serving (and expanding) their member bases. 
3.5.2 PNPB inclusion, rural development, social sustainability 
The PNPB sees family farmer participation in the biodiesel chain as an indicator or even an 
objective for improving social inclusion and, as a result, the social sustainability of biodiesel 
production. This is clearly formulated as one of the main objectives of the biodiesel policy and it 
resulted in high expectations among academics, companies and farmer representatives in the early 
years of PNPB implementation. The failure to involve family farmers in the PNPB and, thus, to 
‘‘socially include’’ them in rural development led to disappointment and disregard for the entire 
PNPB policy (see, for a discussion, César and Batalha, 2010; Wilkinson and Herrera, 2010). Did the 
2009 policy change force them to conclude differently? 
The 2009 change in PNPB policy did alter the participation of family farmers in PNPB, mostly 
through cooperatives. The further institutionalization of the cooperatives may be considered an 
unintended, but very relevant, side effect of the PNPB policy. Three questions remain: which family 
farmers participate in and hence profit from PNPB (mainly through cooperatives); does that 
participation result in their social inclusion and improved rural development (as was the objective 
of PNPB); and does PNPB participation also entail family farmer inclusion in the biofuel chain? 
The increased number of family farmers who have signed contracts with PBio (as individuals or as 
cooperative members) has clearly increased since 2009. However, not all family farmers profit 
equally from this change. In interviews, cooperatives and state officials clearly indicated that few 
smaller, subsistence farmers are members of the expanding cooperatives and few have signed 
contracts with PBio. As such, this category does not seem to have profited from the PNPB policy 
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change. It is difficult for cooperatives to stimulate membership among these farmers, and 
therefore, they are also excluded from the technical assistance, services and support provided 
through the PNPB and related programs. These farmers are often located in remote geographic 
areas with limited infrastructure. They generally have low levels of education and few resources 
and are reluctant to change their current farming practices according to the advice of cooperative 
staff or government officials. This differentiation between subsistence farmers and family farmers 
who are better off supports the conclusions of Rathmann et al. (2012) and Kilham et al. (2010) on 
the degree to which PNPB has reached its targets of social inclusion: it has not done so for all 
farmers. The inclusion policy of PNPB has achieved better results for family farmers who were 
already included in some form of commercializing their produce. However, did this result in the 
social inclusion of these family farmers in rural development? 
The PNPB offered these family farmers an additional, secure market outlet and increased access to 
assistance and services. Cooperatives have been instrumental in reaching out to these family 
farmers, channeling technical advice, seeds, infrastructure and credit facilities to member farmers. 
Through our interviews with cooperative leaders and staff, (a limited number of) individual family 
farmer members, state officials and PBio staff and from the (scarce) literature on PNPB policy in 
Bahia, it is clear that cooperative family farmer members indeed profit from these secure market 
outlets and especially from the PNPB technical and service support programs. As such, the 
inclusion of family farmers in the PNPB does seem to advance their social inclusion in Bahian rural 
(or, perhaps, economic) development. Through family farmer participation in the PNPB, incomes 
did increase (César and Batalha, 2013). Cooperatives all argue that this relative success can be 
attributed to the PNPB policy changes, which slowly moved the program from general national 
policies that hardly worked (2004–2009) to more locally adapted implementation measures that 
stimulated agricultural modernization and innovation and thus the social inclusion of family 
farmers in economic development. Cooperatives have been instrumental in translating general 
national PNPB policy objectives into local, specific implementation trajectories for family farmers. 
However, the changing social and economic landscape of vegetable-oil-producing family farmers in 
Bahia should not be only ‘‘credited’’ to the biodiesel policy. The ‘‘cooperative effect’’ of the PNPB 
falls under wider efforts and opportunities to strengthen cooperatives through government 
programs such as the PNAE and the PAA. These programs offered opportunities for cooperatives to 
address and gain access to a variety of new markets and hence to become more attractive to 
family farmers. Although the PNPB’s social inclusion policy is primarily of an economic nature (and 
focuses very little on other dimensions of rural development), some cooperatives argue that 
membership provides family farmers access to other (social) services provided through 
cooperatives, partly from governmental programs. We did not further investigate that claim. 
Our final question relates to biofuels. With the revised PNPB, family farmers have become more 
involved in the biodiesel economy, but it is not particularly evident that this means that they have 
become part and parcel of the biodiesel production chain. The SFS obligation has resulted in an 
increased number of contracts between PBio and (individual or collective) family famers and has 
thus provided the latter with significant technical assistance and support to improve their farming 
practices, productivity and incomes (as reported from interviews with cooperatives, family farmers 
and state officials). However, their material output (vegetable oil crops) is not always directed to 
biodiesel production. Significant parts of family farmer vegetable oil crops are ultimately used in 
other products, often because of higher market value for alternative oil crop applications (see also 
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César and Batalha, 2013: 8-9) and because farmers have long-standing social relationships with 
other buyers. Our interviews provided indications that sometimes PBio rerouted family farmer 
produced oil to products other than biodiesel and sometimes family farmers and cooperatives 
preferred to sell their oil harvest to other market channels for better profits. Hence, although a 
significant number of family farmers in Bahia do profit from the biodiesel policy of social 
sustainability through social inclusion in economic development, this not does necessarily take 
place through inclusion in the biodiesel production chain. Hence, cooperatives have been a major 
institutional force in improving the inclusion of a specific (but not necessarily small) category of 
family farmers in rural development through biodiesel policy. The PNPB policy revision has 
structurally changed the landscape of vegetable-oil-producing family farmers in Bahia in terms of 
economic development and in terms of the position of cooperatives. Much of how this develops is, 
in the eyes of the cooperatives, dependent on the continuation of financial support that is 
currently available through the PNPB. It remains to be determined if, how and to what extent 
cooperatives can become less dependent on the PNPB’s SFS policy and can rely more strongly on 
membership fees and market sources in organizing and modernizing family farming in Bahia. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The inclusion and operationalization of social sustainability in biodiesel policy in Brazil is unique, 
but it has lessons that are applicable beyond Brazil. Other countries are also looking for ways to 
combine sustainability concerns with biofuel policies; however, often the environmental 
component prevails over social concerns. Brazilian biodiesel shows the opposite with the prevailing 
idea that biodiesel production should not come at the expense of small family farmers and that 
their ‘‘social inclusion’’ could best be enhanced through their active participation in the biodiesel 
production chain. This PNPB social sustainability policy came with new governance instruments 
and arrangements in which agricultural cooperatives were given—and assumed—a central role. 
Thus far, this social biodiesel policy has resulted in more biodiesel company contracts with family 
farmers who produce vegetable oils (often through cooperatives) but not necessarily in an equal 
increase in channeling oil crops toward biodiesel refineries. Significant parts of family farmer 
vegetable oil crops are ultimately used in other products, often because of the higher market value 
for alternative oil crop applications and because farmers have long-standing social relationships 
with other buyers. This makes the claim that active participation in biodiesel production leads to 
increased social inclusion and thus ‘‘social sustainability’’ for biofuels problematic. 
In recent years the increasing level of participation of family farmers and cooperatives in the PNPB 
is not driven by their desire to produce biodiesel feedstock and one can question how much 
additional family farmer biodiesel feedstock has entered the biodiesel value chain due to the 
PNPB. Rather participation is driven by the PNPB requirements for fixed contracts, SFS and 
agricultural assistance, which make participation in the program attractive for these groups of 
farmers. The social inclusion of the PNPB should therefore be viewed in the broader context of 
agrarian development. The increased economic—and derived social—development of family 
farmers was not caused by their inclusion in the biodiesel product chain but rather because family 
farmers became better organized in (stronger) cooperatives, and these cooperatives were able to 
profit from their powerful position in the SFS/auctioning arrangement in providing and/or 
coordinating technical assistance, services and support for their members. Hence, the PNPB—
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along with other governmental programs—has improved the organizational and supportive 
capacities, membership and power of cooperatives in Bahia. 
The rural development of farmers in Bahia, and the growth and importance of cooperatives is thus 
(partly) dependent on the current biodiesel policy arrangements. An assessment of this rural 
development model through biodiesel policy reveals several serious limitations and drawbacks, 
both in its current setting and in its future outlooks. First, marginal subsistence farmers have been 
sidelined in this rural development model because they are neither members of cooperatives nor 
profit from the social inclusion policies of the PNPB. In that sense, social inclusion works for only a 
portion of small family farmers, because social inclusion is in essence a market model, but 
subsistence farmers are only marginally included in the market. Second, the current preferential 
PNPB policies for cooperatives may hamper the development and innovation of cooperatives to 
become more independent from governmental support, alignment and protection. These policies 
may impede their development into more independent ‘‘market-oriented’’ organizations focused 
on interest representation, through their members and by their members. Their current, rather 
‘‘comfortable’’ position may prevent cooperatives from exploiting their full potential to reach 
other ‘‘markets’’ and aim for a wider, more diverse strategy for the rural development of their 
members. Third, the cooperatives’ dependence on the PNPB and related policies is quite 
consequential when changes occur, as concluded by Wilkinson and Herrera (2010: 759) and Garces 
and Vianna (2009: 650). A lowering of the required percentage of raw material that must come 
from family farmers (for instance, following rapidly increasing blending targets, or less preference 
for the north and the northeast) would decrease the power of cooperatives and family farmers vis-
à-vis the biodiesel industry. A change in the approach or policy of the dominant biodiesel chain 
actor, PBio, could undermine the entire system, but increased competition by adding new buyers 
could strengthen the negotiating power of cooperatives. Most dramatically, abandoning the SFS 
would also endanger the current emerging role of cooperatives and the economic development of 
family farmers. In that sense, this rural development model is strongly dependent on PNPB policy 
and is not yet a ‘‘stand-alone’’ general model that can be disseminated widely throughout the rural 
north and northeast. 
Including cooperatives in government family farmer policies has a strong tradition in the south but 
has been rare in the northeast of Brazil. The government has never managed to promote 
cooperative development and farmers never organized themselves massively into cooperatives in 
this region. With the social biodiesel policy, the government found an (indirect) strategy to 
advance cooperatives in the north and northeast by significantly enhancing the organizational and 
institutional capacity and power of economics of solidarity cooperatives. Instead of fighting against 
the capitalist agro-industrial paradigm as part of social movements, such as the MST, they have 
become more mainstream cooperatives that seize the opportunities of large-scale national policies 
to strengthen organizational capacity and membership and to advance a market-oriented rural 
development model. As a result, cooperatives have, to some degree, also contributed to the 
‘‘pacification’’ of agricultural movements and syndicates and diminished rural biofuel protests 
along food-versus-fuel lines in Bahia. These ‘‘cooperative policy outcomes’’ allow for the 
expectation that the social policy on biodiesel will continue for some time. Cooperatives can and 
do play a very important role in creating and linking horizontal (between farmers) and vertical 
(between farmers and state/ business organizations) networks, pacifying rural conflicts and 
advancing rural development. 
Chapter 3 
 
60 
What does this all mean for social sustainability in the context of global bioenergy debates? What 
becomes directly evident from this study is that social sustainability of biofuels is important, but 
much more complicated than often thought and hence time and again poorly understood. 
Initiatives for sustainability certification often come with additional administrative costs and 
incomprehensible accounting systems that in practice create major barriers for family farmers 
rather than stimulating their participation. Cooperatives can become suitable intermediaries to 
facilitate family farmer inclusion in sustainable production, as they have done in other 
commodities (e.g., coffee). Yet, it remains questionable whether biofuel production is a suitable 
development trajectory for family farmers in the first place. The underlying question in the biofuel 
debate is whether participation in these global commodities that aim for large quantities at low 
prices is a good strategy for family farmers to begin with. For small farmers it might make more 
sense to focus on markets with higher added value and appreciation for their specific product(ion) 
(e.g., the production of specialty products for the cosmetic industry, fair trade products). The social 
sustainability of biodiesel in Brazil has little to do with biodiesel production and products, nor with 
food versus fuel, but more with the choices these farmers and cooperatives make to secure 
(future) income and to benefit from governmental policies. The economic incentives offered by the 
PNPB lead to rural development, but not through biodiesel production. 
  
4 Negotiating Authority in Global Biofuel Governance: Brazil and 
the EU in the WTO12 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The global demand for biofuels (liquid or gas fuels deriving from biomass) has grown dramatically in 
recent years. European Union policies that promote biofuels as more sustainable sources of 
transport fuel are partly driving this development. In this article, we analyze how Brazil, as a key 
producer of biofuels, navigates an emerging global governance context for sustainable biofuels. We 
do so by examining how Brazil responds to EU biofuel sustainability imperatives, including by evoking 
World Trade Organization disciplines in questioning their transnational validity and reach. While 
Brazil emphasizes the social and developmental objectives of its biofuel policies in a domestic 
context, it frames itself globally as a leading producer of sustainable biofuels. In so doing, it navigates 
intersecting spheres of authority in a manner that promotes its own biofuel policy agenda, partly by 
seeking to reframe “sustainability” debates internationally to reflect its developmental agenda. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Globalization is changing the nature and practices of global governance, including those relating to 
governance of large-scale environmental change. A complex array of actors and institutions now 
frames and seeks to manage environmental problems in diverse ways, resulting in intersecting 
spheres of public and private authority that shape governance outcomes. We interpret authority 
here as the capacity to define the content of rules and norms that shape social, economic, and 
political processes (loosely based on Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002: 43). Our interest is in how the state, 
still a dominant actor in global environmental governance, navigates shifting spheres of governance 
authority in promoting its own policy agenda. In assessing such a role for the state, we focus here on 
global biofuels governance and the Brazilian state. 
Biofuels are liquid or gas fuels derived from biomass sources such as starch, sugars, fat, wood, or 
waste. Although classifying categories of biofuels is subject to debate, so-called first-generation 
biofuels are associated mainly with (1) sugar or starch from food sources such as sugarcane or corn 
that is converted to bioethanol, and (2) vegetable oils (soy, rapeseed, palm) or animal fats that are 
converted to biodiesel. Second-generation biofuels are derived from ligno-cellulosic (woody) 
sources, while third-generation biofuels are produced from algae (Johnson et al., 2012). 
This paper focuses on first-generation biofuels because they are produced on a large scale as 
transport fuel, and are now under intense scrutiny with regard to sustainability and potential 
competition with food security (Dam et al., 2010; FAO, 2009; Johnson et al., 2012). The 
environmentally friendly characterization applied to such biofuels in the early years of their 
development now faces sustained critiques because of an array of assumed negative effects arising 
from their production and use. These include increased deforestation and land clearing, accusations 
of land-grabbing, expansion of agricultural areas at the cost of nature conservation, and undermining 
of food security by diverting crops for fuel rather than food (FAO, 2009; Wilkinson and Herrera, 
2010). The European Union (EU), one of the largest markets for biofuels, has reacted to such 
concerns by attempting to promote global trade in “sustainable” biofuels (Dam et al., 2010). What 
constitutes sustainable remains heavily contested, partly because different understandings have 
varying implications for access to a growing global market for biofuels. 
As a leading producer and strong proponent of a global biofuels market, Brazil has to engage with 
the EU sustainability imperatives that now dominate global biofuel trade and governance debates 
(Garcez and Vianna, 2009; Goldemberg et al., 2008; Mol, 2010). Brazil is one of the few countries 
with long-established domestic biofuel policies and programs. While it is often seen as able to dictate 
biofuel developments within its borders, Brazil’s authority to continue to do so, given a rapidly 
evolving global biofuel trade and governance context, remains a timely question to examine. 
Much scholarly attention in recent years has focused on rapidly evolving private sources of multilevel 
biofuel governance authority, including the proliferation of private sustainability roundtables and 
other voluntary standard setting initiatives (Leopold, 2010; Mol, 2010, 2007; Ponte, 2014; Schleifer, 
2013). We explore, instead, how the Brazilian state interacts with two dominant sources of state-led, 
public authority to shape the trajectories of global biofuel trade and governance: the EU and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The EU shapes an emerging market in sustainable biofuels through 
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its renewable energy and fuel quality directives. The WTO is the dominant source of global 
rulemaking on the international commodity trade, and thus is a key arena for complex debates about 
trade in sustainable biofuels (and associated biomass). 
We first discuss the shifting spheres of authority within which states now operate in a changing 
global environmental governance context. We then turn to a brief overview of domestic biofuel 
policies and priorities in Brazil. Next we analyze the evolution of the EU’s biofuel policies over the 
last decade, and how Brazil and the EU use the WTO to negotiate global biofuel trade and 
sustainability imperatives. We argue that Brazil strategically frames its biofuel policies and practices 
to link sustainability imperatives to its core developmental agenda, as a way to navigate (and 
contest) ongoing EU efforts to “rescale” governance authority via the vehicle of sustainability.  
We base our analysis on primary and secondary literature, as well as on interviews with 
representatives of governments, international organizations, civil society, producer organizations, 
and private certification initiatives in Brazil, the Netherlands, Geneva (for the WTO), and Brussels (for 
the EU). We also draw on one author’s participant observation of expert meetings on biofuel policies 
in the EU and Brazil from 2007 through 2012. 
4.2 Globalization, the State, and Proliferating Spheres of Authority 
Globalization and its processes have resulted in diverse actors becoming involved in governing global 
environmental change (Andonova and Mitchell, 2010). In light of this, scholarly attention has focused 
on the role of the state and, particularly, an assumed decline in the authority of the state to govern 
global environmental change. Some, like Rosenau, allege that states are losing ground to other 
actors, such as networks of corporations, nongovernmental organizations, or advocacy groups, and 
that governance authority now resides in (potentially competing) spheres of authority rather than in 
hierarchically organized arrangements consisting largely of states (Rosenau, 2007). The notion of a 
“sphere” captures the multiple public/private and formal/ informal loci of authority that underpin 
current global environmental governance, signifying for some a “deterritorialization of authority” 
(Rosenau, 2007: 91).  
While such perspectives assume that the state is losing authority to nonstate actors or becoming 
“disoriented” (Arts et al., 2009) others highlight its continuing importance even in contexts where 
global environmental politics is being rescaled, and/or question a strongly drawn divide between 
public and private authority in environmental governance (Andonova and Mitchell, 2010; Pattberg 
and Stripple, 2008; Reed and Bruyneel, 2010). Given these debates, it is pertinent to examine 
whether and how state authorities are still “able, capable and leading the environmental governance 
of biofuels” (Mol, 2010: 2).  
Although the state remains important in global environmental governance, how and why remain key 
questions to investigate in specific issue areas. In assessing this for the contested realm of global 
biofuel governance, we focus on how the Brazilian state navigates distinct spheres of authority, 
including through selecting favorable fora and framing trade and governance imperatives in ways 
that resonate with its own policy priorities. Our analysis also goes beyond a focus on the 
omnipresent Westphalian model of the state in OECD countries, to include distinct “empirical 
expressions of statehood,” such as emerging economies and/or areas of limited statehood 
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(Compagnon et al., 2012: 238). In our analysis, we consider how Brazil, as a prominent emerging 
economy and strong developmental state, engages with and seeks to shape global biofuel 
sustainability imperatives in specific multilateral fora. We turn next to a brief examination of Brazil’s 
domestic biofuel policy choices and the rationales underpinning them. 
4.3 Governing Biofuels in Brazil: Developmental Imperatives 
Brazil is often characterized as an emerging environmental power, given its rich natural resources 
and biodiversity and its large-scale production and use of renewable energy (Dauvergne and Farias, 
2012: 912; Hurrell, 2010: 44; Sotero and Armijo, 2007: 7). It is also seen as a quintessential 
“developmental” state, one wherein the “idea of development has long been a fundamental value 
with great political and policy resonance within Brazil’s political [and foreign policy] discourse” 
(Dauvergne and Farias, 2012: 906; see also Hochstetler and Montero, 2013). President Lula da Silva 
(2003–2010) and his successor Dilma Rousseff (2011–) have sought to emphasize Brazil’s role on the 
global stage as an emerging world power that advocates for fairness in international trade relations. 
This includes pushing for recognition of the legitimate development agenda of the global South and 
encouraging South-South collaboration and coalition building (Sotero and Armijo, 2007). 
Brazil and the US are the main producers and exporters of ethanol, augmented now by a growing 
(domestic) biodiesel market (Lamers et al., 2011). While ethanol production capacity temporarily 
declined in 2012, Brazil remains a frontrunner in this realm (A detailed discussion of Brazil’s domestic 
biofuels policy evolution is beyond the scope of this paper, but see Bastos Lima, 2012; Stattman et 
al., 2013). Brazil’s focus on biofuels dates back to 1970s’ concerns about energy security and 
dependence on fossil fuel imports, and concurrent recognition of the country’s immense agricultural 
potential as a source of alternative fuels (Stattman et al., 2013). The first domestic bioethanol 
policies were set up during the period of military dictatorship (1964–1985). Ernesto Geisel 
introduced the national program called ProÁlcool in 1975, promoting the use of ethanol (produced 
from sugarcane) as an alternative to fossil fuels for the transport sector. ProÁlcool addressed two 
urgent crises: the adverse impacts of high international oil prices that were affecting Brazil’s currency 
reserves, and the low (and falling) price of sugar on international markets, one of Brazil’s main 
traded crops. 
The initial successes of ProÁlcool through the 1980s ran into hurdles in the 1990s, when declining oil 
prices and favorable sugar prices resulted in shortages of ethanol supply, and thus reduced 
enthusiasm from consumers to use pure ethanol to fuel cars (Lehtonen, 2011; Stattman et al., 2013). 
By 2003, however, with the introduction of the flex-fuel car (which permitted a flexible mixing of 
ethanol and gasoline at the pump), the demand for ethanol rose again (Bastos Lima, 2012). Together 
with growing production capacity, such developments transformed Brazil into the second-largest 
producer of ethanol by 2011, although maintaining this position depends on changing dynamics of 
domestic demand and continuing prospects to increase production (EIA, 2012a, 2012b). 
The success of ProÁlcool stimulated the government of President Lula da Silva in the early 2000s to 
(re)-consider alternatives for diesel fuel (for a detailed history, see Pousa et al., 2007). This resulted 
in the first national biodiesel policy, the National Program for Production and Use of Biodiesel 
(henceforth the biodiesel program), being launched in December 2004 (Brazilian law: Lei 11.097; 
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MDA, 2010). The biodiesel program sought to reproduce the successes of ProÁlcool with regard to 
fuel production capacity, along with several social, environmental, and developmental aims in 
addition to energy security. These included encouraging biofuel crop diversification (rather than 
focusing on a single crop, such as soybeans), spreading crop production regionally (rather than 
concentrating on one state/geographic area), and including small-scale family farmers in biofuel crop 
production (rather than relying exclusively on large-scale agribusiness) (Garcez and Vianna, 2009; 
Hall et al., 2009; Stattman and Mol, 2014). Many of these measures responded to perceived negative 
social and environmental consequences associated with ProÁlcool, such as large-scale (monoculture) 
sugarcane production, and concentrating production in specific regions (mainly the state of Sao 
Paulo). 
To meet such multiple objectives, the government established blending targets for biodiesel in 
diesel, which have increased from 2 percent in 2008 to 7 percent in 201413. While this sent a strong 
signal to the market, biodiesel companies also needed a state-administered “Social Fuel Seal” to 
access this market on favorable terms, which could be obtained by buying a percentage of feedstock 
from small-scale family farmers. The government also introduced tax exemptions favoring use of 
local oil crops grown by small-scale farmers (such as castor beans) over commodity crops produced 
by large-scale commercial farmers in monocultures (such as soybeans). President Lula da Silva threw 
his political weight behind the biodiesel program, given its link to his national development agenda 
that called for special attention to family farming and economic development of poorer regions 
(César and Batalha, 2010; Watanabe et al., 2012). 
As these elements suggest, the national biofuel debate in Brazil has evolved from an initial focus on 
energy security in the 1970s to include a broader social and developmental agenda (Lehtonen, 2011), 
even as such objectives have proven challenging to implement in practice. Thus, most biodiesel in 
Brazil is still produced from commodity crops such as soybeans rather than from castor oil, and from 
feedstocks grown by large-scale rather than small-scale family farmers (ANP, 2012). While this is 
partially because of lack of infrastructure and/or farmer expertise and experience with alternative 
crops (Hospes and Clancy, 2011; Stattman and Mol, 2014), large-scale biofuel production methods 
still dominate, and there are persisting internal conflicts within the Brazilian state about the 
production versus social and developmental goals of the biodiesel program (César and Batalha, 2010; 
Garcez and Vianna, 2009; Hall et al., 2009; Stattman et al., 2013). In continuing efforts to 
operationalize the social inclusion elements of this program, the government has instituted financial 
loan systems for farmers and support for local food production, with recent efforts to involve 
agricultural cooperatives (Stattman and Mol, 2014; Watanabe et al., 2012). 
As described above, the ethanol and biodiesel programs in Brazil have been fueled by energy 
security, as well as economic and social development imperatives. Environmental concerns feature 
less prominently in domestic discourse. For example, the ecological risks of large-scale monoculture 
plantations of sugarcane and soybean have been debated, as has indirect land use change resulting 
from biofuels and associated biomass production. Some measures to reduce the negative 
environmental impacts of burning sugarcane in manual harvesting have also been taken. 
                                                          
13 Governo deve elevar percentual do biodiesel no diesel.” Folha de Sao Paulo, May 24, 2014. 
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Nonetheless, there are few environmental regulations in place domestically that relate directly to 
biofuel production. The biodiesel program officially has an environmental pillar, yet in practice this 
calls for compliance with existing environmental legislation on deforestation and land use change 
(e.g., the Forest Conservation Code) and existing pesticide regulations, which Brazilian authorities 
view as sufficient but which also face implementation challenges (Nazareno, 2012). The rapid 
increase in biodiesel blending targets is likely to enhance reliance on the production capacity of 
large-scale monoculture-based agro-industry, rather than on more sustainable practices of small-
scale family farmers (Garcez and Vianna, 2009; Goldemberg et al., 2008; Martinelli and Filoso, 2008). 
In sum, the evolution of both ProÁlcool and the biodiesel program demonstrate the key role of the 
Brazilian state in establishing and expanding its domestic biofuel market. In certain instances, this 
has gone hand-in-hand with industry-led initiatives, such as development of the flex-fuel car. Yet, 
aligned with the state’s developmentalist orientation, its role in establishing and enforcing blending 
targets and other goals has been central to creating a stable domestic (and export) market for 
biofuels to fulfill domestic policy priorities. A 2011 law further reinforced the state’s role in this 
sector by changing the domestic classification of ethanol from an agricultural product to a fuel under 
the purview of the National Petroleum Agency. With fuel prices more directly controlled by the state, 
such a reclassification ensures a greater involvement by the state in the domestic (and export) 
market for ethanol (Brazilian law: Lei 12.490/2011.). 
We turn next to the EU’s attempt to create and govern an emerging global market in sustainable 
biofuels. These efforts have stimulated a Brazilian emphasis on the environmental sustainability of its 
biofuels, particularly ethanol, in a global trade context, even as it engages with and contests the 
transnational reach of the EU’s sustainability criteria within the WTO. 
4.4 Governing Biofuels in the EU: Sustainability Imperatives 
EU interest in biofuels began in the late 1990s. A 2000 EU green paper titled “Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply” first proposed an increased emphasis on biofuels in the 
transport sector (EC, 2000a). Expectations of a dramatic increase in oil prices fueled a search for 
alternatives for the “energy poor” EU. The green paper also presented biofuels as essential to 
meeting Europe’s climate mitigation goals, framing biofuels as a “green alternative” to fossil fuels in 
the transport sector (Leopold, 2010: 4). In addition, ongoing reform of the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), which has reduced farm subsidies, gave an impetus to identifying alternative uses for 
agricultural land in the EU (EC, 2000b). The green paper thus launched a debate about biofuels as a 
way to reduce vulnerability of the energy supply and achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction 
targets, while simultaneously providing support to rural farmers through an alternative land use 
possibility.14  
This initial debate led to adoption of the EU Directive on the Promotion of the Use of Biofuels and 
Other Renewable Fuels for Transport (henceforth the biofuels directive) in 2003 (EC, 2003). The 
directive called on all EU member states to encourage an indicative, non-mandatory minimum 
blending of biofuels in transport fuel, going from 2 percent in 2005 to 5.75 percent by 2010. The aim 
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See for example: Biofuels for transport”. EurActiv, November 24, 2010 
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was to send a strong signal to industry and governments that the EU considered biofuels a long-term 
alternative to fossil fuel use in the transport sector, although this directive did not, at the time, 
include sustainability criteria for biofuels (see also Schleifer, 2013).  
In 2007, the EU presented its Energy and Climate Change Policy containing its 20-20-20 targets: a 20-
percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to a baseline of 1990, a 20-
percent share of renewables, and a 20-percent increase in energy efficiency. This document 
emphasized that sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply were central to Europe’s 
future energy policy. Together with an intensifying debate about sustainable biofuels, this led to a 
draft directive wherein the Commission proposed mandatory sustainability criteria for biofuels (EC, 
2008, 2007; Schleifer, 2013). The result was the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, which amended 
and replaced the 2003 biofuels directive (EC, 2009). With this new directive, sustainability concerns 
moved to the front and center of EU biofuels policy. The Renewable Energy Directive required a 20-
percent share of energy from renewable sources by 2020, and a 10-percent share of renewable 
energy specifically in the transportation sector, most of which was envisioned to be met through 
biofuels. For biofuels to count towards this obligatory 10-percent target, however, their use has to 
constitute a minimum 35-percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to fossil fuels, a 
figure set to increase to 60 percent by 2018 (EC, 2009: articles 9, 65–81, 84). In a related 
development, the EU also amended its Fuel Quality Directive in further specifying its biofuel 
sustainability goals (The European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, 2009a: 
articles 3, 8-10). This directive reconfirmed that greenhouse gas emissions from biofuels should be at 
least 35 percent lower than those from fossil fuels, and further stated that biofuels produced from 
raw material obtained from land with high biodiversity, including highly biodiverse grasslands or 
high-carbon stock, could not count towards the mandatory blending targets (The European 
Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, 2009a: articles 11, 38, 2009b: article 17-3, 3-5, 
article 7b).  
With these directives, the EU aimed to stimulate the emergence of a global market in sustainable 
biofuels. However, its sustainability criteria remain internally and externally contested, and are 
continually evolving (Leopold, 2010; Oosterveer and Mol, 2010; Schleifer, 2013). In September 2013, 
for example, the European parliament voted to place a 6-percent cap on the use of food-based 
biofuels in meeting the EU’s target of 10-percent biofuels in transportation, and proposed a 2.5-
percent sub-target for promoting production and consumption of second- and third-generation 
biofuels, which the EU refers to as “advanced biofuels.”15 Although the result was two votes short of 
securing a majority, this represented an evolving debate within the EU on defining and agreeing on 
appropriate targets for sustainable biofuels.16 
Biofuel producer countries, including Brazil and Indonesia, have raised concerns in various global fora 
about the consequences of the EU’s sustainability requirements for trade in biofuels and associated 
biomass. For example, UNICA, the Brazilian Association for Sugarcane Producers, released a 
statement criticizing the 2013 European Parliament vote and questioning the “arbitrary cap on use of 
all food-based biofuels.” It went on to note that “such a cap ignores important differences between 
                                                          
15 
EU Parliament 2013. It is important to note that in the US, the term “advanced biofuel” has a different 
meaning and is based on greenhouse gas emission reduction potential of a biofuel. 
16 
Food price fears push EU lawmakers to put a lid on biofuels growth. EurActiv, September 12, 2013 
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conventional biofuels’ environmental performance and is vulnerable to being de facto discriminatory 
and breaching World Trade Organization rules,”17 a perspective supported by other trade analysts.18 
For some, the EU’s sustainability criteria for traded biofuels are designed to exclude certain crops or 
production areas from EU markets, such as palm oil from Southeast Asia, or soybeans from the 
Cerrado region in Brazil, which is classified as a highly biodiverse grassland.19 The WTO compatibility 
of the EU’s sustainability criteria thus remains a contested issue. Explicitly to avoid potential WTO 
conflicts, EU policy does not require that all biofuels meet its sustainability criteria, nor does it 
restrict imports of “unsustainable” biofuels. Instead, it merely stipulates that only biofuels that meet 
the criteria can count towards member state mandatory renewable energy targets (EC, 2013; 
European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, 2009). 
This ensures, however, that interpreting, adjusting, and elaborating the EU’s sustainability criteria, as 
well as ascertaining and certifying which fuels meet these criteria, is rapidly becoming a key 
battleground in negotiating global biofuel governance authority. Various actors, including 
companies, multistakeholder roundtables, and/or private consultancies, are now undertaking such 
certification. In July 2011, the EU approved seven voluntary sustainability labeling and certification 
schemes as demonstrating compliance with the EU’s biofuels sustainability criteria. This number had 
increased to nineteen by October 2014.20 Member states or biofuel companies can choose the 
sustainability label they want to apply to ensure that their biofuels comply with EU legislation and 
thus count towards obligatory blending targets. This results in a growing juxtaposition between 
public and private authority in interpreting and implementing EU sustainability criteria, a topic that is 
beyond the scope of this present paper but that merits greater scrutiny. 
A striking element of the EU’s sustainability criteria has been a relative lack of emphasis on the social 
aspects of sustainability. Environmental concerns, including greenhouse gas emissions or loss of 
highly diverse grasslands and biodiversity, are driving EU sustainability discussions. Another much-
debated concern has been indirect land use change linked to biofuel production, yet this is missing 
from the EU’s sustainability criteria, because of persisting controversies over how to attribute 
specific land use changes to demand for biofuels, or how to measure such changes (Johnson et al., 
2012; Ponte, 2014; Schleifer, 2013). 
In contrast to environmental considerations, social aspects of sustainability are portrayed by the EU 
as important but as being adequately covered by other institutional fora, such as the International 
Labor Organization.21 Although some private certification initiatives endorsed by the EU increasingly 
include social criteria, the EU calls only for biannual reporting relating to food security and local 
                                                          
17 Brazil’s UNICA Statement on European Parliament Vote Outcome on Biofuels/ILUC. September 11, 2013. 
18 
Concerns EU’s Renewable Energy Directive Breaks Rules of Free Trade. EurAsia Review.com, November 21, 
2011 
19 Author meeting with various NGOs and a representative of the Dutch Commission on BiomassSustainability, 
May 25, 2010. The Hague, Netherlands. 
20 See for a continually updated list: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/biofuels/sustainability_schemes_en.htm 
21 Author interview with representatives of Reporter Brasil, March 2010; author interview with a 
representative of the Roundtable of Sustainable Biofuels, June 2009; author interview with an official of the 
Dutch Office of Environmental Affairs, May 2009 and May 2010. 
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development in producer countries.22 This omission is linked partly to concerns that explicit inclusion 
of such criteria will be seen as interference with national sovereignty of biofuel producing countries. 
Yet, for countries like Brazil, the EU’s environmental sustainability criteria also remain a bone of 
contention, insofar as they have the potential to impinge upon domestic production practices. We 
turn next to how Brazil utilizes the WTO to contest the transnational reach of the EU’s sustainability 
imperatives. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Spheres of interaction for governing sustainable biofuels: Brazil and the EU 
Source: developed by authors 
 
4.5 Negotiating Governance Authority: Evoking the WTO 
In negotiating the dynamics of global biofuel trade and governance, the EU and Brazil interact in a 
variety of fora at multiple levels. As shown in Figure 4.1, these include not only the WTO but also 
other multilateral fora such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), as well as bilateral agreements and private sustainability initiatives. 
Despite these multiples sites of authority, the WTO remains a central venue for global biofuel 
governance and sustainability debates. 
Brazil has strongly supported the WTO historically, with active engagement in global trade 
negotiations and processes (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012; Hurrell, 2010). It has also exercised 
leadership in the WTO by successfully forging coalitions with other developing countries, and by 
continually emphasizing the links between global trade liberalization and the legitimate development 
goals of developing countries (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012). 
With regard to global biofuel trade, WTO debates revolve around two key issues: how biofuels are 
classified within WTO disciplines (for a detailed discussion of this complex issue, see Motaal, 2008), 
and compatibility of the EU’s sustainability criteria with WTO obligations. WTO classification of 
                                                          
22 
Ibid. 
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biofuels and biofuel-linked biomass is a crucial issue. The WTO classifies traded goods as agricultural, 
industrial, or environmental. Such classifications have distinct WTO disciplines and obligations 
attached to them, particularly relating to the extent of domestic financial support or subsidies 
permitted. 
Given their nature, biofuels can be classified as any or all of the above, with consequently differing 
implications for market access and domestic production processes. Currently, ethanol (derived from 
sugarcane or maize, among other sources) is classified as an agricultural good within the WTO. As a 
result, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) applies to trade in ethanol, with domestic subsidies 
pertaining to such production and trade permitted in line with this agricultural agreement. In 
addition, the AoA also applies to various crops traded as agricultural commodities, which constitute 
the biomass for first-generation biofuels (see Motaal, 2008).Biodiesel, by contrast, is classified as an 
industrial good in the WTO, regulated under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM). This agreement has stricter rules on trade-distorting domestic subsidies than does 
the AoA. If so, policies and measures that intend to stimulate or privilege domestic production of 
biodiesel at the cost of another WTO member can be challenged under the SCM. 
Classification thus can have vital implications for market access to a growing global biofuel and 
biomass commodity market (ICTSD, 2009; IPC, 2006). The global trade in biofuels and related 
biomass is projected to increase in the coming years (Table 4.1), partly to fulfill EU and other 
mandatory governmental blending targets (Junginger et al., 2011; Lamers et al., 2011; OECD-FAO, 
2013).Thus, WTO classification is a key negotiating site wherein state strategies and political conflicts 
around (different types of) biofuels play out. Further complicating the classification debate is the fact 
that trade in ethanol versus biodiesel is related to very different crop configurations, agricultural 
production dynamics, and sustainability issues. 
The trade dynamics surrounding Brazilian ethanol exports to the EU are relatively straightforward, 
with ethanol being the processed commodity that enters international trade. Biodiesel trade 
dynamics are more complex and fluid, and more closely tied to broader markets for agricultural 
products and vegetable oils (Stattman et al., 2013). While Brazil does not yet export biodiesel to 
Europe in significant quantities, it does export large quantities of soybeans to the EU, from which 
biodiesel can be produced (Lamers et al., 2011). Given that soybeans are also traded globally as 
agricultural commodities under the AoA, where these commodities are converted to biofuels thus 
also is important, since applicable WTO rules and classification categories may change accordingly. 
Given these implications of differing classification categories, Brazil has pushed strongly in the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations over the last decade for both ethanol and biodiesel to be reclassified as 
environmental goods within the WTO (see also Oosterveer and Mol, 2010; UNCTAD, 2011; WTO, 
2005). Environmental goods are subject to lower tariffs and subsidies under WTO rules than 
agricultural and industrial goods. Such a reclassification would benefit Brazil, given the widely held 
view that it is not only the most efficient, but also the most sustainable, producer of sugarcane 
ethanol in the world.23 From Brazil’s perspective, classifying biofuels as environmental goods would 
                                                          
23 EPA 2012; Johnson et al. 2012; sugarcane.org/sustainability/best-practices, accessed December 5, 2012. 
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contribute to a more competitive market by lowering or eliminating tariffs and subsidies.24 This 
would mean more opportunities to increase its biofuel exports while simultaneously promoting its 
international agenda to ensure that trade liberalization furthers the South’s developmental goals.25 
As Brazil sees it, such a reclassification of biofuels is justified to improve “market access for products 
that have low environmental impact and/or are derived from or incorporate cleaner 
technologies…[but which also contribute to] poverty alleviation through income generation and job 
creation for local populations.”26 From the Brazilian perspective, there is a need to redress an 
imbalance in the current “traditional” understanding of environmental goods in the WTO, which 
privilege “end of pipe technologies and products [in which] developed countries hold 90 percent of 
the … market.27 The 2005 Brazilian submission called instead for the “definition of environmental 
goods [to] cover products such as natural fibers and colorants and other non-timber forest products, 
renewable energy, including ethanol and biodiesel” in which developing countries have a 
competitive advantage (WTO, 2005: 2). 
To this end, Brazil (supported by Chile, Columbia, Singapore, and New Zealand) proposed again at a 
special session of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment in November 2007 that biofuels be 
considered environmental goods, subject to tariff cuts or elimination in the Doha Round. The EU 
(supported by the US, Japan, and Australia) opposed this proposal, partly because the 
“environmental” credentials of certain imported biofuels might be suspect (Burrell et al., 2012: 784-
785; Weiß, 2011). Its opposition also related to fears that such a reclassification would result in 
cheaply (and, in the case of Brazil, more efficiently) produced first-generation biofuels being 
“dumped” on the EU market, which could potentially harm European biofuel producers and delay 
the EU’s ambition to encourage second- and third-generation “advanced” biofuel production and 
trade (author interview with Dutch representative to the WTO, Geneva, June 2008 Burrell et al., 
2012). 
Brazil argues, however, that if the EU were serious about sustainability, it would encourage the 
import of biofuels such as Brazilian ethanol, which is environmentally superior to others. In opposing 
such reclassification, the EU is, from the Brazilian perspective, protecting its less-efficient biofuels 
industry through agricultural subsidies and import tariffs. For Brazil, the EU is using “green 
protectionism” to protect its domestic industries, and its rural and agricultural policy priorities, under 
the guise of sustainability requirements. Thus, the compatibility of governmental financial support or 
stimulation of domestic biofuel production is closely linked to the classification debates. The heavy 
subsidizing of biofuels by OECD countries, combined with the potential impact of the 2009 
Renewable Energy Directive’s sustainability criteria on market access, has led Brazil to threaten to 
                                                          
24
 No specific WTO definition exists of environmental goods. Members negotiate to designate specific products 
as environmental goods, which are then placed on a WTO list. http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm. Last accessed October 27, 2014. 
25
 Mol 2010, 9. 
26
 WTO 2005, 2. 
27
 WTO 2005, 2. 
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file a complaint against the EU at the WTO, although it has not yet done so (Oosterveer and Mol, 
2010; Steenblik, 2007).28 
The second WTO debate relates to compatibility of the EU’s sustainability criteria with its global 
trade obligations, given their potential impact on biofuel trade and market access. Brazil argues in 
the WTO that, while countries are entitled to develop standards for environmental protection, these 
cannot discriminate between “like products.” This implies that trade barriers against, for example, 
soy oil used for biodiesel production are discriminatory, if soy oil used in food production is not 
required to fulfill similar sustainability criteria. In the face of such differential treatment for a “like 
product,” the EU’s sustainability requirements are portrayed by Brazil as a non-tariff trade barrier 
that is open to challenge within the WTO (ICTSD, 2009; IPC, 2006; Motaal, 2008). 
Trade disputes, both over biofuel classification and over market disruption resulting from the EU’s 
sustainability imperatives, are increasingly likely to emerge. Argentina has filed a WTO dispute 
against the EU regarding its biodiesel policies, accusing the EU of violating the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and other WTO agreements.29 Brazil has focused so far on 
diplomatic approaches, but this might change, depending on how EU biofuels legislation evolves. 
Brazil’s central claim is that the EU need not concern itself with Brazil’s domestic biofuel production 
processes, which the sustainability imperatives propose to target. The Brazilian Sugarcane 
Association, for example, has complained that EU sustainability imperatives are a “moving target” 
that reflect a lack understanding of local production circumstances.30 
The foregoing discussion illustrates some of the complexities surrounding the emerging global 
biofuels market and attempts by the EU to exercise governance authority in this market, with the 
WTO serving as an important forum wherein these negotiations play out. Brazil evokes WTO rules in 
the attempt to strengthen its authority to shape the emerging global biofuels market, even as it 
seeks to protect its domestic biofuel priorities and production processes from cross-border 
governance attempts. It does so by projecting itself a market leader in sustainable biofuels 
internationally, and by emphasizing the developmental benefits of improved market access to its 
(environmentally) sustainable ethanol 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 A list of all biofuels support policies can be found on: www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/support-
policies-fertilisers-biofuels.htm. 
29 Argentina inicia disputa en OMC por reglas europeas para el biodiesel. Reuters America Latina, May 15, 
2013; WTO 2012: Dispute DS452 and DS459; Members grapple with certifying products, and certifying the 
certifiers (indicating various disputes over the Biofuels directive and the Fuel Quality directive). WTO, October 
29–31, 2013. 
30 
Author interviews with representatives of UNICA, Brussels, March 2010 and Brazil, October 2012. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
States and other actors are now negotiating the authority to govern the relatively new area of global 
biofuel trade and sustainability. Our analysis reveals how interactions between important biofuel 
producers and importers, such as Brazil and the EU, are key to shaping global biofuel trade and 
sustainability governance. States, our analysis confirms, are central to negotiating, contesting, and 
recasting norms and standards of multilevel biofuel governance. 
By examining the interactions between the EU and Brazil within the WTO, we show how these actors 
interact to further their own strategic governance aims and trade interests in the biofuels policy 
realm. One such arena of negotiation is the classification of biofuels within the WTO. Brazil projects 
itself within multilateral fora such as the WTO as the most efficient and sustainable producer of 
sugarcane-based ethanol, and thus argues for enhanced market access for such ethanol. It seeks to 
achieve this by pushing to reclassify biofuels as environmental goods. In so doing, it attempts to link 
the WTO’s Doha Round trade liberalization agenda to its developmental aims, but in this case by 
arguing that such aims can also be furthered through liberalizing trade in environmental goods. 
As our discussion shows, however, such an outcome is only feasible if environmental goods are 
(re)conceptualized to include products in which the South has, or may have in the future, a 
comparative advantage, such as food-based biofuels. Such a reconceptualization hinges, however, on 
contested understandings of the sustainability of first-generation (food-based) biofuels, such as 
ethanol and biodiesel. For the EU, a key publicly stated policy aim is to use trade disciplines and 
sustainability criteria to promote a shift from food-based biofuels to more (environmentally) 
“advanced” biofuels, even as questions about the protectionist intentions underlying EU biofuel 
policies continue to persist. In projecting itself as a producer and exporter of “advanced biofuels” 
(even if food-based), Brazil seeks to contest the EU’s attempts to shape global biofuel trade to fit its 
own regional policy imperatives. 
The global debate over sustainable biofuels is thus as much a battle over governance of national 
territory as of global market access, insofar as it impinges upon domestic production practices. To 
date, Brazil has not yet (needed to) adjust its domestic biofuel policy priorities and practices because 
of the EU’s environmental sustainability requirements. However, this could change in the future, as 
negotiations over the meaning and operationalization of sustainability proliferate in multiple arenas. 
While our focus here has been on the WTO, our findings can be usefully supplemented by analyzing 
how Brazil has contested global rule-making efforts in multilateral fora that are more directly 
concerned with the environmental and food security aspects of biofuel production and trade, such as 
the CBD or FAO.31 
Going beyond Brazil, the implications of evolving biofuel sustainability imperatives are likely to vary 
for smaller developing countries, or those with less advanced domestic biofuel production policies, 
meriting further analysis. This includes analyzing interactions between hybrid public–private spheres 
of authority in the biofuel domain, and their impact on how (different categories of) states frame 
                                                          
31 See Bastos Lima and Gupta 2013 and 2014 for discussion of how Brazil and others have opposed efforts to 
develop multilateral rules on biofuels in UN fora, such as FAO and CBD. 
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and negotiate sustainability. An increasingly important question becomes whether and how the 
hybridization of authority stimulates or discourages a “greening” of the developmental state in 
domains such as sustainable biofuels.

  
 
5 Towards Sustainable Biofuels in the European Union? Lessons 
from a Decade of Hybrid Biofuel Governance32 
 
 
 
Abstract  
The European Union (EU) stands at a crossroads regarding its biofuel policies. For more than a 
decade, the EU sought to create a market for and govern sustainable biofuels for the transport 
sector, even as debates over sustainability escalated. It did so by devising novel hybrid (public and 
private) governance arrangements. We took stock of the nature and outcomes of this experiment in 
hybrid biofuel governance. We relied on qualitative methods of analysis, whereby we reviewed and 
synthesized the evolution of EU biofuel governance arrangements over time, through detailed 
document analysis of secondary and primary literature, including EU and related policy documents 
and private certification scheme websites. Our analysis reveals that, instead of yielding an 
increasingly stringent sustainability framework, the hybrid EU governance arrangements resulted in a 
proliferation of relatively lax, industry-driven, sustainability standards, even as the notion of 
“sustainable biofuels” remained contested in public and political debate. These findings contribute to 
an ongoing debate about the merits of hybrid (public–private) governance arrangements, and 
whether a hybrid approach helps strengthen or weaken sustainability objectives. We conclude that a 
more stringent EU meta-standard on sustainability needs to be developed, to underpin future 
governance arrangements.
                                                          
32 
This chapter has been published as: Stattman, Sarah L., Aarti Gupta, Lena Partzsch and Peter Oosterveer. 
2018. “Toward Sustainable Biofuels in the European Union? Lessons from a Decade of Hybrid Biofuel 
Governance.” Sustainability 10 (4111); doi:10.3390/su10114111 
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5.1 Introduction 
For the last decade and a half, the European Union (EU) experimented with novel, hybrid (i.e., both 
public and private) governance arrangements for the production, import, and use of sustainable 
biofuels for its transport sector. It is now at an important juncture in its biofuel policies, with 
sustainability debates continuing to rage within the EU and beyond, and important changes being 
considered and implemented with regard to future policy choices. 
In this article, we take stock of the nature and outcomes of the EU’s experiment in hybrid biofuel 
governance, in order to draw lessons for future policy directions. This is a very timely moment to do 
so, given extensive political and societal debate underway about the sustainability of biofuels, and 
recent responses of EU institutions to such debates. A recent illustration is the decision by the 
European Parliament (17 January 2018) to phase out the use of palm oil as a feedstock for 
production of biofuels by 2021. This decision challenges a key element in EU’s biofuel policy of the 
last decade, which laid down that inclusion of particular feedstocks would be based on whether or 
not they fulfilled the EU’s standard for sustainable biofuels. By excluding a particular feedstock, in 
this case palm oil, regardless of whether it complies with the EU’s sustainability requirements or not, 
the European Parliament seems to suggest that the standard and procedures developed in the EU’s 
Renewable Energy Directive (RED) do not guarantee the sustainability of biofuels. 
The RED directive, adopted in 2009 and covering the period of 2010–2020, was implemented after 
years of discussion, and is the cornerstone of the EU’s hybrid biofuel governance architecture. It 
prescribes minimum greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions for biofuels, relative to the fossil 
fuel that biofuels are intended to replace. It also prohibits biofuel feedstock production on land with 
recognized high biodiversity and carbon stocks and on peatland. As proof of compliance, the 
European Commission (EC) asks for a sustainability certification of biomass-based fuel, 
independently from whether biofuels are produced within the EU or imported. 
With this policy, the EU aimed to replace 10% of all transport fuel consumed within the EU from 
fossil to bio-fuel by 2020 (European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, 2009; The 
European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, 2009b). In responding to increasing 
controversy over sustainability criteria for biofuels, however, one key change was made in April 
2015. In the context of a new directive on the quality of petrol and diesel fuels, and the promotion of 
energy from renewable sources, the EU agreed to put a cap of 7% on use of first-generation biofuels 
(i.e., based on agricultural crops), to limit the volume of such crops grown solely for energy 
consumption (The European Parliament, 2015). 
The EU RED directive and associated decisions, regulations, norms, and standards lay the 
groundwork for a particular, novel (hybrid) governance approach to biofuels within the EU, wherein 
the EU sets a “meta-standard” (the basic, minimum, sustainability requirements) and leaves it to 
private initiatives to assess and certify compliance of a particular biofuel with this standard, through 
private certification schemes. The integration of private certification initiatives with RED created a 
hybrid biofuel governance landscape within the EU, i.e., a combination of public standards and 
private certification initiatives to govern access to the EU biofuel market (Ponte and Daugbjerg, 
2015). 
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Extensive research in recent years focused on how private certification initiatives function (Partzsch, 
2011; Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015; Schleifer, 2013; Stattman and Gupta, 2015). Many studies 
discussed, additionally, the sustainability debates around biofuels, including the pros and cons of 
various measurement tools to assess the (adverse) effects that biofuels might have on changing land 
use, GHG emissions, and agricultural production, among others (Bailis and Baka, 2011; Bernard and 
Prieur, 2007; Pacini et al., 2013). Our article adds to these existing studies by examining and distilling 
lessons from 10 years of hybrid biofuel governance within the EU, wherein the functioning of private 
certification initiatives is one key (but not the only) element of the analysis. We analyze the links 
between these private initiatives and EU-devised meta-sustainability standards, which in turn are 
evolving in response to continued debate and controversy over the sustainability of biofuels as 
alternatives to fossil fuels. It is the interaction between public and private governance elements that 
we are interested in, particularly in light of the recent decision by the European Parliament that 
challenges the long-standing basis of the RED-centered hybrid governance arrangement. This laid 
down that the sustainability of a particular biofuel is assured if the EU RED sustainability criteria are 
fulfilled, as verified through private certification processes recognized and accredited by the EU. In 
this arrangement, any feedstock could be used, as long as it is certified according to EU standards. As 
this seems no longer to be the case, some critical questions arise. Why does the European 
Parliament no longer recognize this governance arrangement as a guarantee for sustainable biofuels, 
and what does this mean for the future of biofuel policy in the EU? We discuss these questions in this 
paper. 
We proceed as follows: the next section conceptualizes hybrid governance, as we use the term here. 
Section 3 describes the evolution of hybrid biofuel governance in the EU. Section 4 evaluates how 
these governance arrangements worked in the last decade, and the extent to which they furthered 
the EU’s sustainability goals. We conclude by drawing out the implications of our findings for the 
future of biofuel policy in the EU. We rely on qualitative methods of analysis, whereby we review, 
distill, and synthesize the evolution of EU biofuel governance arrangements over the last decade, 
through detailed document analysis of secondary and primary literature, including EU and related 
policy documents, and private certification scheme briefs and websites. 
Our analysis reveals that, instead of yielding an increasingly stringent EU-wide framework to 
guarantee use of sustainable biofuels within the EU, the hybrid governance arrangements resulted in 
a proliferation of relatively lax, industry-driven, sustainability standards, at the cost of more 
ambitious multi-stakeholder initiatives, even as the notion of biofuel sustainability remains 
contested in public and political debate. These findings contribute to an ongoing debate in the 
literature about the merits of hybrid (public–private) governance arrangements, and whether a 
hybrid approach helps strengthen or weaken sustainability objectives. Our analysis shows that 
hybridity did not deliver on strengthening sustainability objectives, as envisioned by some advocates 
of public–private governance. We conclude that a more stringent EU meta-standard on sustainability 
needs to be developed, to underpin future governance arrangements. 
5.2 Hybrid Environmental Governance 
Hybrid governance, or the interaction between private and public sources of authority, was the 
subject of several studies in the global environmental realm (Falkner, 2003). Much analytical 
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attention was devoted to the emergence of hybrid governance and sources of their legitimacy (Chan 
and Pattberg, 2008; Partzsch, 2011). Related research highlighted the consequences of these 
developments for the (changing) authority of the state (Cashore et al., 2004; Green, 2013). 
In conceptualizing hybrid biofuel governance here, we build on the interpretation by Ponte and 
Daugbjerg, who argue that hybridity is a form of mutual dependence between public and private 
actors (Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015, p.2). They define hybridity as: 
“polyarchic and overlapping governance arenas, where interactions between a variety of 
mutually dependent private and public actors give rise to hybrid regulatory features, and 
where collective orders and individuals engage in cross-border rulemaking, implementation, 
and enforcement activities” (Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015, p. 4). 
Working with such a notion of hybridity, a key debate in the literature is how hybrid forms of 
governance are related to sustainability outcomes, particularly given the proliferation of such 
arrangements in the sustainability realm. Hybrid forms of governance are especially evident in the 
issue-areas of forests (Bartley, 2014), fisheries (Gulbrandsen, 2010), and commodities, such as palm 
oil for biofuels (Schouten and Glasbergen, 2012). Whether these arrangements further sustainability, 
or rather detract from it, remains debated. Some scholars argue that hybrid governance may 
enhance the governance capability to achieve sustainably goals, including environmental protection 
(for example, climate mitigation, biodiversity conservation, and indirect land-use change), social 
advancement (for example, improved labor conditions), and economic prosperity (for example, 
financial viability and macro-economic effects) (Abbott, 2012; Scarlat and Dallemand, 2011, p. 3; 
Schleifer, 2013, p. 3). Others consider that hybridity risks undermining sustainability objectives 
through leaving too much decision-making authority to private actors, and thereby also exacerbating 
environmental degradation, socially unjust outcomes, or economic hardship (Cashore and Stone, 
2014). 
At the very least, this debate in the literature reveals that the contribution of hybrid forms of 
governance to realizing sustainability objectives remains variable and unstable. The inclusion of 
private initiatives in state-led governance can, in theory, promote adoption of more stringent criteria 
and prioritize best practices for a “race to the top”. On the other hand, if multiple options are 
available and competition between private schemes arises, the resultant fragmentation can also 
undermine sustainability in a “race to the bottom”. It is timely, therefore, to examine this 
relationship for the case of EU biofuel policies, to which we turn below. 
5.3 EU Biofuel Regime: The Emergence of Hybridity Governance 
This section describes the landscape of the EU hybrid biofuel governance regime. We firstly outline 
the emergence of the regime and the sustainability imperatives therein. We then consider the 
involvement of private voluntary certification schemes in the context of EU biofuel sustainability 
objectives. 
5.3.1 EU Biofuel Directives: Scope and Sustainability 
The first EU “biofuels” directive—to promote the use of biofuels and other renewable fuels for 
transport—entered into force in 2003 and set a voluntary blending target of 2% in 2005, and a 
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binding target of 5.75% renewable energy in the transport sector by 2010 (European Parliament and 
The Council Of The European Union, 2003). There were no strict sustainability standards, but the EC 
had to report on cost-effectiveness, and economic and environmental aspects of biofuels production 
and trade, the effect of biofuels on climate change, indirect land-use change (ILUC), and the long-
term options for energy efficiency in the transport sector.  
Following the implementation of the biofuels directive, the use of biofuels for road transport 
increased to 2.6% in 2007 (European Commission, 2009). This was partially achieved by a growth in 
imported bioethanol in the period between 2005 and 2007, due to the lower production costs and 
higher efficiency of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol at that time (Stattman and Gupta, 2015). Also, 
biodiesel trade increased through cheap soybean oil from the United States, where farmers 
benefited from subsidies (European Commission, 2009). However, this increase in international trade 
complicated reporting on GHG emissions, an important sustainability indicator. 
Official GHG emission savings in this period amounted to 9.7 Mt (2006) and 14.0 Mt (2007) CO2-eq., 
but these figures remained debatable because the EU based them on the assumption that biofuels 
were produced from “abandoned” agricultural land, while indirect land-use change impacts from 
biofuels (ILUC) were not taken into consideration. By 2006, lobbyists, environmental organizations, 
and scientists began arguing that the EU’s desire to make its transport energy more sustainable led 
to increased GHG emissions in other countries (Bailis and Baka, 2011; European Commission, 2009), 
thus undermining the main sustainability objective incorporated in the biofuels directive. They 
argued that these (in)direct adverse effects should be included as risks to be mitigated in EU biofuel 
policies (Bailis and Baka, 2011; Baka, 2014). The debate became most heated with the 2007–2008 
food price crisis, when United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Jean Ziegler 
called biofuels a “crime against humanity” (Ziegler, 2008). After years of deliberations—both in 
public and behind the scenes—two follow-up EU directives came into effect in 2009: the Renewable 
Energy Directive (RED) (The European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, 2009b) 
and the revised Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) (European Parliament and of the Council of the 
European Union, 2009). These directives called for detailed reports from member states on land-use 
change and other environmental impacts from increased production of biofuels, thus making 
sustainability objectives officially part of EU biofuel policies by defining basic sustainability criteria. 
RED requires the EU to meet at least 20% of its total energy needs from renewables by 2020, of 
which at least 10% must come from renewable transport fuels. Biofuels may only be counted if they 
meet the sustainability criteria set by the EU. These criteria are as follows: (1) biofuels must achieve 
GHG savings of at least 35% in comparison to fossil fuels and this requirement rose to 50% in 2017 
and 60% in 2018 (but only for new production plants); (2) biofuels cannot be grown in areas 
converted from land with previously high carbon stock such as wetlands or forests; and (3) biofuels 
cannot be produced from raw materials obtained from land with high biodiversity, such as primary 
forests or highly biodiverse grasslands (The European Parliament and of the Council of the European 
Union, 2009b). These criteria were further elaborated through detailed standards and norms in order 
to reconcile diverse national interpretations, for example, European Standard series EN 16214 and 
associated technical specifications (European Committee for Standardisation (CEN)., 2018). When 
biofuels are compliant with these criteria, the EU accepts them as being produced in a “sustainable” 
manner. Companies can demonstrate compliance by using voluntary schemes recognized by the 
European Commission. 
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Despite the sustainability requirements put in place by RED and FQD, debates about the potential 
adverse effect of biofuels continued. In particular, there were ethical concerns with regard to food 
versus fuel, an issue immediately related to the land-use change driven by the increasing demand for 
biofuels (Afionis and Stringer, 2012; Stattman and Gupta, 2015). Political debates resulted in April 
2015 in the agreement that the EU would use a cap of 7% for biofuels derived from crops grown on 
agricultural land, to be used as part of the renewable energy target for transportation by 2020 
(Biofuelsdigest, 2014; The Council Of The European Union, 2014; The European Parliament, 2015). 
This agreement also included obligatory reporting on GHG emissions caused by indirect land-use 
change and an obligation for member states to create incentives for advanced biofuels. Here, we can 
see that, although the EU shifted considerable governance authority to the private sector when 
demanding “voluntary schemes” to certify the sustainability of biofuels, more recently, the European 
Parliament strengthened its baseline sustainability criteria within its mandatory regulation, given the 
food vs. fuel debates. This implies a slight “re-centering of the state” (Bartley, 2014) in the EU’s 
hybrid approach to biofuel governance, through the enhancement of the sustainability meta-
standard. 
In November 2016, the EC published a draft proposal for REDII, i.e., a revised biofuel policy for the 
post-2020 phase. It announced a gradually phasing out of conventional biofuels by 2030. While the 
proposal includes a call to increase the proportion of renewable energy in Europe to 27% by 2030, it 
proposes to reduce the contribution from conventional biofuels in transport from a maximum of 7% 
in 2021 to 3.8% in 2030. It also puts into place an obligation to raise the share of other “low-emission 
fuels”, such as renewable electricity and advanced biofuels in transport, to 6.8%. Furthermore, the 
Commission suggests that advanced biofuels are those that emit at least 70% fewer GHG emissions 
than fossil fuels (compared to savings of 60% in 2018 for new production plants by RED). 
This appears to signal a trend that the EC will continue encouraging the development of advanced 
alternative fuels for transport through a blending mandate for fuel suppliers, while progressively 
phasing out the contribution from food-based biofuels. Such a trend is partly driven by the negative 
public perception on biofuels as competing directly with food. As Marie Donelly, Director for 
Renewables, Research, and Energy Efficiency in the Commission’s Energy directorate puts it, “we 
have to be very sensitive to the reality of citizens’ concerns, sometimes even if these concerns are 
emotive rather than factual based or scientific” (EuroActive, 2016). As revealed by this statement, 
the EU’s sustainability standard-setting and associated hybrid governance continues to be a subject 
of contestation and multiple interpretations. 
5.3.2 RED Endorsed Voluntary Certification Schemes 
Parallel to the implementation of these EU directives, there was proliferation in the development of 
private biofuel certification schemes. This was partly because the EU developed its biofuels 
sustainability standard as a meta-standard (Samerwong et al., 2017), leaving compliance with it to be 
assessed by private actors. One of the key considerations for doing this concerns the limitations the 
EU encountered as a consequence of international trade regulation (Ackrill and Kay, 2011; Bartley, 
2014). The regulations included in the World Trade Organization (WTO) seriously limit the possibility 
of states to impose regulations and product requirements on other member states (Stattman and 
Gupta, 2015). A hybrid governance approach that builds on a meta-standard seems to offer better 
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opportunities to influence non-product-related processing and production methods beyond the EU 
(Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015). 
This was most evident in the period between the initial adaptation of RED in 2009 and the 
acceptance of compliance with RED of the first seven private schemes in July 2011 (Pacini et al., 
2013). During this period, the number of schemes available to certify biomass or biofuel as meeting 
EU criteria increased to 67 (Dam et al., 2008), including the Biomass Biofuels Sustainability Voluntary 
Scheme (2BSvs) and the International Sustainability and Carbon Certification (ISCC), which became 
the most popular schemes issuing certificates for EU RED (Moser et al., 2014, p. 45). 
From the 67 available schemes, 19 were accepted by the EU as of December 2016 (European 
Commission., 2018). These can roughly be divided into three categories: (1) roundtable/multi-
stakeholder initiatives (e.g., Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO), Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS)); (2) industry schemes (e.g., 2BSvs, Bonsucro, 
and Greenergy); and (3) government-supported schemes (e.g., ISCC with initial support from the 
German government, NTA 8080 with support from the Dutch government) (Kemper and Partzsch, 
2018; Pacini et al., 2013). Some schemes have a specific national scope whereas others are 
potentially applicable worldwide. Also, some cover particular crops and only parts of the biofuel 
production chain, whereas others cover all biofuel crops and entire production chains.  
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is an example of such a scheme. The RSPO was 
founded in Switzerland in 2004 as the result of an informal meeting initiated by the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) two years earlier with Aarhus United UK Ltd., Golden Hope Plantations 
Berhad, Migros, Malaysian Palm Oil Association, Sainsbury’s, and Unilever (Partzsch, 2011). This 
private initiative developed a scheme to certify the sustainability of palm-oil products. For instance, 
most palm oil is processed into foodstuffs (68%) and cosmetics (27%), and only 5% is used for 
biofuels (although this share is increasing rapidly) (Kekeritz et al., 2016). Certifying palm oil for 
biofuels required some adaptation because, in the context of palm oil for food, sustainability was not 
discussed in these terms (e.g., GHG savings).  
It took almost two years after RED was published before the EC approved the first voluntary schemes 
as certifiers of compliance with the EU meta-standard. This caused a regulatory gap between the 
policy-driven market demand being generated for “sustainable” biofuels, and their (certified) 
availability on the market (Pacini et al., 2013). As a result, in the intervening period, various 
stakeholders sought to fill this gap by creating their own sustainability scheme. For some, this may 
have been a strategic move, in the hope that the EC would adopt a given scheme as a way to make 
its sustainability requirements operational, giving the initiators a first mover advantage. For others, 
the hope was to create an effective multi-stakeholder platform that would develop a baseline of 
stringent criteria to promote sustainability objectives (Pacini et al., 2013). 
The EU continued recognizing new schemes after 2011, but the acceptance of schemes by the EC is 
temporary (for a period of five years), and, as shown in, several schemes were not renewed after the 
expiration of the first five-year period, such as RSPO RED. 
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Table 5.1 European Commission’s acceptance of voluntary schemes 
Year of 
Acceptance 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 2BSvs 
(Biomass Biofuels 
voluntary scheme) 
Ensus * 
 
Biograce 
GHG 
Gafta Trade Assurance 
Abengoa–RBSA * 
(Abengoa’s Bioenergy 
Sustainability 
Assurance Standard) 
NTA 8080 * 
(Dutch Technical 
Agreement 8080) 
 
 HVO (hydrotreated 
vegetable oil) 
Renewable Diesel 
Scheme for Verification 
of Compliance with the 
RED sustainability 
criteria for biofuels 
Voluntary 
scheme 
BonSucro Red Tractor  KRZ INIG System 
(System of certification 
of biofuels and 
bioliquids) 
 Greenergy* Redcert  Trade Assurance for 
Combinable Crops 
 ISCC (International 
Sustainability and 
Carbon Certification) 
SQC (Scottish Quality Farm 
Assured Combinable 
Crops) 
 Universal Feed 
Assurance 
 RSB EU RED 
(Roundtable for 
Sustainable 
Biomaterials) 
RSPO RED (Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil) * 
  
 RTRS EU RED 
(Round Table on 
Responsible Soy) 
   
* Expired (status December 2017)  
Source: adapted from NL Agency 2011 (2011 p. 29) with added information from other sources European 
Commission (2018); Runge (2007); Sengers (2010); Munro (2015) and 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes (visited 24 July 2018) 
 
To understand the process and proliferation of schemes, one has to look at the timeline of EU 
policies. The political discourse shifted during the 2007–2008 food price crisis when scholars 
demystified the “ethanol bubble” (Runge and Senauer, 2007, p. 41) and outlined potentially 
devastating implications for global poverty and food security (Munro, 2015; Sengers et al., 2010). As 
a consequence, environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) started fiercely opposing 
biofuels (Partzsch, 2011). Critical NGOs, such as Oxfam and Friends of the Earth, were involved in 
initial efforts to define sustainability criteria for biofuels, in particular, in the (Dutch) Cramer 
Commission, a multi-stakeholder initiative initiated in 2006 that resulted in the NTA 8080. However, 
for a while, WWF remained the only NGO to participate in later initiatives, such as the ISCC 
(International Sustainability and Carbon Certification) supported by the German government from 
2006 till 2012 (ISCC 2016). No NGOs are members of 2BSvs, a collaboration between seven French 
grain producers in 2012 (2BSvs 2016). This dwindling NGO participation indicates the growing civil 
society opposition against the weak definition of “sustainability” in these initiatives, as well as 
against biofuels in general. 
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A comparative study by WWF (2013) found large differences between private certification standards, 
especially with regards to their performance on environmental and social dimensions, and with 
regards to the aspects of sustainability covered—whether they were social, economic, and/or 
environmental dimensions (Bor, 2012; NL Agency - Ministry of Economic Affairs Agriculture and 
Innovation, 2011; The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)., 2014). Complementing this study, 
Kemper and Partzsch (2018) found that higher NGO presence in biofuel certification schemes 
correlated with stronger sustainability criteria. Roundtable/multi-stakeholder initiatives were 
demonstrated to be more ambitious, compared to government-supported and industry schemes. 
Partly, this was because, in the EU’s hybrid governance system, it was also left open whether these 
private initiatives needed to draw on evolving EU norms and standards, such as EN 16214 (European 
Committee for Standardisation (CEN)., 2018), designed to operationalize its sustainability criteria, or 
whether they could devise their own norms and standards to comply with EU criteria. The EU’s 
norms and standards sought to operationalize a minimum, narrow set of sustainability criteria 
(mainly environmental considerations). For future research, the analysis can also look at the effect of 
these norms and standards and include other voluntary standard-setting bodies such as the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5.4 Evaluating the Effects of the EU’s Hybrid Biofuel Governance System 
As we sketched above, the EU’s biofuel sustainability certification approach can be characterized as a 
form of hybrid governance, since it relies on a combination of public–private standard-setting and 
implementation. We next consider below whether hybrid governance furthers or undermines the 
fulfillment of the EU’s sustainability goals and potentially increases or decreases their stringency. 
5.4.1 The EU Meta-Standard 
RED formulated three minimum sustainability criteria (GHG savings, protection of land with high 
carbon stock, and protection of biodiverse forests and grasslands). To be accepted by the EC as 
certifiers of compliance with EU’s sustainability requirements, voluntary certification schemes have 
to meet, at least, these three criteria. In addition, since 2015, the EU agreed to put a cap of 7% on 
conventional biofuels, to limit the quantity of potentially edible crops grown on agricultural land for 
energy consumption. For REDII, the European Commission now proposes to further strengthen 
requirements for GHG savings (70% less GHG emissions than fossil fuels compared to required 
savings of 60% in 2018 for new production plants) and to lower the cap on conventional biofuels to 
3.8% in 2030. All other criteria included in an RED-accepted scheme remain voluntary. This implies 
that the current RED serves as a meta-standard or legal (minimum) baseline for private certification 
schemes (Figure 5.1). As a “meta-standard”, it is a minimum standard that aims to have a broad 
reach and exclude (at least) the least sustainable practices. 
The timeline of accepted sustainability schemes (see Table 5.1) reveals that the short-term initial 
effect of this hybrid governance strategy was a growth in the number of certification schemes. There 
was also an increase in the number of companies and projects participating in the various schemes. 
The first schemes were often the result of a broad multi-stakeholder consultation process, with a 
wide scope reaching well beyond the minimum RED requirements, as they were not yet fixed at the 
time of their development. Looking at the more recent schemes, the picture is different. These 
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schemes are often led by business conglomerates and offer little more than compliance with the 
minimum EU standard. The lack of transparency in the certification and auditing process suggests 
business as usual, rather than improvements with regards to sustainability objectives on the ground. 
While the EC is yet to provide a clear long-term vision or a foreseeable increase in the sustainability 
requirements in the meta-standard (other than GHG emissions and a cap on conventional biofuels), 
current RED’s ambitions for strengthening sustainability in biofuel production is undermined through 
the expansion of certification schemes containing minimal sustainability standards. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Fragmentation of certification options, according to stringency 
Source: developed by authors 
 
A potential benefit of using a meta-standard approach is the reduced costs for standard 
development and control, compared to a scenario where the EU would have to carry out certification 
by itself (Abbott, 2012). The large variability of biofuel resources, production regions, and 
competition with other markets would have made it very difficult to introduce a simple universally 
applicable certification scheme. In the present set-up, sectors and companies are able to develop a 
certification scheme that fits with the specific needs of their markets and industries. This helped 
improve the speed of diffusion, because these private standards are able to adapt their criteria faster 
than the EU bureaucracy could do (Schleifer, 2013). In particular, voluntary schemes allowed the EU 
to promote sustainable production and processing methods beyond their own territory, for example, 
for palm oil production in Indonesia and Malaysia, if this feedstock is processed into biofuel and 
exported to the EU and included in the 10% transport target (Afionis and Stringer, 2012; Ponte and 
Daugbjerg, 2015). 
While WTO trade rules allow some regulatory scope for environmental sustainability, social 
sustainability rules are deemed non-compliant. Therefore, the EU refrained from introducing binding 
requirements on social sustainability criteria in the RED meta-standard (Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015). 
By contrast, voluntary standards may include social sustainability requirements, for instance, 
minimum wages on biofuel farms (Stattman and Mol, 2014). However, even more ambitious 
schemes, such as the Roundtable for Sustainable Biomaterials (until 2013 known as the “Roundtable 
on Sustainable Biofuels”), which was one of the earlier and more ambitious multi-stakeholder 
schemes developed in 2006, only request reporting about social aspects and do not prescribe specific 
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standards. Among the schemes that the European Commission accepted so far, there is little 
incentive to demand sustainable practices that go beyond the meta-standard. 
5.4.2 Proliferation, Fragmentation, and Competition: Too Many Schemes Dilute Sustainability 
RED has not limited the number of private voluntary certification schemes that can apply for 
acceptance. This means that any scheme that meets the meta-standard sustainability requirements 
can be accepted. On the one hand, this keeps the market accessible for new applicants. On the other 
hand, however, this multiplicity and diversity between schemes results in fragmentation and a push 
toward including only the minimum sustainability objectives from the EU biofuel policy (Abbott, 
2012; Schleifer, 2013). 
As we showed earlier, after promulgation of RED in 2009, more industry-driven schemes began 
emerging, such as 2BSvs and Bonsucro/Better Sugarcane Initiative (Table 5.1). Generally, these 
schemes are less stringent and remain close to the minimal EU sustainability meta-standard, even if 
they are locally successful (Manos et al., 2014). Arguably then, by accepting industry schemes, the EU 
is undermining the likelihood of companies to be certified by the more stringent certification 
schemes. The increasing spread of certification schemes to choose from, and the competition 
between them, led to a “race to the bottom”, i.e., a “pick-and-choose” system wherein companies 
avoid schemes that would demand changes in their current production process or that are seen as 
too stringent. Most companies choose to be certified by industry and government-supported 
schemes, and hardly any company commits itself to the stricter RSB or RSPO standard (International 
Sustainability and Carbon Certification (ISCC), 2016; Moser et al., 2014; RSB, 2016). The ISCC issued 
more than 13,000 certificates (and only five projects are on the “blacklist”) (International 
Sustainability and Carbon Certification (ISCC), 2016). Often, companies are certified by several 
schemes; thus, if they lose the certification from a more stringent scheme, for example, RSPO 
certification, they still remain certified by the less stringent schemes, for example, ISCC (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2016). As such, their products can still count toward the EU’s 10% transport target. Thus, 
even companies losing (a specific) certification do not lose their access to the European market. 
While, at the outset, in an environment of policy uncertainty, hybrid governance helped set the 
scene by creating elaborate sustainability frameworks, after the adoption of RED in 2009 and its 
request for certification, this upward sustainability standard-setting process was (partly) undermined 
by companies demanding lower requirements. New certification schemes rather contributed to 
business as usual instead of promoting sustainability. 
What we can observe with this approach of RED, i.e., a de facto promotion of its legally required 
sustainability criteria, is that companies reorient their strategies in order to be certified by only the 
minimum meta-standard, rather than pursuing (even if voluntarily) more stringent best practices 
with regards to sustainability certification (Bartley, 2014, p. 104). The ensuing variety and strategic 
maneuvering of those seeking to be certified also creates fragmentation (Abbott, 2012; Schleifer, 
2013). Such dynamics then do not contribute to promoting more sustainable outcomes on the 
ground. 
Another shortcoming of these dynamics in biofuel sustainability certification is that certification 
occurs primarily where it is easy to obtain, i.e., at production sites that already comply with the 
required minimal meta-standard. Most of the 19 voluntary schemes that the European Commission 
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accepted for RED are not applicable to developing countries, for example, the Scottish Quality Farm 
Assured Combinable Crops (SQC) scheme, which certifies only Scottish biomass (European 
Commission, 2016). Consequently, certification does not serve as a tool to expand the use of best 
practices, especially when the benefits of becoming certified under a more ambitious sustainability 
scheme are limited. Less sustainable farms have sufficient alternative export possibilities (beyond 
access to the EU market) that do not require certification (Mohr and Bausch, 2013, p. 10; Saikkonen 
et al., 2014, p. 8). See Textbox 5.1 for examples of strategies that may encourage a race to the top. 
The fact that private certification schemes are not embedded in laws or policies of producing 
countries might increase this effect even further (Gulbrandsen, 2005a; Mayer and Gereffi, 2010; 
Ruysschaert and Salles, 2014, p. 440). This would be an argument for a more legality-driven approach 
to promote sustainability outcomes across a whole sector. For example, the Indonesian Sustainable 
Palm Oil system (ISPO) is a mandatory national standard that is applicable to all oil palm growers in 
Indonesia (Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (IPSO), 2016); however, ISPO is yet to be accepted by the 
EC (European Commission, 2016). 
 
Textbox 5.1 Top-runner program for sustainable biofuels 
 Japan encourages competitiveness on energy efficiency with a unique program: the Top Runner 
Approach. The program sets a mandatory meta-standard, based on the most efficient (“top 
runner”) products on the market, for a variety of appliances, equipment, and automobiles. It 
has been a highly effective program since its adoption in 1998 and is now considered one of the 
major pillars of Japanese climate policy. By 2009, the program achieved mandatory energy 
efficiency standards for 21 products (Kimura, 2010). 
 Likewise, the European Commission could limit the number of accepted biofuel certification 
schemes and only accept the most stringent schemes for contributions to its 10% transport 
target. This would prevent earlier and more ambitious schemes to vanish from the market. 
Companies would be more likely to commit to schemes that are more ambitious and, hence, 
more likely to stay on the Commission’s list. 
Source: developed by authors 
5.4.3 Certification and the Stimulation of Best Practices 
As we argued above, voluntary certification schemes have become, in part, responsible for the 
execution of the sustainability requirements of RED. This is controversial due to the nature of many 
voluntary certification schemes, which are driven by mainly profit-seeking private actors (Partzsch, 
2011; Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015). With regards to what constitutes stringent criteria and best 
practices, biofuel certification schemes reveal a broad variety in governance procedures and 
standard-setting with regards to coverage, assurance, verification, transparency, quality, and 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Ambitious certification schemes were developed before a 
discussion started on a mandatory requirement for sustainability certification of biomass-based 
transport fuels, i.e., specifically before the 2007–2008 food price crisis. The most ambitious schemes 
were developed for high value-products, for example, palm oil in certified food and cosmetic 
products. The Rapunzel “HAND IN HAND” program, started in 1992, can definitely be considered a 
“best practice” (see fail to deliver on its promises. Textbox 5.2) (Rapunzel., 2016). With regards to 
biofuel certification, multi-stakeholder initiatives in particular, such as the Cramer Commission and 
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the RSB, demonstrated a broad set-up and inclusion of various sustainably criteria, including 
environmental and social reporting indicators (Cramer et al., 2007; RSB, 2016). The government-
driven schemes in their early phase of set-up also demonstrated this broader and more stringent 
approach, in particular, ISCC and NTA 8080 that the Dutch normalization institute NEN developed 
following the Cramer Commission. However, different to Rapunzel’s “HAND IN HAND” program, 
these schemes never aimed for organic biomass production when talking about sustainable biomass. 
Prohibition of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) was an issue in the Cramer Commission 
(Partzsch, 2011), but did not enter into any final criteria catalog. Central to the Cramer Commission, 
which focused on biomass-based fuels, was the GHG balance. The Commission suggested a minimum 
requirement of 30% GHG reduction for 2007 and 50% GHG reduction for 2011 (and 70% emission 
reduction in the long run), compared to fossil fuels (Cramer et al., 2007). RSB requests GHG emission 
reduction of 50% compared to fossil fuel (RSB, 2016). The 2009 EU RED criteria are similar: GHG 
savings of at least 35% in comparison to fossil fuels, 50% since 2017, and 60% since 2018 (but only 
for new production plants) (The European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, 
2009b). 
The effectiveness of individual certification schemes was the topic of extensive research by 
academics and NGOs, which demonstrated that there is a large gap between intentions and set-up of 
many voluntary schemes, and that these schemes have limited (global) impact (Dam et al., 2008; 
Gulbrandsen, 2005a; Meyer and Priess, 2014; Ruysschaert and Salles, 2014; WWF-Germany., 2013). 
A related risk of using voluntary schemes is that certification itself is not always a guarantee that 
standards are actually followed or enforced or that underlying governance issues are addressed 
(Bush et al., 2015; Larsen et al., 2013; Mayer and Gereffi, 2010). This means that compliance with a 
scheme is not the same as achieving the sustainability objectives set out by the policy. The EU’s 
dependence on, and trust in, certification as a tool for improving sustainability might, therefore, fail 
to deliver on its promises. 
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Textbox 5.2 Best Practice: Rapunzel HAND IN HAND Sustainability Criteria for Palm Oil.  
 No clear-cutting of primary forests; protection of the natural habitat of endangered animals 
and plants 
 Promotion of animal and plant diversity also inside palm plantations 
 100% organic cultivation, no combined organic-conventional operations and absolute 
prohibition of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
 Integration in locally grown structures, respect of land ownership rights and rights of 
indigenous people 
 Transparent production structures and process chains 
 Regular on-site visits of Rapunzel agri-engineers 
 Verifiable social standards 
 External control and certification of independent agencies 
 
The German organic food company Rapunzel started the HAND IN HAND program in 1992, which 
certifies palm oil from Ghana, among other raw materials, used in the company’s products. The 
program combines the ideas of controlled organic farming and fair trade. 
Source: Rapunzel (2016) (authors’ translation from German) 
 
Most private schemes deal differently with regards to other sustainability criteria, such as 
biodiversity. For example, the Cramer Commission (2007) proposed that plantations must not be 
located in or in the immediate vicinity of “gazetted protected areas”. A core RSB principle is that 
“biofuel operations shall avoid negative impacts on biodiversity, ecosystems, and conservation 
values” principle 7, see Reference (International Sustainability and Carbon Certification (ISCC), 2016), 
including that “ecological corridors shall be protected, restored, or created to minimize 
fragmentation of habitats” principle 7, see Reference (International Sustainability and Carbon 
Certification (ISCC), 2016). Similarly, the Cramer Commission and RSB asked for environmental 
reporting, including on the use of agro-chemicals. The EU RED prohibits feedstock production on land 
with recognized high biodiversity and carbon stocks, and on peatland. There is, however, no ban or 
need for reporting on the use of agro-chemicals (The European Parliament and of the Council of the 
European Union, 2009b). So, we may argue that more than two decades after the set-up of the “best 
practice” Rapunzel scheme, the EU’s hybrid governance approach is still lagging behind in terms of 
what is possible regarding sustainability. The examples described above illustrate that hybrid 
governance may enhance the governance capability to achieve sustainably goals, but only if states 
include in their meta-standard new or improved “best practices” developed by private schemes that 
instituted more stringent sustainability requirements (Abbott, 2012). 
5.4.4 Assumptions and Characteristics of the Biofuels Market 
To understand the governance and sustainability challenges related to the biofuels market, it is 
important to take the specific characteristics of this market into consideration, because they 
influence the European governance landscape. Biofuels are not sold on a consumer market like 
foodstuffs and cosmetics. When people buy gasoline, they have no information about how the 
blended percentage of biofuels contained therein is certified. There are also no alternatives available 
at the point of sale, from which a consumer could choose. This also poses a limitation relating to the 
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difficulty of quantifying the amount of certified biomass for biofuels by private initiatives, making it 
harder to assess their success in comparison with one another. 
As outlined above, worldwide demand for biofuels is primarily policy-driven, rather than by 
economic considerations. An increasing number of countries developed a biofuel-for-transport 
strategy by using policy or tax incentives/cuts, blending targets, or production subsidies. Only in the 
United States of America (USA) and the EU are these blending mandates under continuous scrutiny 
because of sustainability concerns. In other regions, the focus is primarily limited to energy-security 
aspects (Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), 2014; Stattman and Gupta, 
2015). The wide availability of alternative markets for non-certified biomass/biofuels has 
implications for the effectiveness of EU policies, because there are no globally comprehensive biofuel 
laws and, hence, there is no level playing field for companies with regards to buying and trading 
biofuel resources. The willingness of companies to invest in this sector is, therefore, affected by 
uncertainty about long-term policy objectives regarding the insecurity about certification and the 
continuation of blending requirements (International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2014; 
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), 2014; WWF-Germany., 2013). 
Another challenge in the case of biofuels is that this term covers many different resources, products, 
producing countries, etc. This makes a discussion about sustainable biofuels challenging; soy 
produced in one region might be seen as efficient and sustainable, while soy from another region 
may be not. This makes it hard to define “sustainable soy” in general terms (Stattman et al., 2013). 
The same applies to almost all biofuel crops and producing countries, all of which have their own 
interpretation of sustainability, with possibly more consideration for social or economic aspects than 
the EU meta-standard. Brazil, for instance, has its own social development program for the 
promotion of biofuels that is very different from the environmental sustainability-driven certification 
requirements of the EU. Instead of requesting GHG savings, protection of land with high carbon 
stock, and protection of biodiverse grasslands, the Brazilians included also social inclusion ambitions 
in their biodiesel policy (Stattman and Mol, 2014). In addition, Brazilian sugar traders argue that 
increasing domestic demand made export to the EU less important, together with the lack of price 
premiums for participation in the EU biofuels market, and the costs of certification. As such, the 
added value of certification for them is negligible, especially in light of other available markets (Pacini 
et al., 2013, pp. 901–902). It may, therefore, not be surprising that the Greenergy scheme was not 
renewed after its initial five-year approval by the EC. 
The interplay between agricultural and food markets and the energy market is another important 
issue in considering sustainability standards for biofuels. Beyond the fact that production of biofuels 
may drive up food prices, it is clear that first-generation biofuels are intimately linked to agricultural 
and food markets through their reliance on the same resources. Biofuels are, thus, part of a highly 
international agricultural dynamics with constantly changing trade flows, as well as part of a highly 
volatile energy market. This creates new forms of competition on many different levels and markets. 
In addition to the challenges for certification, these characteristics of a biofuel market ensure that 
there is interference with other institutions that regulate international trade, in particular, the WTO. 
The EU is restricted in its ability to formulate expansive production process-based biofuel 
sustainability requirements, without creating non-tariff trade barriers or putting into place 
unjustified agricultural subsidies as a way to promote production of sustainable biofuels (Stattman 
and Gupta, 2015). The large share of biomass that is imported from regions outside the EU is seen as 
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an argument in favor of voluntary certification, as this is where unsustainable practices 
(environmental degradation, etc.) are witnessed more often. By making use of voluntary certification 
to monitor farms in non-EU producing countries, the EU avoids conflicts with the dominant free-
trade paradigm and can influence production processes outside its own borders without breaking 
the WTO rules (Schleifer, 2013, p. 9). 
5.5 Conclusions 
The EU created an elaborate framework to stimulate the production and use of biofuels, while 
striving for sustainability within its production and supply chain. We have seen that EU biofuel 
policies evolved over time. While the EU was increasing the share of biofuels and renewable energies 
and the biomass imports in its transport policies, it was also becoming more cautious about the 
potential negative side-effects of stimulating biofuel production, in particular, relating to ILUC and 
food price increases in developing countries. 
The EU’s main biofuel policy tool, RED, applied a hybrid governance approach that allows the EU to 
demand sustainable biofuels by setting a meta-standard for sustainability and efficiently outsourcing 
monitoring and certification obligations to private actors. This approach promised to be flexible and 
to draw on latest insights into sustainability practices on the ground, as well as to make use of 
innovative private initiatives. The expectation was that private certification schemes would add their 
own additional sustainability goals to the mandatory EU meta-standard and, hence, facilitate a shift 
toward greater sustainability in biofuel production, within and beyond the EU. Our analysis suggests 
that the hybrid governance strategy relied upon by the EU did offer the potential to increase the 
impact and stringency of its biofuel sustainability objectives in the manner envisaged above. 
However, this did not materialize in practice because of the minimal requirements of the EU’s meta-
standard, which in turn led to a proliferation and fragmentation of available certification options, 
and a concurrent lack of incentives to search for and be certified against the best available practices 
with regards to sustainability. 
Firstly, given that the EU’s hybrid governance approach stimulated the involvement of private actors, 
the meta-standard turned out to be more crucial than initially assumed. Early sustainability schemes 
were formulated by multiple stakeholders, including NGOs such as Friends of the Earth and Oxfam, 
and addressed a broad range of sustainability aspects, reaching well beyond the minimum RED 
requirements to come. The later industry schemes, however, adhere to the “minimum” of the EU 
meta-standard. Against this backdrop, we conclude that the meta-standard is set too low and does 
not encourage a “race to the top” in sustainability standards. It took more than five years after the 
introduction of RED before the EU addressed the impact of biofuel stimulation policies on food 
prices, by introducing the 7% cap on the use of first-generation biofuels from crops grown on 
agricultural land. Now the European Commission proposes to further strengthen this requirement to 
a 3.8% cap on food-based fuel in 2030. Regarding the planned increase of the biofuels share, 
however, the overall volume of potential food processed to biofuel and renewable energies might 
still increase. Contributing more effectively to all dimensions of sustainability in biofuel production 
would require the EU to set its meta-standard at a higher level and to also include social criteria. 
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Secondly, the proliferation of private schemes led to a serious fragmentation of biofuel certification 
and associated sustainability governance. Companies may choose between several schemes and they 
may opt for the least demanding and still have access to European market for sustainable biofuels. 
As there is no economic incentive to commit to more ambitious sustainability standards, there 
currently is a race to the bottom. Contrary to other studies that show convergence between 
different standards at a higher level (Reinecke et al., 2012), the case of biofuels suggests that the 
presence of many different schemes results in a fragmentation-induced lowering of standards to a 
baseline minimum. Explanations for such differences in sectors might be the absence of consumer 
involvement in the development and use of biofuels standards in general, the absence of NGOs in 
the more recent standards, and the diversity of biomass materials used for the production of 
biofuels. Lessons for the setting of biofuel sustainability standards can be learned from the more 
ambitious standards developed for organic and “fair trade” palm oil processed to foodstuff and 
cosmetics (e.g., Rapunzel HAND IN HAND). 
Thirdly, EU certification requirements lack incentives to strive for “best practices”. Ideally, 
hybridization of market-based and governmental regulation would contribute to achieving real 
sustainability outcomes (Larsen et al., 2013). In the current system, however, we found that schemes 
are forced into competition, primarily motivated by (economic) decision criteria and financial 
benefit. We found no indications that a learning process is taking place with regards to the 
development and implementation of ever more stringent sustainability criteria for biofuels. The 
political and public debate shifted rather to the question of whether the EU should make use of agro-
biomass-based biofuels in the first place to achieve its sustainability goals. 
Fourthly, food-based biofuels continue to be a public concern. Ongoing debates about the adverse 
effect of biofuels indicate that neither individual voluntary certification standards nor the EU meta-
standard have the governance capacity to address sustainability issues with the magnitude of, e.g., 
ILUC, thus challenging this hybrid governance approach to sustainability. This is clearly illustrated in 
the European Parliament decision to propose an end to the use of palm oil for biofuels. It shows the 
lack of public trust in the effectiveness of the complex hybrid arrangement to prevent the negative 
effects of biofuel production. The interaction between hybrid governance and sustainability 
objectives is, thus, revealed again to be delicate and changeable. Existing experience with hybrid 
forms of governance suggest that the EU RED arguably has little effect on the ground in biofuel-
producing countries and might even be hindering the achievement of sustainability objectives. A 
crucial imperative for future EU biofuel governance is, therefore, to seek appropriate governance 
mechanisms and incentives that will actively stimulate the development and adoption of best 
practices. Effectively, this means a more active involvement of public authorities in the design and 
implementation of specific criteria and standards for biofuels.  
In concluding, how do these findings resonate beyond the biofuel issue-area? It is important to note 
here the specific characteristics that make biofuels a special case of EU hybrid governance. 
Compared to most other commodity markets, government involvement in this case is high, as the EU 
sets specific targets for biofuel production and use, and contributed to creating a policy-led 
international market for biofuel production and trade. Unlike other areas, consumers are not in the 
front guard of making decisions, since they are not informed about the presence of biofuels in their 
transport fuel, neither do they have any choice in what to buy. In addition, biofuels can be produced 
from a broad range of different raw materials, most of which may also be used for other products, 
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complicating the development and application of stringent sustainability criteria. These unique 
characteristics notwithstanding, our broad conclusions are nevertheless applicable in other domains 
beyond biofuels as well. Based on our findings, we conclude that hybrid environmental governance 
requires active state and public involvement, to ensure the application of lessons learned, and 
effective implementation of sustainability standards on the ground in diverse contexts. Hybrid 
governance cannot be successful by simply shifting responsibilities for sustainable production and 
processing to private actors. For a future research agenda, it will be interesting to see how our 
findings about hybrid governance apply to sustainability of other agro-food chains. Also, in this 
paper, we primarily examined the EU approach. Comparing this to how biofuel governance evolved 
in, for example, the USA or in Latin America could shed further light on when and under what 
conditions hybrid (public–private) governance can further desired sustainability objectives.
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6 Conclusion 
This thesis analyses evolving biofuel governance arrangements in Brazil and the EU and the 
interactions between them, including diverse notions of sustainability contained herein. A central 
concern is the extent to which the EU has succeeded in exporting its own notions of sustainability 
beyond its borders, in seeking to create a global market for sustainable biofuels.  
Through detailed analysis in four empirical chapters, the thesis answers two cross-cutting research 
questions:  
 How have biofuels been governed in the EU and Brazil over time, and what (conflicting or 
converging) notions of sustainability are embodied in these evolving governance 
arrangements? 
 
 How has the EU sought to export its notions of sustainability beyond its borders, with 
particular focus on Brazil, and (how) has it succeeded in doing so? 
Section 6.1 of this concluding chapter synthesizes the key findings of the thesis from the four 
empirical chapters. Section 6.2 then answers the two cross-cutting research questions. Section 6.3 
reflects on theoretical contributions and the methodological approach adopted in the thesis, 
including internal and external validity. Section 6.4 concludes by providing policy implications and a 
future research outlook.  
6.1 Research findings 
The overall research objectives and questions were addressed within the four empirical chapters, 
focusing, respectively, on evolving EU and Brazil biofuel governance and on how key aspects of 
sustainability were negotiated and developed in each of these contexts (see Figure 6.1).  
Chapter 2 traced the historical evolution of bioethanol and biodiesel policies and governance 
arrangements in Brazil, including the role of key actors. In doing so, I explained how biofuels in Brazil 
have been governed over time, including evolving understandings of sustainability therein. The 
analysis showed that ethanol-focused governance arrangements concentrated primarily on energy 
security rather than sustainability concerns. In contrast, biodiesel governance initially was concerned 
with (social) sustainability, particularly questions of rural development and social inclusion of small 
farmers in biodiesel production. The analysis shows, however, that over time both types of biofuels 
are being governed to further agricultural and energy goals, rather than (social) sustainability 
objectives. This is illustrated by the growing focus on increasing blending targets for biodiesel, rather 
than on realizing social inclusion and rural development goals. These policy objectives (and their 
implementation) are also driven primarily by domestic imperatives, rather than export 
considerations.  
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Chapter 3 built on the historical tracing of biofuel governance arrangements in Brazil in the previous 
chapter to analyse in more depth the social inclusion component of Brazilian biodiesel policies. The 
chapter focused on the 2004 biodiesel policy and its two main objectives: to advance biodiesel as a 
transportation fuel and to foster social inclusion of family farmers through participation in the 
biodiesel chain. The chapter analyzes the extent to which cooperatives are involved in integrating 
family farmers into the biodiesel chain and what this means for the social sustainability of biodiesel, 
taking the northeast state of Bahia as a case study area. The findings show that through the biodiesel 
policy, cooperatives—until then a marginal phenomenon in northern Brazil—increased their 
membership, were empowered, and contributed to the economic development of a significant group 
of family farmers. However, these family farmers have not been substantially included in the 
biodiesel production chain itself. The chapter reveals the complexity of realizing social sustainability 
goals in biofuel governance. It shows that, although agricultural cooperatives can serve as 
intermediaries to facilitate family farmer inclusion in sustainable production, it is questionable 
whether a focus on producing specific quantities of global commodities, such as biofuels, is a suitable 
development trajectory for family farmers.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Analytical lenses: interacting spheres of governance authority 
Source: developed by author 
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Chapter 4 moves to consider the global context for Brazilian biofuel governance and policies. It 
explores how global demand for biofuels has been stimulated by European Union policies that 
promote biofuels as a potential sustainable source of transport fuel, and how strategies are used by 
the EU to export its evolving notions of sustainability beyond its own borders. The chapter analyzes 
how Brazil has navigated an evolving global governance context for sustainable biofuels, in particular 
how it has responded to EU biofuel sustainability imperatives. The chapter focuses specifically on 
analyzing how these debates have played out in the context of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
disciplines governing trade in commodities such as biofuels. The chapter concludes that while Brazil 
emphasizes the social and developmental objectives of its biofuel policies in a domestic context, it 
frames itself globally as a leading producer of (environmentally) sustainable biofuels. In doing so, it 
navigates intersecting spheres of governance authority, such as the EU and the WTO, in a manner 
that promotes its own biofuel policy agenda, partly by seeking to reframe “sustainability” debates 
internationally to reflect its developmental agenda. The analysis shows how the global debate over 
sustainable biofuels is as much a battle over governance of national territory as a battle over global 
market access insofar as it impinges upon domestic production practices. The chapter concludes, 
however, that Brazil has not yet adjusted, nor felt the need to adjust, its domestic biofuel policy 
priorities and practices because of the EU’s environmental sustainability requirements.  
Chapter 5 shifts to analysing in detail how biofuel governance arrangements have evolved in the EU 
over time, and how understandings of sustainable biofuels have evolved within these arrangements. 
The chapter analyses a decade of biofuel policy making in the EU, in the context of continuous 
debates on sustainability issues related to the large-scale production, import and use of biofuels. In 
particular, the chapter focuses on the nature and functioning of the EU’s novel hybrid (public-
private) biofuel governance arrangements, and how notions of sustainability have been negotiated 
and established herein. Compared to most other commodity markets, state involvement in this case 
is high, as the EU sets specific targets for biofuel production and use and has contributed to creating 
a policy-led international market for sustainable biofuel production and trade. The EU’s hybrid 
governance approach has been implemented since 2009, involving a meta-standard established by 
the EU and specific sustainability requirements developed by private and hybrid actors to comply 
with the meta-standard. The expectation underpinning a hybrid governance approach was that 
private initiatives would add their own additional sustainability objectives to the mandatory EU 
meta-standard, and hence lead to greater sustainability in biofuels production, both internally within 
and external to the EU. The chapter concludes that instead of yielding an increasingly stringent set of 
sustainability standards, this hybrid approach is characterized by contested notions of sustainability, 
with a trend towards less ambitious or lowest common denominator industry-led standards. At the 
same time, while the EU has continuously increased the share of biofuels and renewable energies 
and the biomass imports in its transport policies, it has recently become more cautious with regard 
to potential negative side-effects of stimulating biofuel production, in particular indirect land use 
change (ILUC) and food price increases in developing countries. Its biofuel policy directions are 
therefore yet again being adjusted and are currently at a critical juncture. 
6.2 Answering Research Questions 
This sub-section draws on and further syntheses of empirical findings presented above to answer the 
two cross-cutting research questions of this thesis. 
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6.1.1 Governance arrangements in Brazil and the EU  
 
How have biofuels been governed in the EU and Brazil over time, and what (conflicting or 
converging) notions of sustainability are embodied in these evolving governance 
arrangements?  
In Brazil, biofuel governance has been characterized by a strong role for the state, without much 
governance authority transferred to non-state actors. This has shaped the directions of, and 
approach to, governance, and associated sustainability goals. In realizing its specific sustainability 
goals, Brazil has tried to involve other actors, such as agricultural cooperatives. The thesis findings 
suggest that a central focus of Brazil’s governance arrangements has been to set up, and 
institutionalize, blending targets rather than specify detailed sustainability targets. Despite concerted 
efforts, particularly in early years of biodiesel policy development, to broaden the scope to include 
social sustainability as a crucial policy goal, blending targets, i.e. percentage of biofuels blended with 
fossil fuels, have been a persistent and dominant focus of domestic biofuel governance in Brazil over 
time, for both bioethanol and biodiesel. National biofuel policies have also prioritized linking a 
variety of policy domains (including development, energy and agricultural policies). Biofuel 
governance arrangements and strategies have focused on creating schemes to subsidize and thereby 
increase production, including through financial incentives and price manipulation. The focus has 
been primarily on securing domestic supply and demand of biofuels, with more market-driven 
developments and export possibilities emerging as a supplementary concern in later years when the 
EU sought to create new markets in (sustainable) biofuels.  
Through these governance arrangements, Brazil’s notion of sustainability has also evolved. As 
chapters 2 and 3 show, there has been a shift from a concern with energy security towards one 
including social sustainability in biofuel governance. But in recent years, the primary concern has 
been to encourage large scale production rather than securing rural development. The limited 
environmental concerns associated with large scale biofuel production have focused on domestic 
issues like air pollution due to sugarcane burning during the production process, and with trying to 
prevent excessive reliance on one or two crops (such as sugarcane or soy) to avoid monocultures in 
biofuel production. This effort at crop diversification notwithstanding, the dominant crops for biofuel 
production in Brazil remain sugarcane and soy. Environmental concerns in Brazil’s biofuel 
governance have hardly touched upon climate change and land use. 
In the EU, governance of biofuels was initiated by an EU directive, i.e. it has been, as the case with 
Brazil, also state-driven. Initial governance arrangements were ‘top-down’ and intended to create 
markets in the new commodity – biofuels. However, these early governance arrangements for 
biofuels did not include or specify sustainability requirements. Governance arrangements instead 
were focused on securing alternative transport fuels, and thereby promoting large scale production 
and import of biofuels (bioethanol and biodiesel). The assumption underlying this was that these 
alternative fuels would be a greener alternative to fossil fuels, especially with regard to reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions. With a growing surge in demand for biofuels as a result of these EU 
policies, however, sustainability came to the fore, with concerns voiced regarding conflicts between 
land used for biofuel versus food production, and regarding reductions of greenhouse gas emissions 
to the extent believed earlier. The latter was particularly voiced because of including emissions 
resulting from indirect land use change when converting land to biofuel production. EU biofuel 
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governance arrangements responded (slowly) to these concerns by developing a meta-standard that 
sought to reduce environmental consequences of expanded biofuel production, including adverse 
impacts on biodiversity. Simultaneously, a proliferation of private and hybrid governance initiatives 
emerged to try to address sustainability concerns. The EU responded by creating a hybrid 
governance scheme in order to operationalize its sustainability meta-standard. It also developed a 
typology of different biofuels, in order to address concerns about food-based biofuels, with diverse 
governance arrangements applying to different types of biofuels. More recent developments include 
phasing out food-based biofuels all together, in order to shift to more advanced second and third 
generation biofuels that raise fewer sustainability concerns.  
The EU’s biofuel policy directions have not, however, consistently moved towards more stringent 
sustainability requirements. It started out by setting ambitious goals for biofuels, to create a market 
in what was seen to be a more sustainable alternative to fossil fuels. However, these goals soon 
came in conflict with contentious debates about sustainability, including trade-offs between fuel 
versus food. The EU’s novel hybrid governance approach has resulted in a mandatory meta-standard 
for sustainability, but this meta-standard is a minimum floor rather than a set of increasingly 
ambitious sustainability requirements. In response to a continuing controversy about sustainability, 
however, the EU has also recently chosen to go beyond its own meta-standard. In separate policy 
debates and trajectories, it recently decided to phase out palm oil for biofuel production and to place 
caps on biofuels produced from other food crops.  
In sum, governance arrangements for the EU and Brazil are both primarily state-driven, and 
sustainability considerations included in these arrangements reflect different state priorities, such as 
environmental concerns (in the case of the EU) and social inclusion and rural development (in the 
case of Brazil). More than Brazil, the EU has, furthermore, relied upon private actors to 
operationalize its meta-standards for sustainability. In Brazil, non-state intermediaries, such as 
agricultural cooperatives, have been given an important role in creation and governance of a biofuel 
market, partly to further social sustainability goals, but these goals have been only partially realized. 
Furthermore, in both cases, the involvement of non-state actors has not resulted in more stringent 
sustainability standards being developed or realized in practice. In Brazil, the social inclusion goals 
have been marginalized to emphasize growing domestic production via ever increasing blending 
targets, while in the EU intense debates about the conflict fuel versus food has resulted in a policy 
shift away from first generation, food-based biofuels. This has potentially reduced the need to 
develop and institutionalize more stringent criteria to address environmental (and social) 
sustainability concerns arising from first generation biofuels.  
6.1.2 EU governing beyond its borders  
 
How has the EU sought to export its notions of sustainability beyond its borders, with particular 
focus on Brazil, and (how) has it succeeded in doing so? 
This question is addressed here by first, identifying key evolving elements of the EU’s sustainability 
meta-standard, and second, assessing how these were taken up or not in the Brazilian context. The 
section discusses how Brazil has reacted to EU sustainability imperatives over time, and whether the 
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EU meta-standard has impacted upon its own domestic or international biofuel policy directions and 
choices.  
In doing so, three key elements of the EU’s sustainability meta-standard and associated policy 
directions and debates are discussed: (a) the social sustainability-related food versus fuel debate that 
launched sustainability discussion within the EU, and how this was reflected (or not) in the EU 
sustainability meta-standard over time; (b) the environmental sustainability debate over which 
biofuel crops were more emission-saving and energy and climate friendly, and incorporating these 
elements into its sustainability meta-standard. The concern relating to indirect land use change and 
impact on high biodiversity areas from growing crops used for biofuels were part of this 
concern/debate; and finally, (c) the shift from first to second and third generation biofuel use on 
both social and environmental sustainability grounds. 
(a) Food versus fuel: As the detailed analysis in chapters 4 and 5 has documented, the EU’s initial 
attempts to create a market in biofuels as a sustainable transport option encountered a contentious 
food vs. fuel sustainability debate, which escalated into a global controversy during the food price 
crisis in 2007-2008. This coincided with the EU proposing obligatory blending targets for biofuels, but 
not yet a clear standard with regard to sustainability. Nevertheless, the food vs. fuel debate 
reinforced the EU’s decision to add sustainability criteria to its emerging biofuel policies. However, 
the stringency of the EU’s sustainability requirements to address this debate has been contested 
from the start. As the chapter shows, the EU debated its meta-standard in response to the food 
versus fuel debate for a while, even as more than 60 different sustainability initiatives emerged in 
the interim to fill the policy gap. Eventually, the EU’s meta-standard does address this debate, by 
limiting use of food crops used for biofuels.  
Has Brazil followed a similar trajectory? Brazil’s response to the food versus fuel debate is, as argued 
in chapter 2, to engage with the debate on a global stage but largely to make the point that this is a 
non-issue in Brazil. The reason offered is because Brazilian sugarcane ethanol production is not 
pushing global or national food prices higher, because it was a long-standing existing domestic 
market, with a well-established calibrated balance between sugar and ethanol production (chapter 
2). As for soy-based biodiesel, the argument was that there is sufficient land available to avoid a food 
versus fuel competition. More generally, in contrast to seeing the use of food crops for biofuels as 
detrimental to social sustainability and food access, the Brazilian approach and policy choices instead 
emphasized that biofuel (biodiesel) production helped small farmers participate in the biofuel chain, 
thereby increasing their sources of income and therefore their purchasing power (including for 
food). 
In conclusion, the food versus fuel debate and its uptake in EU policies compelled Brazil to advertise 
its own policies and practices on a global stage as being a sustainable alternative, compared to 
developments in other countries where biofuel policies impacted food security (e.g. Mexico). The 
issue of biofuels competing with food production was considered a non-issue within Brazil itself.  
(b) Environmental credentials of biofuels: As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the 2008 EU RED 
directive required biofuels to reduce GHG emissions by 35% compared to fossil fuels, in order to 
count towards the EU’s mandatory biofuel quota or to be eligible for financial support schemes. This 
increased to 50% in 2017. In the same directive, it was also stated that raw material from land with 
high biodiversity, including highly biodiverse grasslands, could not count towards the mandatory 
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blending targets. With these requirements, the EU attempted to stimulate the emergence of a global 
energy market in sustainable biofuels. These measures were taken after strong criticism of the 
earlier 2003 Biofuels directive that did not include such requirements and the strong and increasing 
concerns about the potential negative effects of EU biofuel policies. With these requirements, the 
EU attempted to create a biofuels market that was potentially more climate neutral regarding GHG 
emissions. To this end, the EU has created specific calculation tools that determine the extent to 
which certain crops count towards member state obligations relating to GHG emission saving. This 
also influences signals which crops are seen by the EU as preferable for biofuel production.  
As a proof of compliance with its directive, the EU asked for sustainability certification of biomass 
used to produce biofuels. Different voluntary sustainability schemes have since been accredited by 
the EU to certify compliance with requirements of the EU directive. As argued in chapter 5, the EU 
requirements function as a meta-standard and the voluntary certification initiatives can be viewed as 
a form of hybrid governance that, in addition, allow the EU to pursue certain policy objectives that 
might otherwise run afoul of WTO obligations because of their potential negative trade impact 
(chapter 4). By accepting a diversity of different voluntary certification initiatives, the EU argues that 
trade is not limited.  
The reaction in Brazil with regard to the new EU requirements regarding environmental 
considerations was twofold. On the one hand, Brazilian sugarcane has been labelled as one of the 
most efficient and environmentally friendly biofuel crops. Both EU and Brazil agreed on this, and EU 
policies did not change this perspective. On the other hand, the situation regarding production and 
use of soybeans for biodiesel is different. Already before biofuel-related sustainability concerns were 
initiated, worries were raised on the expansion of soybean production into the Brazilian Cerrado, i.e. 
the Brazilian savannah with high biodiversity. The EU is a major importer of soybeans for food and 
animal feed, with no special sustainability requirements. However, for soybean used for biofuels, 
Brazil has been compelled to exclude biodiesel derived from highly biodiverse grasslands. Non-
biofuel related concerns about unsustainable, monoculture production and expansion of soybean 
led early on to the development of a multi-stakeholder initiative in the form of the Round Table for 
Responsible Soy (RTRS), which officially started in 2006 and certified the first producers in 2011. 
From the start, soybeans have been the main feedstock for biodiesel production in Brazil. The global 
market has not played an important role because, as shown in chapter 2, in the “National Program 
for the Production and Use of Biodiesel” (PNPB) Brazil emphasized the national character of its 
policy. This is reflected in the criteria developed by the RTRS. These criteria, however, were not 
compliant with the EU directive. Therefore, after the implementation of the RED directive, a special 
EU annex was created ‘RTRS EU RED’ that made the RTRS compliant with the EU criteria, and the 
RTRS EU RED was reapproved in 2017. It is unclear, however, what percentage of Brazilian soy export 
is used for biodiesel and certified under this scheme. More importantly, it remains possible for Brazil 
to export soybean crops produced from areas that do have a favorable calculation for biofuels and 
comply with EU criteria. As it does so, it can also still produce and export from (high biodiversity or 
other) areas that do not meet the criteria, because the vast bulk of the international commodity 
market does not require certification. The EU policy therefore gave a signal and started the (local) 
debate, but it is very questionable whether it actually changed local practices.  
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In conclusion, the hybrid “tactic” of the EU, to establish its meta-standard on environmental criteria 
and then allow private initiatives to assess compliance, has partly worked but the overall effect has 
been limited, as argued in detail in chapter 5. The EU hybrid system only requires certification of 
biomass used for biofuels. All other usages of non-certified biomass are usable on non-biofuel 
markets. Nevertheless, some of the voluntary certification schemes are used by Brazilian farmers, 
primarily “RTRS EU RED” for soy; and “Bonsucro EU” for sugarcane. Without the EU policy, these 
schemes probably would not have been developed. On a critical note, however, it is questionable 
whether domestic production practices have changed as a result of these schemes. Case studies 
from chapter 3 and 4 indicate support for this conclusion, showing that exported crops that were 
already in compliance with EU criteria became certified for the EU market, while crops from other, 
not certifiable resources and lands, continue to be used within Brazil or for export to countries 
without these requirements. These schemes have thus not necessarily contributed to decreasing 
deforestation or preventing indirect land use change, as the EU policy aimed to do. The demand for 
biofuels has still driven up total demand for agricultural production, thus also the demand for land.  
(c) Shift from first generation to advanced biofuels: The controversies about EU biofuel policies and 
the lack of knowledge about their sustainability has resulted, over the years, in an enormous amount 
of research. The research has been executed in many different fields, varying from technical 
innovations to social sciences. New insights have been gained not only regarding the use of biomass 
for biofuel production, but also regarding calculation methods, interpretations of sustainability, 
production systems, conversion techniques, and social and political consequences (Fehrenbach et 
al., 2008; Ros et al., 2010). This has broadened knowledge about ways to achieve GHG emission 
savings and an energy transition from fossil fuels. One result has been that the EU has moved 
towards ever more stringent regulation of first-generation biofuels and has sought to stimulate a 
move towards second and third generation biofuels, on both social and environmental sustainability 
grounds. The way that the EU has sought to do so is to move away from its “meta-standard” for 
food-based biofuels towards a policy of capping overall use of food-based biofuels.  
In Brazil, an opposite development is taking place. Although here research on biofuel production and 
sustainability considerations has continued, it is primarily focused on improving the efficiency and 
conversion techniques for sugar cane and soy as primary biomass sources. In spite of ongoing 
debates about land expansion, the Brazilian government continues to increase biofuel-fossil fuel 
blending targets. The aim to include family farmers into the biofuel chain to achieve social inclusion, 
so prominent in the early years of biodiesel policies as shown in chapter 3, has been pushed to the 
background in the context of the country’s increasing energy demand. The political turmoil and 
corruption scandals in recent years have also shifted attention away from securing Brazil’s position 
as one of the largest biofuel exporters, an ambition held by President Lula da Silva. Brazil’s financial 
and economic situation has also shifted focus in this and other policy programs away from social 
development issues. 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the EU has sought many different ways to export its 
notions of sustainability beyond its border, including, amongst others, to Brazil. However, its hybrid 
policy approach has had only a limited influence on domestic practices in Brazil, for various reasons. 
First of all, the EU itself has also changed its own perspective regarding biofuels. This is noticeable in 
the shift from “biofuel governance” to “sustainable biofuel governance” from 2003 until the present 
day. While initially, the EU prioritized setting up a meta-standard with environmental sustainability 
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requirements, it has in recent policy steps signaled a move away from this approach towards caps on 
certain food crops from particular regions. It has also chosen to emphasize a switch towards 2nd and 
3rd generation biofuels that are deemed to be more sustainable.  
A success has been that EU sustainability requirements have not, so far, been scrutinized by WTO 
trade rules. In this context, the EU has not had any conflicts with Brazil as a major exporter of 
soybeans. This is an entirely different case with palm oil produced in Indonesia and Malaysia, which 
has become under scrutiny due to the deforestation of lands with high carbon stocks. However, also 
in this case the meta-standard was not sufficient to block this use of palm oil. Rather in a separate 
trajectory, EU negotiators have agreed with palm oil producing countries to phase out the use of 
palm oil in transport fuels from 2030.  
This example, as many others in this thesis, shows that what constitutes “sustainable biofuels” and 
how sustainability can be measured/guaranteed, remains contested and part of continuous, evolving 
debates. There is no shared notion between the EU and other biofuel production regions. 
Sustainability remains contested and context-based, even as the authority to define and 
operationalize sustainability remains largely with states (see also Figure 6.2). In addition, the EU has 
partly undermined the success of its own biofuel policies by only demanding sustainability for 
biomass used for biofuels. Crops that do not meet biofuel sustainability standards can still enter the 
European market for different use purposes. An alternative would have been to develop more 
stringent standards that also apply beyond biofuels to other use categories of the same crop. Yet the 
governance challenges this poses, in the context of international trade rules as well, are also 
significant.  
 
  
Figure 6.2 Converging and diverging EU – Brazilian notions of sustainability 
Source: developed by author 
6.3 Contribution to Knowledge and External Validity 
This thesis contributes to existing knowledge in a variety of ways, with its findings and conclusions 
serving to both extend current insights on biofuel governance in the EU and Brazil, and going beyond 
these two countries to draw lessons for other countries engaged in biofuel production and trade. We 
also address lessons from the biofuel case for other areas of sustainability governance, more 
generally.  
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First, this thesis highlights the importance of a focus on governance of an emerging commodity, such 
as biofuels. An initial motivation to undertake this research was to place governance considerations 
central in this newly emerging sustainability debate, given a biofuels literature that at the time 
tended to be largely technical, with a focus on different typologies of biofuels and their technical 
climate mitigation potential. In emphasizing the need to examine complex governance challenges, 
the thesis also highlighted the need to focus on complex interactions between states and non-state 
actors. In doing so, it has shown that the state remains vitally important in this context, with biofuel 
governance trajectories being primarily state driven. While much global governance literature has 
focused in the last decade on the rise of private governance and the ‘decline of the state’ 
(Compagnon et al., 2012; Falkner, 2003; Mol, 2016; Pattberg and Stripple, 2008; Rosenau, 2007), this 
thesis reaffirms the centrality of the state, at least in this specific context (cf. Mol, 2018). While doing 
so, the thesis has also emphasized and further illustrated the multi-actor context of biofuel 
governance, wherein diverse non-state actors are also influential in shaping governance trajectories.  
A particular focus has been on examining the notion of hybrid governance, wherein the state 
interacts with private actors in novel forms of partnership or collaboration to further its governance 
objectives, including those relating to the evolving and contested notion of sustainability. As this 
thesis reiterates, hybrid sources of authority emerge and can be potentially effective in areas not yet 
extensively addressed via formal, state-led governance, such as, for example, neglected and ignored 
or newly emerging policy domains (Cashore, 2002; Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015). This has been 
reaffirmed in the literature for other policy domains, such as forestry and fisheries (Gulbrandsen, 
2010, 2005a; Lars H. Gulbrandsen, 2008; Schouten and Glasbergen, 2012). As the findings of this 
thesis reveal, hybridity has been an important dynamic in biofuel governance as well. Furthermore, a 
novel finding of this thesis is that a state’s embrace of hybridity can be strategic, rather than 
resulting from state weaknesses. As the thesis shows, the state or public authorities (in this case, the 
EU) make strategic use of the capabilities of other actors, particularly as a means to govern beyond 
their own borders. This both engages with, and departs from, dominant claims in the literature that 
emphasize that hybrid governance is on the rise primarily as a result of a retreat of the state, and/or 
in response to gaps in state-based governance or its ineffectiveness (Bush et al., 2013; Gulbrandsen, 
2005b; L. H. Gulbrandsen, 2008; Mol, 2016; Schouten and Glasbergen, 2012). 
The analysis suggests, rather, that the EU has strategically engaged in a hybrid governance approach 
as a way to operationalize and diffuse beyond its borders its own sustainability meta-standard. In 
Brazil, as well, the state remains central to biofuel governance trajectories, even as it has engaged in 
its own experiments with hybridity, in this case involving agricultural cooperatives to further its own 
particular sustainability goals (relating to social inclusion), with varied results. These latter insights 
are another novel contribution of this thesis, given that agricultural cooperatives in Brazil had been 
little analyzed from a sustainability perspective.  
The thesis findings also reveal that hybridity per se does not lead to higher sustainability standards. 
This is in contrast to earlier claims in the literature about the promise of private and hybrid forms of 
environmental governance and standard-setting as a key means to ‘green the state’ (Eckersley, 
2004). The merits of private governance and their contributions to sustainability have since been 
extensively debated and contested in the literature (Abbott, 2012; Bush et al., 2015; Pattberg and 
Stripple, 2008; Schaller, 2007).The findings of this thesis support a more critical take on hybrid 
approaches. Furthermore, the focus on the strategic use of hybridity to govern beyond state borders 
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is also novel, given extensive early debates in the governance literature about why hybrid 
governance is on the rise; what it might yield in terms of governance effectiveness; and whether and 
to what extent it was filling gaps in state-led governance. The thesis contributes to and extends these 
debates by examining hybridity as an explicit state strategy to govern beyond its borders, and export 
a state-mandated sustainability meta-standard.  
The analysis in the thesis also shows, however, that hybridity as a strategy did not always help the EU 
to govern beyond borders, by successfully exporting its (contested) notion of sustainability to Brazil. 
The findings highlight that hybridization is thus not necessarily the best road to increasing 
sustainability, if the state-mandated “meta-standard” is not stringent. And even if it is, it is still a 
significant challenge to use it to secure a race to the top, rather than to the bottom, in hybrid 
sustainability standard-setting. Advantages of hybridization are particularly hard to realize in the face 
of fragmentation, which can arise if voluntary schemes are forced into mutual competition.  
As such, our findings also engage with the extensive literature on certification as a tool of voluntary, 
state-led environmental governance (Bush et al., 2013; Toonen and Mol, 2016, 2013; Zhang et al., 
2016). The thesis findings highlight that certification is not a substitute for mandatory state-led 
governance, and is rather a tool to execute a state-led meta-standard and its effectiveness depends 
on the stringency of the meta-standard. As such, it also contributes to long-standing debates about 
the interface between trade and environmental standard-setting (Maciel et al., 2015; Oosterveer and 
Mol, 2010), in influential international settings such as the WTO. The analysis of how Brazil and the 
EU engage with the notion of sustainable biofuels within the WTO reveals that debates about how to 
‘classify’ commodities, such as biofuels, are not just about ‘neutral’ scientific assessments, but are 
very much linked to divergent sustainability framings of different states. This has implications for 
how other states, such as the United States or Argentina, might seek to further trade in ‘sustainable’ 
biofuels, and leverage WTO disciplines in seeking to do so. 
The thesis findings are thus also very relevant to understanding biofuel governance challenges in 
contexts other than the EU and Brazil. The findings of Chapter 4, for example, suggest that the global 
debate over sustainable biofuels is as much a battle over governance of national territory as of global 
market access, insofar as it impinges upon domestic production practices. While Brazil has not yet 
adjusted its domestic biofuel policy priorities and practices because of the EU’s environmental 
sustainability requirements, this may vary for smaller developing countries, or those with less 
advanced domestic biofuel production policies.  
Related to this, an increasingly important question becomes whether and how the hybridization of 
authority stimulates or discourages a “greening” of the developmental state in domains such as 
sustainable biofuels. Specific findings in the empirical chapters 2 and 3 suggest that, for countries in 
Africa or Southeast Asia, for example, that might be interested in producing biofuels and creating a 
domestic market, realizing social sustainability goals requires government commitment. It is also 
clear that certification by itself is not a guarantee for sustainable use of natural resources, because if 
biofuels create demand for extra agricultural production, this has implications for a country’s total 
land use. The findings also imply that, since different food crops are suitable for biofuel production, 
so countries have to consider what is most suitable for their farmers and on what scale biomass-
producing crops should be produced.  
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With the above, the findings of the thesis confirm, more generally, the widely noted finding in the 
literature that sustainability remains a contested and context-specific concept (Ackrill and Kay, 2011; 
Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015; Searchinger, 2009).  
6.4 Future Research Outlook  
This thesis focused on the governance of first-generation biofuels derived predominantly from a few 
globally traded commodity crops, such as sugarcane (bioethanol) and soy (diesel), with a focus on 
Brazil and the EU. Key findings about the potential for hybrid governance, certification and state-led 
meta-standard-setting processes to further sustainability in Brazil and the EU, but also in other 
countries beyond these two, have been outlined above.  
One key area of future research relates to continued use of first-generation biofuels in other parts of 
the world, despite persisting sustainability concerns. Thus, examining governance dynamics and 
sustainability definitions in contexts other than the EU and Brazil, and for crops other than soy and 
sugarcanes, remains relevant and timely, for example, in the US, Argentina, as well as countries in 
South-East Asia and Africa.  
Equally important, and increasingly the subject of emerging analyses, is the shift from first to second 
and third-generation biofuels, such as wood pallets, biogas, algae and other sources (Bluemling et al., 
2013; Mol, 2014; Pristupa and Mol, 2015). For future research, it is important to investigate whether 
there are similar or different dynamics, for example, around state-led and hybrid governance 
approaches in these new generations of biofuels. Although sustainability concerns for these second 
and third generation biofuels do not appear to be as critical or prominent, this might change in the 
future when the scale of production increases. A crucial question meriting further research therefore 
is: what trade-offs might this present, and how do the lessons from first-generation biofuels apply 
here, if at all? 
In conclusion, the thesis highlights the continually evolving nature of new sustainability challenges 
and solutions, such as state-created (global) markets in sustainable biofuels. The role of the state 
remains a centrally important dynamic to further investigate. The recent elections in Brazil point to a 
potential shift in power away from the political party that has – until now– promoted biofuels 
domestically and internationally. Preliminary signs point towards a more domestic, inward-looking 
agenda, which is less oriented towards positioning the country on the global stage, whether for 
biofuels or other prominent issues. These developments might influence the role of Brazil as a major 
exporter and international player in the biofuel and more broadly, in sustainable energy debates. 
Following and understanding these developments within Brazil will be important with regard to the 
evolution of the biofuel policy domain, but also for issues such as deforestation in the Amazon and 
climate policy more generally. 
As for the EU, as noted in this thesis, it stands at a crucial cross-road in its climate and energy 
policies, particularly with regard to the role for biofuels herein. EU countries are now debating how 
to implement collectively the 2015 Paris climate Agreement, including through revisiting the 
implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) between 2020-2030. Consequently, future 
biofuel development and governance trajectories remain in flux and fundamentally uncertain in 
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Brazil, the EU and beyond, and will be shaped in the context of broader political developments 
around energy and climate policy. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I List of interviewees 
Date Name  Affiliation Country Additional 
information 
21-02-2008 Director 
Sustainable 
Sourcing 
Development 
Unilever Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands 
Co-interview 
06-10-2008 Researcher  University of Campinas 
(UNICAMP), scientist 
Campinas, Brazil  
27-11-2008 Committee 
secretary 
WTO’s Committee on 
Trade and Environment 
(CTE),  
Geneva, 
Switzerland 
 
Interviewed by student 
26-11-2008 Chief of the Trade, 
Gender and 
Development 
United Nations 
Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) 
Geneva, 
Switzerland 
Interviewed by student 
05-12-2008  Business Unit 
Manager 
Dutch standardization 
institute (NEN) 
Delft, The 
Netherlands 
 
09-12-2008 Policy advisor Oxfam Novib The Hague, The 
Netherlands 
Interviewed by student 
10-12-2008 Deputy Head of 
Unit 
Dispute Settlement 
and Legal Aspects 
of Trade Policy 
Directorate-General for 
Trade European 
Commission 
Brussel Interviewed by student 
15-12-2008 Policy advisor Senter Novem The Hague, The 
Netherlands 
Interviewed by student 
15-12-2008 Policy advisor Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Hague, The 
Netherlands 
Interviewed by student 
17-12-2008 Policy advisor Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the 
Environment  
The Hague, The 
Netherlands 
Interviewed by student 
Div. 
meetings 
2008-2010 
Director Latin 
America and the 
Caribbean  
Wageningen University 
and Research  
Wageningen, 
The 
Netherlands; 
Sao Paulo, Brazil 
 
Div. 
meetings 
2008-2011 
Professor and 
founder of the 
Brazilian Center for 
Biofuels 
University of Sao Paulo Piracicaba, Brazil  
Div. 
meetings 
2008-2011 
Teamleader Natural 
Resources 
Wageningen University 
and Research 
Wageningen, 
The Netherlands 
 
12-01-2009 Manager Energy 
Transitions 
Shell The Hague, The 
Netherlands 
Interviewed by student 
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16-01-2009 Chairmen of the 
Board 
Netherlands Biodiesel 
Industry Association 
(VNBI) 
Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands 
Interviewed by student 
20-01-2009 Policy officer Directorate-General for 
Mobility and Transport of 
the European Commission 
(DG TREN) 
Brussels, 
Belgium 
Interviewed by student 
15-04-2009 Senior policy 
advisor 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs 
The Hague, The 
Netherlands 
Co-interview 
 
11-05-2009 Department Head 
global affairs 
Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the 
Environment  
The Hague, The 
Netherlands 
Co-interview 
 
 
25-06-2009 Counsellor 
(Agriculture) 
 
Permanent 
Representation of The 
Netherlands at the UN 
and other International 
Organizations (e.g. WTO)  
Geneva, 
Switzerland 
 
26-06-2009  Manager 
Environmental 
Affairs 
Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) 
Lausanne, 
Switzerland 
 
 
23-06-2009 Implementation 
manager and chair 
of technical 
working group on 
social issues 
Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) 
& Better Sugarcane 
Initiative (BSI) 
Lausanne, 
Switzerland 
 
24-03-2010 Professor Federal University of Rio 
de Janeiro 
Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 
 
30-03-2010 Scientist University of Campinas 
(UNICAMP) 
Campinas, Brazil  
30-03-2010 Professor 
economics and 
international 
relations 
University of São Paulo 
(USP) 
São Paulo, Brazil  
31-03-2010 Head of 
International Affairs 
Brazilian Sugarcane 
Industry Association 
(UNICA) 
São Paulo, Brazil  
31-03-2010 Sustainability 
manager 
Brazilian Sugarcane 
Industry Association 
(UNICA) 
São Paulo, Brazil  
01-04-2010 Scientist Confederaçao Brasileira 
de Tiro Esportivo (CBTE) 
Campinas, Brazil  
06-04-2010 Consultant Consultant Associação 
Nacional dos Fabricantes 
de Veículos Automotores 
(ANAFAVEA) 
São Paulo, Brazil  
19-03-2011 Associate Director Tecnologico de 
Monterrey, Mexico City 
Campus 
Montreal, 
Canada 
 
26-09-2012 Academic Universiteit van São Paulo 
(USP) 
São Paulo, Brazil  
27-09-2012 Postdoc researcher Wageningen University São Paulo, Brazil  
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and Research 
27-09-2012 Researcher Universiteit van São Paulo 
(USP) 
São Paulo, Brazil  
02-10-2012 Researchers Federal University of 
Bahia (UFBA), PhD 
student 
Salvador, Brazil  
02-10-2012 Professor Federal University of 
Bahia (UFBA) 
Salvador, Brazil  
02-10-2012 Director COOTEBA Salvador, Brazil  
02-10-2012 Technical assistent COOTEBA Salvador, Brazil  
08-10-2012 CEO COOPAF Salvador, Brazil  
10-10-2012 Project Coordinator COOPERUNA Salvador, Brazil  
11-10-2012 Technical 
coordinator 
COOPERACD Salvador, Brazil  
15-10-2012 CEO COOPAF Salvador, Brazil  
18-10-2012 Coordinator for 
Family Agriculture 
COOMAF Barreiras, Brazil  
23-10-2012 Director COOTRASB Itubera, Brazil  
23-10-2012 CEO COOTRASB Itubera, Brazil  
24-10-2012 2nd hand of the 
president 
COOFAVA Valença, Brazil  
25-10-2012 CEO COOMTRATA Nazaré, Brazil  
25-10-2012 Two families (2 
men, 6 women), 
names unknown 
COOMTRATA, cooperative 
members 
Nazaré, Brazil  
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Appendix II Attended meetings and conferences 
 
Date Conference/meeting title  Organized by Country Role 
06-10-2008 Biofuels and sustainability: 
Brazilian perspectives 
Shell The 
Netherlands 
Observer 
03-07-2009 
 
Biofuel workshop Research School for 
Resource Studies for 
Development (CERES) 
The 
Netherlands 
Participant 
24-02-2010 - 
26-02-2010 
Energy transitions in an 
interdependent world: 
what and where are the future 
social science research agendas? 
Sussex Energy Group, 
Science and Technology 
Policy Research 
United 
Kingdom 
Presenter 
25-05-2010 NGO meeting - biofuels  Biomass Sustainability 
Committee (Dorette 
Corbey) 
The 
Netherlands 
Observer 
10-11-2010 - 
12-11-2010 
Towards a New Knowledge for 
Scale Sensitive Governance of 
Complex Systems 
Scaling and Governance 
network, Wageningen 
University 
The 
Netherlands 
Presenter 
29-11-2010 - 
30-11-2010 
Sustainable Biomass for 
European Energy Conference 
Flemish Institute for 
Technological Research 
(VITO) 
Belgium Participant 
16-02-2011 Good Governance of Land and 
Natural Resources – Balancing 
Global and Local Interests 
Centre for Development 
Innovation (CDI) 
The 
Netherlands 
Presenter 
16-03-2011 - 
19-03-2011 
Global Governance: Political 
Authority in Transition 
International Studies 
Association (ISA) 
Canada Presenter 
22-03-2012 - 
24-03-2012 
Energy and Society Workshop Institute of Social Sciences 
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Appendix III Interview guidelines and questionnaires  
 
Example of semi-structured guide for chapter 2 
This is an example of a semi-structured questionnaire used during a field visit to Brazil between 
March 15, 2010 – April 9, 2010. The respondents varied from: policy makers, ethanol and biodiesel 
producers, sugarcane and vegetable oil farmers, fuel consumers and car industry representatives. 
N.B. a selection of questions was made for each interviewee, dependent on background and 
expertise. The insights of these exploratory interviews were used as background information for 
chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 
 
1. Ethanol 
 
a. Contemporary situation 
 
o How would you define the contemporary bio ethanol sector in Brazil? 
o What do you expect for the future? 
 
b. Key historical events 
 
o Can you describe important positive events in the development of the ethanol sector in 
Brazil? How did these moments/events impact the sector? 
o Can you describe important negative events in the development of the ethanol sector in 
Brazil? How did these moments/events impact the sector? 
 
c. Policy, Polity and Politics 
 
o Which steering tools are and have been used to stimulate ethanol production? 
o What are the key objectives of ethanol policies? 
o Do the political steering instruments fit the objectives of ethanol policies? 
 
o Who are the most important actors/stakeholders/players in the ethanol industry? 
o Who were, in your opinion, the key instigators of bio-ethanol policies?  
o Who benefits most from these policies? In what way? Has this changed over time? 
 
o Which organisations/institutions are involved? 
o Has this changed in the different stages of the ethanol policies? 
o What is the impact of the contemporary global interest for the organisation of the market? 
 
 
d. Transmission or transition 
 
o Within the ethanol program 
o From ethanol to biodiesel 
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2. Biodiesel 
 
a. Contemporary situation 
 
o How would you define the contemporary biodiesel sector in Brazil? 
o What do you expect for the future? 
 
 
b. Key historical events 
 
o Can you describe important positive events in the development of the biodiesel sector in 
Brazil? How did these moments/events impact the sector? 
o Can you describe important negative events in the development of the biodiesel sector in 
Brazil? How did these moments/events impact the sector? 
 
 
c. Policy, Polity and Politics 
 
o Which steering tools are and have been used to stimulate biodiesel production? 
o What are the key objectives of biodiesel policies? 
o Do the political steering instruments fit the objectives of biodiesel policies? 
 
o Who are the most important actors/stakeholders/players in the biodiesel industry? 
o Who were, in your opinion, the key instigators of biodiesel policies?  
o Who benefits most from these policies? In what way? Has this changed over time? 
 
o Which organisations/institutions are involved? 
o Has this changed in the different stages of the biodiesel policies? 
o What is the impact of the contemporary global interest for the organisation of the market? 
 
 
d. Transmission or transition 
 
o Within the biodiesel program 
o From ethanol to biodiesel 
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Example of semi-structured guide for chapter 3 
This is an example of a semi-structured questionnaire used during a field visit to Brazil between 
September 25, 2012 –November, 8 2012. Goal of this visit was to increase the understanding of 
cooperatives involved in the biodiesel projects in Bahia. The collected information has been used for 
chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 
Interviews with COOPERATIVES 
COOP:  ________________________________________________ 
Name:  ________________________________________________ 
Position:  ________________________________________________ 
E-mail:   ________________________________________________ 
Phone:   ________________________________________________ 
Adress:  ________________________________________________ 
Website: ______________________________________________/ N 
Anonymous Y / N 
General information (COOPs) 
# Members  _______________ Represent size in Ha  _________ 
# classified FF  _______________ Represent size in Ha  _________ 
COOP founded in _______________ 
Who started the COOP (bit of history):___________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Tell a bit more about type of COOP, just agricultural or also other objectives/sectors: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
(ask for available document of start of COOP  Y / N ) 
Who are in the direction of COOP?  
 ___________________________________________ 
Is the direction rotated?     Y / N How 
often:____________________________ 
How can FF become a member of the COOP?
 ___________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Is there a membership fee?  Y / N How much: 
_________________________________ 
Are there membership obligations?  Explain: 
__________________________________________ 
 
Is there a difference between FF and other members? Explain: _______________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Can you give a typology of the FF that participate in the PNPB? ______________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________(land size, family, education, crop varieation, involvement in COOP, etc.) 
 
PNPB & Family Farming 
COOP particpates in PNPB  Y / N since: _______ 
How, by whom, when are decisoins made about participation in PNPB_________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Does COOP have SFS    Y / N since: _______  how long is it valid: 
_______________ 
Do you think the SFS helps to improve the with the social inclusion of FF? Explain: _______________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you actively try to increase the amount of FF in PNPB? Explain:____________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
To get SFS, the COOP needs FF with DAP.  Who gives DAP in your region: 
__________________  
Are there any problems with DAP? Explain: ______________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Are there problems with DAP and FF with regard to landtitles? Explain: ________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Are Government organisations are involved with regard to PNPB/SFS? Which? How? 
_____________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you collaborate with other organisations/COOPS in PNPB, which and how: __________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Family farming & Technical assistence 
With which crops does your COOPerative participates in the PNPB? 
Castor  Y / N 
Sunflower Y / N 
Palm oil Y / N 
Others:  ______________________________________________________________ 
Harvest Crops % that comes of FF #ha Main buyer 
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2007/8     
2008/9     
2009/10     
2010/11     
2011/12      
2012/13      
Can you explain any changes in the table above? _________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
What happens with the raw material? Describe process from harvest to reception of money: ________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Are there problems with biodiesel production? Explain: _____________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
How do FF receive their money from the PNPB? __________________________________________ 
Do FF need loans? For what? From whom? ______________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Does COOP have own crushing machine? Y / N  Why? 
_______________________________ 
Does COOP have storage facilities?  Y / N  Why? 
_______________________________ 
Who pays for cost of seeds  
 ___________________________________________ 
Who pays for cost of fertilizers  
 ___________________________________________ 
Who pays for cost of transport of raw material? 
 _____________________________________ 
Do FF receive technical assistence as part of PNPB Y / N 
Does the COOP provide TA?    Y / N 
Do other organisations also provide TA?   Y / N Which: 
________________________ 
What kind of technical assistence do you provide? _________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Who are the people that give technical support for biodiesel crops? ___________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
How often TA of COOP visits FF _______________week / month / year 
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Who pays for cost of TA  _________________________________________________ 
Does the TA assistence result in new farming pracitces? Example? ___________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Is the productivity of these crops improving? What are contraints or helping factors? ______________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________(land / labour / availability of seeds / others) 
Is TA satisfactory in your opinion? Why? ________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Petrobras (Pbio) / other buyers 
 
Do you work with Petrobras/Pbio  Y / N since: _______ 
If NO, why not: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
If YES: What do you sell to Pbio: raw material / vegetable oil / other; __________________________ 
Who negotiates the contract: __________________________________________________________ 
What is the duration of the contract: ____________________________________________________ 
Who determines prices paid for in contract with Pbio: 
_______________________________________ 
Is quantity predefined?  Y/ N 
What happens if the production is to low? ________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Who finances investments?    
 ______________________________ 
Is Petrobras responsible for funding your COOPerative? Y/ N  
Which part of your income is dependent on Petrobras?   _____________________________ 
What will happen if support by Petrobras will stop? 
 ______________________________ 
Do you trust the strategy Petrobras or would you prefer to sell to others too? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
What are in your eyes the advantages/disadvantages of Pbio? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
What do you think will happen in the future with the involvement of Petrobras in the PNPB?  
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_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Other contracts 
Besides Pbio, do you sell the oil crops to other buyers?    Y / N 
To whom do you prefer to sell? Why? ___________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
What kind of contracts?   
 _________________________________________________ 
Who negotiates the contract:  
 _________________________________________________ 
Who determines prices paid for:  
 _________________________________________________ 
For how many years:   
 _________________________________________________ 
Is quantity predefined?   Y/ N 
Who finances investments? 
 _________________________________________________ 
Does SFS stamp help with the making of contracts with industry? Y / N 
Who gives better price:   Petrobras / local market / international market / others: _____ 
Expectations 
Are FF benefitting from the PN/PB? Explain: _____________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you thinkt that as a result of PNPB, FF have a better income? Explain: ______________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Is the decision-making process of COOPS different now FF can participate in PNPB? Explain: 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
How do you define social inclusion? Explain: _____________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you think PNPB and SFS are useful tools to stimulate social inclusion? Explain: _______________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
How do you see the future of FF? Explain: _______________________________________________ 
How do you see the future of the PNPB? Explain: _________________________________________ 
What are main problems/constraints for COOPS in PNPB? Explain: ___________________________ 
Do you think that the biodiesel market development will increase / decrease in the future? Explain: 
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_________________________________________________________________________________ 
What could be improved? 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Other information 
Do  you have background documents or other info available?  Y / N 
What kind: ________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you have contact information about:  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________
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Summary 
This thesis examines the global governance of sustainable biofuels, with a specific focus on Brazil and 
the European Union (EU) as major players in the production, trade and use of first-generation liquid 
biofuels. Biofuels are solid, liquid or gas fuels derived from biomass sources such as starch, sugars, 
fat, wood, or waste. So-called first generation liquid biofuels are those derived either from sugar or 
starch from food crops such as sugarcane or corn, which are converted to bioethanol; or from 
vegetable oils (soy, rapeseed, palm) or animal fats, which are converted to biodiesel. This thesis 
focuses on first-generation liquid biofuels because they are produced on a large scale for transport 
fuel and are under intense scrutiny with regard to sustainability and potential competition with food 
security.  
The EU, one of the largest markets for biofuels, is leading in the attempt to promote global trade in 
“sustainable” biofuels. Brazil, as a leading producer and strong proponent of a global biofuels market 
and a key exporter to the EU, has to engage with the EU sustainability imperatives that now 
dominate global biofuel trade and governance debates. While Brazil is often believed to be able to 
dictate biofuel developments within its borders, its authority to continue to do so, given a rapidly 
evolving global biofuel trade and governance context, is becoming less evident and needs to be 
examined.  
Biofuels have been on the national governance agenda of some countries since the 1970s, but 
emerged on the global governance agenda in the late 1990s, in response to the twin challenges of 
the search for energy security and addressing climate change. Biofuel policies are being 
implemented by countries across the globe with the ambition to (partly) replace fossil fuels for 
transport with renewable alternatives. A vast conglomerate of state and non-state initiatives are 
involved in the multilevel governance of biofuels over the past few years. Governing biofuels is thus 
a complex multifaceted (global) governance challenge, with multiple sectors, multiple actors, and 
multiples sites of governance now emerging and interacting, and divergent notions of sustainability 
deployed herein. In this context, it is important to understand how governance of biofuels has been 
approached, and how existing approaches to sustainability have fared, and whose notion of 
sustainability is shaping global biofuel trade and markets.  
This thesis thus analyses evolving biofuel governance arrangements in Brazil and the EU and the 
interactions between them, including diverse notions of sustainability contained herein. A central 
concern is whether, and to what extent, the EU has succeeded in exporting its own notions of 
sustainability beyond its borders, in seeking to create a global market for sustainable biofuels.  
Through detailed analysis in four empirical chapters (all published), the thesis answers two cross-
cutting research questions:  
 How have biofuels been governed in the EU and Brazil over time, and what (conflicting or 
converging) notions of sustainability are embodied in these evolving governance 
arrangements? 
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 How has the EU sought to export its notions of sustainability beyond its borders, with 
particular focus on Brazil, and (how) has it succeeded in doing so? 
Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of bioethanol and biodiesel policies and governance 
arrangements in Brazil, including the role of key actors. In doing so, it explains how biofuels in Brazil 
have been governed over time, including evolving understandings of sustainability therein. The 
chapter finds that ethanol-focused governance arrangements focused primarily on energy security 
rather than sustainability concerns. In contrast, biodiesel governance initially was also concerned 
with (social) sustainability, particularly questions of rural development and social inclusion of small 
farmers in biodiesel production. Over time, however, the analysis shows that both types of biofuels 
are being governed to further agricultural and energy goals, rather than social sustainability 
objectives. This is illustrated by the growing focus on increasing blending targets for biodiesel, rather 
than on realizing social inclusion and rural development goals. These policy objectives (and their 
implementation) are also driven primarily by domestic imperatives, rather than export 
considerations.  
Chapter 3 builds on the historical tracing of biofuel governance arrangements in Brazil to analyse the 
social inclusion component of Brazilian biodiesel policies. The chapter focuses on the 2004 biodiesel 
policy and its two main objectives: to advance biodiesel as a transportation fuel and to foster social 
inclusion of family farmers through participation in the biodiesel chain. The chapter analyzes the 
extent to which cooperatives are involved in integrating family farmers into the biodiesel chain and 
what this means for the social sustainability of biodiesel, taking the northeast state of Bahia as a case 
study area. The findings show that through the biodiesel policy, cooperatives—until then a marginal 
phenomenon in northern Brazil—increased their membership, were empowered, and contributed to 
the economic development of a significant group of family farmers. However, these family farmers 
have not been substantially included in the biodiesel production chain itself. The chapter reveals the 
complexity of realizing social sustainability goals in biofuel governance. It shows that, although 
agricultural cooperatives can serve as intermediaries to facilitate family farmer inclusion in 
sustainable production, it is questionable whether a focus on producing specific quantities of global 
commodities, such as biofuels, is a suitable development trajectory for family farmers.  
Chapter 4 moves to consider the global context for Brazilian biofuel governance and policies. It 
explores how global demand for biofuels has been stimulated by European Union policies that 
promote biofuels as a potential sustainable source of transport fuel, and strategies used by the EU to 
export its evolving notions of sustainability beyond its own borders. The chapter analyzes how Brazil 
has navigated an evolving global governance context for sustainable biofuels, in particular how it has 
responded to EU biofuel sustainability imperatives. It focuses specifically on analyzing how these 
debates have played out in the context of World Trade Organization (WTO) disciplines governing 
trade in commodities such as biofuels. The chapter finds that while Brazil emphasizes the social and 
developmental objectives of its biofuel policies in a domestic context, it frames itself globally as a 
leading producer of (environmentally) sustainable biofuels. In so doing, it navigates intersecting 
spheres of governance authority, such as the EU and the WTO, in a manner that promotes its own 
biofuel policy agenda, partly by seeking to reframe “sustainability” debates internationally to reflect 
its developmental agenda.  
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Chapter 5 shifts to analysing in detail how biofuel governance arrangements have evolved in the EU 
over time, and how understandings of sustainable biofuels have evolved within these arrangements. 
The chapter analyses a decade of biofuel policy making in the EU, with a focus on the nature and 
functioning of the EU’s novel hybrid (public-private) biofuel governance arrangements, and how 
notions of sustainability have been negotiated and established herein. The EU’s hybrid governance 
approach has been implemented since 2009, involving a meta-standard established by the EU and 
specific sustainability requirements developed by private and hybrid actors to comply with the meta-
standard. The expectation underpinning a hybrid governance approach was that private initiatives 
would add their own additional sustainability objectives to the mandatory EU meta-standard, and 
hence lead to greater sustainability in biofuels production, both internally within and external to the 
EU. The chapter finds that instead of yielding an increasingly stringent set of sustainability standards, 
this hybrid approach is characterized by contested notions of sustainability, with a trend towards less 
ambitious or lowest common denominator industry-led standards. At the same time, while the EU 
has continuously increased the share of biofuels and renewable energies and the biomass imports in 
its transport policies, it has recently become more cautious with regard to potential negative side-
effects of stimulating biofuel production, in particular, indirect land use change (ILUC) and food price 
increases in developing countries. Its biofuel policy directions are therefore yet again being adjusted 
and are currently at a critical juncture. 
In concluding, Chapter 6 combines the insights of the four empirical chapters in order to answer the 
main research questions. It sums up how biofuels have been governed in the EU and Brazil over time, 
and what notions of sustainability are embodied in these evolving governance arrangements. It also 
addresses how the EU has sought to export its notions of sustainability beyond its borders and 
whether it has succeeded in doing so.  
The thesis finds that governance arrangements for the EU and Brazil are both primarily state-driven, 
and sustainability considerations included in these arrangements reflect state priorities, such as 
environmental concerns (in the case of the EU) and social inclusion and rural development (in the 
case of Brazil). In Brazil, biofuel governance has been characterized by a strong role for the state, 
without much governance authority transferred to non-state actors. The EU has relied more upon 
private actors to operationalize its meta-standards for sustainability. EU’s novel public-private hybrid 
governance approach has resulted in a mandatory meta-standard for sustainability, but this meta-
standard is a minimum floor rather than a set of increasingly ambitious sustainability requirements.  
In Brazil, while non-state intermediaries, such as agricultural cooperatives, have been given an 
important role in creation and governance of a biofuel market, partly to further social sustainability 
goals, these have been only partially realized. Furthermore, in both cases, the involvement of non-
state actors has not resulted in more stringent sustainability standards being developed or realized in 
practice.  
The thesis findings show, furthermore, that the EU has sought many different ways to export its 
notions of sustainability beyond its borders, including, amongst others, to Brazil. However, its hybrid 
policy approach has had only a limited influence on domestic practices within Brazil. In concluding, 
the thesis highlights how persisting controversies over sustainability have resulted in the EU moving 
towards ever more stringent regulation of first-generation biofuels, even as the opposite dynamic 
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can be observed in Brazil. The analysis reveals, more broadly, that what constitutes “sustainable 
biofuels” and how sustainability can be furthered remains subject to continuous debate. 
Sustainability is contested and context-based, even as the authority to define and operationalize it 
continues to lie largely with states. 
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